AFRICA and ASIA
Entanglements in Past and Present
: Bridging History and Development Studies

Conference Proceedings

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Editor’s Preface

Our eyes are now witnessing that Africa’s economic growth has currently been faster than the world average since 2000, showing relative buoyancy during a period of economic recession and groundbreaking events on the continent have taken place in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in recent times from the AU’s adoption of its Agenda 2063 to the Conference on Financing For Development. These new developments seem to symbolize what many termed “Africa’s time”. Turning our eyes to Japan, “slow but for the long term” is the conventional expression in relation to Japanese engagement in Africa. However, the inaugural Africa-Japan Business and Investment Forum took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in September 2015, and this event is recognized as a lead-up to TICAD VI, which will take place late August 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya.

Another view opened up before us is that today the centre of gravity of the world political economy is moving toward Asia, and this movement had a profound effect on Africa. The rise of East and South Asia in general and China and India in particular is closely connected to the recent course of economic and political development in Africa. African interest in Asian models and Asian interest in African resources and potential leads to deeper ties between the two regions and building reciprocal relations.

In this backdrop this conference was organized in order to enlarge and deepen the scope of the study of Africa-Asia relations by addressing facets of those interactions that have been so far mostly neglected in contemporary scholarship. We aim to offer historically contextualized insights about the various ways in which the African and Asian regions and studies engage with each other and explore those engagements from a variety of theoretical standpoints and frameworks. The conference draws on the expertise of Asianists and Africanists in direct dialogue, exploring histories, dynamics, and outflows of social interaction between the two regions and studies.

This conference also aimed to review recent research in history and development studies and explore the methodological and conceptual challenges and the variety of topics they present. We aimed to discuss reciprocal benefits that accrue from engagements between disciplines, between historians and developmentalists, where they cooperate to analyze development process and social change in Africa and Asia.

On 31 July and 1 August, 2015, prominent scholars from Asian and African countries assembled at Kansai University in Osaka, to discuss about the past and present of Afro-Asian relationship in general and Japan-Africa relations in particular, the history of labour, industrialization and development path of African economies from comparative perspective. It is enormously
effective that all the participants presented their latest academic findings and discussed many themes that fall broadly within the domain of history and development studies; serious attention was paid to interconnectedness between Africa and Asia below the state level, and rich use of such a variety of methodologies as field research, narrative exploration, archival studies and so on.

The conference had six sessions. The papers of the first session shed light on African and Asian migration on the Indian Ocean and examined the role of diaspora factor in Afro-Asian relations. In the second session much was discussed about trade unionism as a salient part of civil society and in the success of democratic movements, the movement of people to alien places seeking employment in case of Ethiopian female domestic workers, the role of trade unions in the history of Kenya, and development in small scale mining sectors in Zimbabwe. The third and fourth session strongly focused on industrialization process in Southern African countries such as Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), Botswana and examined the function of state and entrepreneurship in economic development in South Africa. The fifth session shed light on the way how to manage the indigenous knowledge system, biodiversity and intellectual property rights in the process of economic development and environment change from the viewpoint of knowledge economy. The final session discussed the past and present of TICAD process and examined new TICAD framework based on Development Cooperation Charter issued by Japanese Cabinet in February 2015 from the perspective of Japan-Africa relations in particular and Afro-Asian relations in general. Regrettably some papers presented in the conference cannot be complied in this proceedings for reasons beyond one’s control. This editor highly appreciates extraordinary paper presenter, Professor Maitseo Blaane (University of Botswana), Professor Nathaniel Agola (Doshisha University), Dr. Showers Mawowa (University of Pretoria), and Professor Om Prakash (Delhi School of Economics, Visiting Scholar of Kansai University). Also sincere gratitude goes to Ms. Naoko Tsuyama (Visiting Professor of Kansai University) and Dr. Mohamed Omer Abdin (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies), whose comments were of significance to beef up our discussion.

This conference is the third one on the topic of “Africa and Asia Entanglements in Past and Present”. The first conference was hosted by Stellenbosch University, South Africa, on November 4-5, 2013, and the second one was held at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, on July 26-27, 2014. The great dedication of organizers of the two prior pathbreaking gatherings, Professor Scarlett Cornelissen and Professor Yoichi Mine, is highly appreciable.

This meeting of the international conference and the publication of the conference proceedings
is not possible without the assistance of many people. This conference was approved by the Board of Kansai University and supported by Kansai University Research & Education Promotion Fund. Firstly this editor is very much grateful to Professor Harushige Kusumi, President of Kansai University and Professor Kohei Yoshinaga, Dean of the Faculty of Economics, who made time for giving welcoming address. Secondly this conference was prepared by an international team of professors who endeavor to bring it successfully. The dedication of those professors and graduate students, specifically Professor Scarlett Cornelissen of Stellenbosch University, Professor Yoichi Mine of Doshisha University, Professor Manoj Shrestha of Konan University, Professor Mika Yamana, Professor Michiko Kitaba, Professor Yoshitaka Shinkuma, Professor Kenta Goto of Kansai University, Mr. Takumi Okamoto, Ms. Atsuko Munemura, Ms. Haruka Maruyama, Mr. Gao Sog, Mr. Wan Jiawei, Ms. Rou Ontaku of graduate students of Kansai University are deeply appreciated by all the participants.

Finally as the conference convenor and editor of the proceedings, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all participants from Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world.

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Part 1

African Migration in the Indian Ocean
1
Africans in the Early Twentieth Century Persian Gulf

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The history of Africans outside of Africa has been one of the neglected issues in the historiographies on the Indian Ocean World studies for so long time. Some exceptions are found in the studies of Africans in South Asia, but most of them are ethnographical studies and do not investigate its history so much.¹ In addition, these focus on some certain settlements in particular location and miss the connection to other regions. On the other hand, there are plenty of studies on migration history, but these do not focus on Africans. It is only around the beginning of the twenty-first century when pioneer studies on the history of Africa outside of Africa in the Indian Ocean World have come out. A large pushing factor for this trend is the concept of African diaspora which emerged and has been developing mostly in the Atlantic studies. With help of results in the Atlantic studies, Shihan de Silva Jayasuria, Richard Pankhurst, Edward A. Alpers and some other scholars have produced pioneer works on African diaspora in the Indian Ocean World, and not a few scholars join this trend later and now a once-hidden aspect of Indian Ocean World history is explored.²

To explore African diaspora in the Indian Ocean has several difficulties. The chronic problem which scholars in this field have to face is shortness of data and source. One striking example is estimation of trade volume. For example, as to the Atlantic slave trade, well-known “voyages database” (http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/index.faces) covers 35,000 separate slaving voyages conducted in the Atlantic Ocean during the period between 1514 and 1866,³ which contributes a lot to those who estimate the trade volume. On the other hand, as to the Indian Ocean slave trade, there

is no such records for exploring trade volume. Thus, scholars need to rely on so-called “gestimation” with limited sources. Scholars on African diaspora in the Indian Ocean tend to incline descriptive materials and unveil individual experience. The problem of this approach is that we cannot make sure how much such individual experiences represent general experience. Most probably, in order to solve this problem we need to collect such individual cases and bring together to draw much bigger picture. In other words, to draw large picture of African diaspora, we need to build up new method dealing with individual experiences.

Source

Nonetheless, if we focus on some particular area and particular date, we can obtain a certain mass of slave narratives; that is the first half of the twentieth century Persian Gulf, and also it is the focus of this paper. My current on-going project is to collect these slave narratives from British archives and compile a dataset, then analyse them in qualitative way. And this paper particularly focuses on African in the dataset and analyse some characteristic features. For details of these narratives, I already read and published at several occasions, thus, I do not go into details here, but briefly, these were recorded by British officials in order to issue manumission certificates. We can regard these narratives represent quite accurate their experiences, because British representatives were highly required detailed examination of what slave stated. Principal attitude of British officers in the Persian Gulf was not to involve internal affairs as much as possible and slavery was regarded as one of such internal affairs and any of sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf did not agree to abolish slavery as late as the 1930s. Thus, they could not issue manumission certificate only because these applicants claimed that they were slaves. Only the way to issue manumission certificate without interfering “internal affairs” was to claim that given slave was a subject of slave dealings, because most of sheikhdoms agreed to abolish slave trade. Thus, British officers needed to carefully examine statements given by applicants and in many cases, they gathered further information from third party to ensure the accuracy of statements and prove that particular applicant was a subject of slave dealings, more particularly those across the boundaries of sheikhdoms. Not a few applications were rejected because of false statements.

There are several studies to deal with slave narratives. However, in general it is difficult to grasp the entire view of slavery or slave trade from these studies. They focus on some particular narratives and describe in details as possible. Methodologically these studies relying on slave narratives seek opposite direction to those which try to show the entire view of slavery or slave trade. Scholars try to capture much broader dynamics of slavery and slave trade beyond individual case, on the contrary, tend to omit perspective to the details of individual cases. Methodological question in my mind is at which standpoint we can grasp both micro and macro issues. In other words, is it possible to sketch broader view of slavery and slave trade with using individual narratives of slaves?

It is important to notice that those slaves who left their narratives will have been a part of the entire bonded population in the Persian Gulf.

Following this introduction, this paper examines the dataset from several angles including

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Strange Gap

Graph 1 shows the proportion of “Africa” as “place of origin”. Most of testimonies show where they come from and I pick up these and calculate as “place of origin”. In this graph, Africa shares 13%. The breakdown is shown in Map 1. Indeed, some testimonies mention even the name of village where they came from, while others just state “Abyssinia” for example. The largest region of origin is East African and Ethiopia follows if we sort out these cases according to wider region.

Some might feel that 13% occupancy of Africans among bonded population in the first half of the twentieth century Persian Gulf is a bit lower than expectation. However, we can obtain totally different result from “appearance”. Graph 2 shows the result and here we can find out Africans occupy more than half of the entire entries. “Appearance” here include either applicant’s self-assessment such as “I am Swahili” or officers’ impression which often is able to find out in the documents such as “he is Swahili”. Due to the nature of these reports as is mentioned in earlier part of this paper, we can trust at high degree British officers’ impression. In this graph, we can observe much larger African occupancy than previous slide based on place of origin.

How we can understand this gap between Graph 1 and Graph 2? This is the gap between those who were physically from Africa and those who (were) identified themselves with Africans. The clue will be found in Graph 3 which shows breakdown of “Africans” according to “Appearance”; those who categorised as “mix” (“mixed population”) occupy 12%. In most of cases, statements confirm that they were “mixed” between either “habshi” or “siddi” and Arabs. Particular ethnic groups shown in Graph 3 such as “Swahili”, “Sudan”, “Somali”, “Abyssinian” and “Nubia” are applied to those who were born in Africa. That means that “mix” and just simply “African” as well as “African origin” indicate that these were born outside of Africa, in most of cases, born in the Persian Gulf. If we calculate those who are supposed to have been born outside of Africa, it exceeds 50%. In addition, even those categorised into “Baluchi” in Graph 2 we need to deal with carefully, since we can find out another “mixed population” between Africans and Baluchi among them.

In other words, we have certain amount of locally born “Africans” in the dataset. An interesting fact from dataset is shown in Graph 4. 147 out of 333 Africans whose birth year can be identified in their statements were born after 1902. This is important year for African diaspora in the Persian Gulf; over 100 slaving ships were captured off Mozambique by the Portuguese force when the Portuguese governor was cracking down on the purchase of slaves by so-called northern Arabs.5 As Matthew S. Hopper argues, it alone did not end Indian Ocean slave trade from East Africa; however, this is definitely one important factor to push slave trade towards the end.6 Behnez A. Mirzai argues that this incident made the attention of slave traders towards Makran as alternative slave ground.7 It is certain that after this incident slave ground to fulfill the demand in the Persian Gulf shifted from East Africa towards the Persian Gulf itself.

If so, then following question is the mechanism of reproduction of African population in the Persian Gulf.

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Graph 1. Proportion of “Africa” according to “Place of Origin”. n=1348

Map 1. The place of origin in Africa sorted by large region
Graph 2. Proportion of “Africans” according to “Appearance”. n=412

Graph 3. Breakdown of “Africans” in “Appearance”. n=270

Graph 4. Birth year of “Africans”. n=331
Local Reproduction and Preference of African Slaves

In fact, mechanism of reproduction in details is largely obscure. We do not have documents written by slave themselves on this issue and also we do not have third party observation such as western travelogues mentioning it. As I already mentioned, the main concern of recording of these narratives is to obtain enough evidence to issue manumission certificate, thus the mechanism of reproduction is rarely shown in these narratives.

The term “reproduction” may bring misunderstanding as if master forced slaves to produce their children as existed in the Atlantic cases. It is not clear about the intension of masters; however, what is clear is we can find out in the testimonies not a few slaves raised the issue of marriage as a reason to abscond from their masters. For example, Salmah bint Musa who was 27 years old at the time of recording left her statement as follows;

He also did not get me married though I attained the matrimonial age… Under these circumstances, I request that I may be granted a manumission certificate so that I may live a free life.  

What is certain is that demand of marriage existed among slaves. In many cases, slaves’ marriage was arranged by their master. No statement claims that they wanted to marry with free status. In this point, what is interesting is comparison between Graph 5 and Graph 6. Graph 5 is breakdown of marriage among Africans while Graph 6 is that of Baluchi. Baluchi who are certainly better to be recognised as Africans are counted as Africans and drawn from Baluchi. What is clear is that inter-slave marriage among Africans is twice larger than that of Baluchi. According to the principle of Islam, slave wives who bear child of free masters entitle freedom and their child also obtains free status. It is not certain how much masters intended to reproduce slave population through inter-slave marriage, however, taking the above-mentioned principle into consideration, inter-slave marriage was the way to produce slave population while free-slave marriage was not.

Why did masters prefer African slaves? One remarkable statement was produced by Khamis bin Muhammad. He was Makrani and was born of free-born parents. But when he was seven years old, he was kidnapped and taken to Dubai. Since then, he lived as slave, but in 1937, he fled away from his master who did not provide “sufficient food and clothing” and rushed into British Political Agent in Bahrain. What is remarkable in his statement is that in 1928 he was taken to Dubai by his master and his master tried to sell him, but eventually no one bought. According to Khamis, it is because “I did not look like a negro”.  

Unfortunately, this dataset could not provide sufficient answer to the question above. To answer the question, it is required different sources which enable us to explore racial notions of master’s side. However, the following numbers from the dataset will provide some hint for future studies. That is, 64.84% of African males engaged in pearl fishery while 45.85% of the rest of all male applicants in the dataset engaged in the same industry. There is no evidence to show that African pearl divers had more accessibility to British officers than pearl divers in different races. Needless to say, pearl fishery was the main industry in the early twentieth century Persian Gulf. Thus, one possibility of African preference as slave in local context relates to the local notion that physical strength of Africans is suited for pearl fishery.

8 OIOC IOR R/15/1/206/67.  
9 OIOC IOR/R/15/1/206/366.
Conclusion

Due to available sources, African diaspora history in the Indian Ocean requires different approach from the Atlantic counterpart. Slave narratives would be one of the important sources in this field. If so, the question is how we can use these sources. This leads us to the further question how we can connect individual experience to broader picture of African diaspora in this ocean. The dataset which I rely on in this paper has huge potential in terms of its size and reliability of testimonies. A significant feature of African population found in the dataset is large reproduction of the African bonded population in the Persian Gulf. While slave import from Africa ceased, local African population replaced. We need to admit that there was strong preference of African slaves in this region. The background of this preference is remained as a future question. However, the dataset shows high proportion of African pearl diver. It might be fair suspect that local understanding of physical strength of Africans which is suitable for pearl fishery would have been one factor to push this tendency. In order to prove this, it is required some other new sources.
2
Indian Ocean African Migrants: Recognition and Development

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Introduction

Migration streams, points of origin and destination and Asians with a cultural memory that connects them to Africa have concerned me for several years. African migrants have lived in Asia for hundreds of years. But they are only gaining visibility now partly due to descendants of formerly enslaved African-Americans delving into their own past and genealogy. As trade links between Africa and Asia grow, the historical connections between the two continents gain new momentum. Old links between Africa and Asia are re-emerging as histories are being recorded through narratives and oral traditions. Firstly I describe characteristics of Indian Ocean migration. Then I discuss its relevance to contemporary Asia, which gives the whole topic its significance. The Indian Ocean is an area marked by continuous population movements and commercial activity, much of it unrelated to the needs of colonial elites and the slave trade.

Inevitably the slave trade becomes an important factor in this scenario. An enslaved person is one who has been ripped of all human rights, a commodified human being who is the legal property of his or her owner. To discuss ethnic and cultural identity in the Indian Ocean presupposes comparison with other areas of the world. Comparison has been made mainly with Indian Ocean islands where patterns of colonisation and slavery appear to be similar to the Caribbean. In the Atlantic, European demand for slaves was for field hands and mine workers (Lovejoy 2012: 20). Plantation slavery existed in the Western Indian Ocean, Zanzibar and the Middle East but the enslaved were also sailors, soldiers, servants, nannies, fort builders, road builders and water carriers for example.

In the Atlantic world two factors are impossible to ignore – colonisation and slavery. Patterns of colonisation and movement of people within the Indian Ocean are in sharp contrast to the Atlantic World, where western intrusion and population movement dominate. There is some overlap in terms of slavery as certain parts of the Indian Ocean were used as staging posts for movement across the Atlantic.

Indian Ocean slavery is dwarfed by the overwhelming scholarship on the Atlantic. The transatlantic slave trade was concentrated over four and a half centuries, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, and was driven by the demand for plantation labour in which Africans became a factor of input in a triangular trade that operated between Africa, Europe and the Americas. In terms of the numbers involved, the nature of demand and the tasks performed by forced migrants, the Indian Ocean slave trade is different to the Atlantic. But there are inevitable similarities between the Atlantic and parts of the Indian Ocean.

The actual number of Africans caught up in the slave trade in all the oceans of the world are not known. The best estimate is that 12.5 million Africans were moved across the Sahara, Red Sea and Indian Ocean from 800 AD to 1900 AD (Lovejoy 2000). 7 million Africans were moved before 1600 – prior to European entry into Indian Ocean trade. From 1600 to 1900, fewer Africans
- 5.5 million - were moved eastwards.

A similar number of Africans were moved to the Americas over a shorter time span. Between 1501 and 1866, 12,521,336 (12.5 million) African slaves crossed the Atlantic (Transatlantic Slave Trade Database Voyages 2008, 2009).

Both Britain and France invested a proportion of their foreign capital in plantations in the West Indies and in the Indian Ocean islands of Réunion and Mauritius. But in Réunion and Mauritius, plantations accounted for less than 10% of national income (Piketty 2014: 162).

In the South of USA, on the other hand, from 1770 to 1810, slaves contributed significantly to the capital and boosted wealth. During the same period, in the north of USA, where there were virtually no slaves, the wealth was half that of the South (Piketty 2014: 160-161).

In the case of the Atlantic, African movement was linked to major economic activities. Income from the Indian Ocean slave trade did not dominate the economy, unlike in the Atlantic World (Piketty 2014: 158-163).

Visibility of African Migrants

The religious distribution of African migrants reflects the networks that operated and the sources of demand to some extent. Particularly in the Middle East due to conversion and assimilation, many African migrants have merged with the populous at large. There are exceptions such as Dubai where descendants of Africans acknowledge their hybrid identity and call themselves “Gulfriicans” (Bilkhair 2003: P.C.)

Conversion paved the way for social inclusion and also for social mobility. This is best illustrated by the life of Malik Ambar, an enslaved Ethiopian, became the Peshwar (Chief Minister) of Ahmednagar from 1600 to 1626. Transition from enslavement to Chief Minister in India occurred in a single generation. He rose to power through elite military slavery. The respect he commanded as a military leader, Peshwar, strategist and philanthropist, is memorialised in his tomb in Khuldabad. Malik Ambar appointed puppet Sultans and ensured that he held the reins and provided the spur. First, he promoted a 20-year old member of Ahmednagar’s Nizam Shahi dynasty, Murtaza II as Sultan (1600-1610). After Murtaza’s death, his 5 year-old son, Burhan, was appointed as Sultan (1610-1632)(Alderman 2006: 108).

Social mobility was not inhibited and power was consolidated through affinal relationships. Malik Ambar’s daughter became the second wife of the Sultan, Murtaza Nizam Shah II (Shyam 1968: 35). A sister of Sultan Murtaza II became a wife of Malik Ambar’s son, Fateh Khan. Fateh Khan also married the daughter of one of the most powerful noblemen in Bijapur, Yaqut Khan (Eaton 2006: 56).

Free migrants, African traders, sailed across the Indian Ocean and made Janjira, an island off the west coast of India, their trading base from the thirteenth century. But from the seventeenth century, Janjira became the power base for African rulers. African rule in Janjira continued for over 330 years (from 1618 to 1948). From Janjira, a second state, ruled by Africans, emerged. It consisted of twenty scattered villages in today’s Gujarat, and was named Sachin. Sachin was ruled by Africans for over 150 years, until 1948, a year after India’s independence.

African migrants are visible in the historical record as loyal and able soldiers. Africans were valued as able soldiers in Asia. In Hyderabad, the African Cavalry Guards proudly paraded with the Nizam and commanded respect until the Princely states were absolved. The Cavalry Guards were disenfranchised but their descendants still live in Andhra Pradesh.
In Uttar Pradesh, Sultan Wajid Ali Shah’s African female bodyguards, defended him, fighting ferociously during the 1857 Indian Mutiny, an event that turned the subcontinent’s history. The English soldiers only knew from the deadbodies that they were fighting women. Descendants of African migrants live in poverty today, classified as an ‘Other Backward Class’ (Llewellyn-Jones 2011).

In nearby Sri Lanka, Portuguese archival records show the cost of maintaining 100 African soldiers in early seventeenth century Sri Lanka. There is no reference to the soldiers being slaves. The border between free soldiers, slave-soldiers and freed slaves turning into soldiers is a fuzzy area.

Records in the National Archives (Kew) that I looked at show that Frederick North, first British Governor of Sri Lanka (formerly called Ceylon), bought slaves from Mozambique. Freed slaves had promised to become good soldiers and rejoiced in the change of status from enslavement to freedom. The men were enlisted to the 3rd and 4th Ceylon Regiments (de Silva Jayasuriya 2011). But Women were also bought from Mozambique. Insurance was also included in the transaction costs reflecting the risk-averse nature of the buyers.

In 1804, Governor North (1798-1805) bought 70 men and 8 women from Goa. Men cost 175 Rix Dollars each but women were cheaper at 150 Rix Dollars each. North also purchased 100 slaves - 79 men, 19 boys and 2 women - from Bombay. Men cost 145 Rix Dollars each. Women and boys were cheaper at 125 Rix Dollars each.

In 1810, the 2nd British Governor, Thomas Maitland (1805-1811) bought 145 African slaves: 104 men at £40 each, 23 women at £30 each and 8 children at £10 each from Diego Garcia. These slaves had complained of ill-treatment by the French and wished to get away. Maitland transported the slaves to Galle and enlisted the men to the Third Ceylon Regiment.

All markets are demand-driven and the slave market is no exception (de Silva Jayasuriya 2008: 15). The difference in pricing of men, women and children reflects the demand. It could also reflect a shortage in the supply of men. It is not clear why a few women and children were bought. Were the slavers trying to keep families together? Or was there some other agenda? These are issues that could be addressed at future conferences.

Sri Lanka was under direct rule of the British Crown. I have looked at archival records of the EIC for the Sumatra factory also. The price of women and children was lower than for men in both the Company and Crown records which must reflect the inherent utilitarian value (de Silva Jayasuriya 2010).

**Development Issues: Scheduled Tribe Status**

In the Indian Ocean, Africans have been known by various ethnonyms and exonyms in different places and at different times. Indians of African descent are now mostly called Sidis. In the South Indian state of Karnataka, Sidis are either Muslims, Christians or Hindus and this variation reflects their different histories. Runaway slaves from Portuguese Goa took refuge in nearby forests and formed marooned communities.

Islamic Sidis originally migrated to Karnataka from Janjira island and probably also from the Deccan region in central India where Indian rulers imported Africans as soldiers to their armies (Camara 2004: 102-103). When Sidis shifted to Uttar Kannad and settled down in areas inhabited by Hindu tribals and upper caste Hindus, the Sidis converted to Hinduism.

Cross religious marriages occur among Sidis who consider themselves an endogamous group, similar to jati as known by Hindus and called jamat by Moslems. The Portuguese called...
this grouping *casta* and we all know the English borrowing ‘caste’.

Sidis in North Karnataka (Uttar Kannad) qualify for assistance programs that include reservation of places in educational institutions, jobs in government run services (railways, post office, police force), subsidies for housing, and other forms of minor financial assistance. The process of obtaining Scheduled Tribe status started in the 1980s and in 2003, the Central government acknowledged Sidis in Uttar Kannad (North Karnataka) under the Scheduled Tribe/Scheduled Caste categories.

Another group of Sidis in Shaurashtra, in the Western Indian state of Gujarat also received ST status in 1956 (Micklem 2001). But many Sidis fall out of the radar and attempts to redress past atrocities and injustices create new inequalities. A few leaders have emerged from the empowered Sidi communities. Sidi entrepreneurs and graduates have developed a sense of social responsibility and are searching for ways to give back to their community. As lawyers, sociologists, entrepreneurs and Non-Governmental Organisations emerge from the community, there is a trickle down effect to those at the lower end of the social spectrum.

Clearly, elite military slavery and scheduled tribe status enabled forced African migrants to gain visibility in the socio-political sphere. Those who became marginalised are gaining visibility through their strong cultural memories. There is no space in this paper to discuss cultural memories of African migrants but see de Silva Jayasuriya (2015). For forced migration of Africans to South Asia, I can therefore propose a model.
The over-riding goal of this talk has been differentiating Indian Ocean African migration as far as possible from the Atlantic slave trade. Demands for recognition can only be achieved by recovering the past. If Africans have lived for hundreds of years in Asia, lack of interest in them cannot be attributed simply to the indifference of the host societies. The crucial point here is the ability to absorb others. In contrast to the Americas, North and South, in Asia the most striking difference is social mobility followed by conversion. Assimilation took place within the Islamic World, though it is interesting to note that the pattern of social mobility consequent on conversion was also true of the Portuguese. Speaking Portuguese and conversion to Roman Catholicism were prerequisites for assuming a Portuguese identity.

Moreover, trade and religion went hand in hand even before European intervention. Islamic teachers followed Arab trade from the seventh century onwards. Trade and Religion were interwoven with voluntary migration and slavery in ways which make it difficult to disentangle the two. Following European intrusion, the slave trade became a means of obtaining manpower to run imperial enterprises. Without a readily available supply of low cost labour, the high risk long distance spice trade would have been impossible.

The borderline between slave descendant and free migrant is also not easy to establish given that migrations are centuries old and histories are fragmented. Elite military slavery enabled Africans to make the transition from enslavement to positions of power and authority in India even within a single generation. A few hundred Sidi elite in India remind us of their past prominent political role whilst the majority of Sidis were marginalised. A few Sidis have been recognised as socially and economically disadvantaged and have been empowered with Scheduled Tribe status. But a lag occurs before these empowered Sidis can realise their entitlements. Even the few Sidis who have managed to achieve Scheduled Tribe status, in recognition of their disadvantaged position, designed to empower them have found negotiating their way through powerful bureaucracies to be a slow process. Scheduled Tribe status is akin to positive discrimination that was given in USA to African-Americans as a pump-priming measure to break out of a vicious cycle. This is only the start of a way into what we now call Human Rights.
The scholar of Indian Ocean migration is in a difficult position. Diversity and acculturation have blurred the demarcations which have further diluted ethnic and physiognomic differences through assimilation. The Indian Ocean is heterogeneous and complicated by layered histories and inter-mixing of peoples and cultures. Intrusion of Europeans in Indian Ocean trade disrupted the centuries old exchange of goods, peoples and ideas within the region. Not only did it increase competition amongst trading parties, it also redistributed market shares among more players.

However, Indian Ocean hierarchies and stratifications are not necessarily based on colonial intervention and slavery. The layers beneath colonisation and slavery cannot be ignored. The wider socioreligious differences which have shaped identities in the precolonial era have re-emerged as countries regained their freedom from colonialism. As a consequence, the presence of Africans in Asia and the history of African migration in the Indian Ocean World have gained new momentum. Afro-descendants claiming their identity and heritage are now emerging from the peripheries (Gir forest in India) and are beginning to gain attention in the global arenas. Journalists, photographers and academics have been active agents in bringing to the fore the presence and plight of Asians with African ancestry. The key to unlocking demands for recognition is historical knowledge of the past events, crimes and atrocities. Recognition is a prerequisite of development. There could be no better agenda for the historian of the Indian Ocean.

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Western Indian Ocean and Indian Security Engagements: Issues of Cooperation and Competition with South Africa

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The Indian Ocean has become a key strategic arena in the 21st century. One reason is the growth of the Asian economies and their increased need for raw materials, including energy from the Middle East, to provide for their economic growth. The changing geo-political situation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in the last decades, has acted as a stimulus for the littoral nations to look seaward.

In recent years India has strengthened its involvement in the African Indian Ocean Rim considerably. This shift in policy comes in part because of India’s desire to compete with China’s growing influence in the region. The Indian Ocean has immense significance to India’s development. India’s maritime doctrine, published in 2004 and revised in 2007, spelled out the immense importance of the Indian Ocean to India’s security and economic development, manifest in the high dependence upon seaborne supplies of natural resources (Large 2012).

In the mid-1990s, Indian foreign policy largely centred on improving relations in its immediate neighbourhood, confirming its position as the regional power. This aspiration was fundamental to India’s support of the IOR-ARC regional grouping. Shared membership of the IOR-ARC links India to the African Indian Ocean Rim states (Vines and Oruitemeka 2008). India, asserting itself through bilateral and trilateral efforts, has strengthened its relations along the African Indian Ocean Rim, notably with Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar and coastal states such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya.

The significance of the Indian Ocean to India’s economic development and security is immense. Most of India’s trade is by sea and nearly 89% of its oil arrives by sea. Avoiding disruption in the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are vital for India’s economy. The Indian navy has patrolled the Exclusive Economic Zone of Mauritius since 2003 (Berlin 2006, 72). India has similarly agreed on defence co-operation with Seychelles through a Memorandum of Understanding drawn up in 2003 for India to patrol its territorial waters.

In February 2005, a move by the Indian naval chief ahead of an anticipated Chinese move in a similar direction included provision of Indian patrols and training of Seychelles navy personnel, in addition to the donation of a patrol vessel and helicopters. The Indian government took a further step to strengthen initiatives with the island nation when, in September 2005, it created a new defence ministry office headed by a two-star admiral (Berlin 2006). The Indian navy is planning further joint exercises with the Seychelles in 2008.

A further response has been India’s first listening post on foreign soil, which began operations in northern Madagascar in July 2007. New Delhi has apparently rented land for $2.5 million from the Malagasy government in order to construct a radar surveillance station with high-tech digital communication systems to watch shipping movements (Indian Express 2007).

India has further been in discussions with the Mauritian government about a long-term lease of the Agalega Islands, which would officially serve as a high-end tourist resort. In strategic terms, Agalega could serve as a small, yet important, base on the path between India and the important
shipping lane of the Mozambique Channel on the southeast coast of Africa (Forsberg 2007).

Developments in the security arena are striking and were emphasized in late 2004, when the Indian Air Force conducted a combined air-defense exercise with its South African counterpart - the first combined air exercise ever conducted by India on the African continent. The participating Indian Mirage 2000 fighters, deployed from north central India flew with help from newly acquired Il-78 aerial tankers, to South Africa via Mauritius (Press Trust of India 2004). Since 2008 India, South Africa and Brazil have participated in biennial naval exercises of the Cape of Good Hope, which have included anti-air and antisubmarine warfare, visit-board-search-seizure operations and anti-piracy drills. At South Africa’s request the IBSAMAR exercises also includes officers from other SADC states. India have also participated in other excursuses with South Africa and other Southern African countries, including Exercise Blue Crane, involving 12 states from Southern and Eastern Africa (Brewster 2014).

India’s president visited Tanzania in 2004, which led to an agreement for increased training of Tanzanian military personnel in India and more frequent calls by Indian warships at Tanzanian ports (Indo-Asian News Service 2004). Relations have also expanded with Mozambique. India provided joint patrols off the Mozambique coast during the AU summit in Maputo in 2003 and provided this service again in 2004 for the World Economic Forum’s meeting in the capital (Vines and Oruitemeka 2008). In March, 2006 India and Mozambique signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation. Subsequently, two meetings of the Joint Defence Working Group were held in 2008 and 2010. The scope of the MoU covers joint activities that include maritime patrolling of the Mozambican coast, mutual training in military institutes, supply of defence equipment/services and establishment of partnership and transfer of knowhow and technology for assembling and repair of vehicles, aircraft and ships as well as rehabilitation of military infrastructure (Ministry of Defence 2011).

Piracy and counter-terrorism: It also features in India’s increasing naval interest in the African Indian Ocean Rim. A significant percentage of India’s trade including oil and fertilizers passes the Gulf of Aden. According to Indian government figures, annual Indian imports through the Gulf of Aden route alone are valued at $50 billion while exports are pegged at $60 billion. Therefore, the safety and unhindered continuity of maritime trade through this route became a primary national concern, since it directly impacts India’s booming economy (Gokhale 2011). Moreover India’s large sea-faring community who are embarked onboard both Indian and foreign flagged vessels, accounts for 6% of the world’s sea-fareres (Indian Navy n. d.). Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a threat to shipping since second phase of Somali Civil War int eh early 21st century (Khan, Sana Aftab n.d.). In order to protect Indian ships and Indians employed in sea fearing duties, Indian Navy commenced anti piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden commencing from October 2008. A total of 1104 ships (139 Indian flagged and 965 foreign flagged from 50 different countries) have been escorted by Indian Navy ships through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). The Indian Navy has undertaken various initiatives to strengthen its anti piracy efforts. Merchant ships are currently escorted along the entire length of (IRTC), that has been promulgated for use by all merchant vessels (Indian Navy n.d.).

The Cabinet Committee on Security met in March 2011 and considered proposals with regard to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia. It approved a series of measures to address the legal, administrative and operational aspects of combating piracy. It recommended formulating suitable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for coordinating Indian Navy’s activities in the Gulf of Aden with the navies of friendly foreign countries (Krishna 2011).

India has also entered into multilateral initiatives to help fighting the menace of piracy. At a briefing during Milan naval exercise in January 2012. An Indian Navy officer noted that India, China and Japan have “evolved a mechanism under which it will be ensured that there is enough gap between the India, Chinese and the Japanese convoys” This will ensure escorting a greater number of ships in a day. The coordination exercise among the three navies was held under the ‘Shared Awareness And Deconfliction (SHADE)’ grouping established in December 2008 for sharing “best practices”, and activities of nations involved in counter-piracy operations in the region (Khanna, Monty. 2012. Somali Pirates: Convoy Coordination India, China and Japan. Outlook).
Another example of joint naval anti-piracy operations involves India and the European Union (EU). During his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, defense minister AK Anthony highlighted the need for defense cooperation between two countries. Both countries agreed to establish a Joint Committee in order to chalk out a roadmap for bolstering bilateral defense cooperation. India has also joined hands with Sri Lanka and Maldives to keep the seas around them free of piracy.

Responding to the piracy menace in the contiguous waters, India has a prominent policy of engagement in the region. The Indian defense minister assured that, “the Indian Navy has been mandated to be a net security provider to the island nations in the Indian Ocean Region. We would like to assure our maritime neighbors about our unstinted support for their security and economic prosperity” (Anthony, A. K. 2011) India has provided defense aid to Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives to build capacity to address nontraditional security threats such as terrorism and piracy.

Apart from bilateral initiatives, India supports and participates in multilateral forums like Indian Ocean Rim Association (IOR-ARC). India has been a pioneer member of this regional organization. Another voluntary initiative of India is the formation of ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium’ (IONS) which seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues. In the process, it endeavours to generate a flow of information between naval professionals that would lead to common understanding and possibly cooperative solutions on the way ahead. East African countries including- Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania actively participate at this forum.

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Part 2

Labour History of Africa
African Trade Unions: Awkward Customers

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Introduction

In very different kinds of work situations where there is a sharp divide between workers and management, workers will organise, withhold their labour as a bargaining tool and turn into a collective force in particular situations in more or less every part of the world. This is inherent in the labour process and the contradictions that flow from that process. The vast African continent has as much as anywhere been the site of such situations and below, very much to name but a few, are striking examples.

Thus in 1882, thousands of coal heavers working on the banks of the newly constructed Suez Canal in Egypt, effectively recent migrant workers who had discovered this relatively massive source of paid employment, went on strike. Their employment was really controlled by labour brokers. The European owned company could not break the strike whose resolution benefited workers and brokers. Interestingly the nascent nationalist movement under ‘Urabi Pasha was in control in Cairo and perhaps created an atmosphere conducive to worker militancy; ‘Urabi expressed sympathy with their movement. However in another decade coaling was in decline and eventually the job ceased to exist due to technological change. (Beinin and Lockman, 1988)

In 1897 a significant part of the employees of the Public Works Department in Lagos Colony went out on strike and strikes affected skilled, white collar workers and labourers in the colony—canoe men, railway clerks and hospital workers in state employment in following years. This was a West African city with street life dominated by petty commerce and independent artisanal activity. (Hopkins 1966) Yet here too there was the possibility of strike action. Andreas Eckert has even noted the presence of a contemporary strike in German Duala in Cameroun of slaves unwilling to plant cocoa trees as an unfair, overly demanding, labour practice. (Eckert 1999) Slaves on strike make of course for a bizarre contradiction in terms.

In his recent study, mostly devoted to early African National Congress history and its links with labour, Peter Limb has painstakingly unearthed many examples, on mines and docks, of early strikes substantial enough to have involved organisation of some sort in Kimberley, on the Rand, and in Port Elizabeth particularly, in 19th century South Africa. (Limb 2010; also Webster 1978) Limb is aware of the many forms of worker resistance such as slacking, desertion and destruction of machinery as well, but these are actions of individuals or small groups that don’t form any foundation to union development. Strikes are something different.

Before leaving the South African case, for a very different example one might mention as well the remarkable general strike of Indian indentured workers in the collieries and cane fields of Natal which led to Mohandas Gandhi uncharacteristically taking up the workers’ cause and bringing to a theatrical end his career in South Africa in 1913. The strikers were objecting to the imposition of a £3 tax newly required

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1 For older but not unrelated views, see Freund, 1988, chapter 5. There is considerable detailed material there, notably on South Africa, Ghana and Kenya based on the literature then available, which I have not repeated here. My one obvious mistake was my less than optimistic pessimistic conclusion based on my failure to anticipate the democratisation movement that would take off. I have tried to concentrate on mending that here and on highlighting more recent scholarship.
annually of ex-indentured workers who sought to remain, as the large majority did, in the new Union of South Africa. It began with a call by Gandhi as a way of interesting the Indian masses in the multi-fold claims of an emergent commercial minded ethnic elite; Swan describes its unexpected impressive progress amongst the sugar cane pickers of the Natal south coast as a strike ‘in the absence of leadership, an appropriate ideology or even a precise set of demands …’ (Ibid., 252) The strike played its part in the end of the indenture system which had been so critical in the economic development of that British colony. (Swan 1984)

However, interesting as protests of this kind are in the history of labour, trade union organisation represents a further development. Trade unions arose in Europe essentially in the nineteenth century in the rising capitalist milieu. They stylized opposition to management not merely in the form of strikes which could be licit under specific juridical conditions but also in the form of collective bargaining procedures that could lead to agreements that covered whole industries. Such agreements covered not merely wages but many other facets of the life of labour: rules about seniority and promotion, about hiring and about dismissal. The unions could also come together in a federation with a management structure of its own. When this system operated plausibly, it was considered to be the cornerstone of industrial democracy as opposed to a despotic regime of labour control in which workers’ rights were purely arbitrary or perhaps customary. For workers, the union as a legal institution promised a powerful protective resource against arbitrary commands of management.

However the rules that unions engaged to honour in agreement barred spontaneous and destructive work stoppages, sabotage and the like, and could become a barrier to workers’ aspirations as they saw things. This is more comprehensible because in fact management views of trade unions were themselves ambiguous and varied over time. Management might choose to honour signed and sealed agreements but inevitably the existence of limits over their control of labour at work was resented, particularly when the tide of change in technological application or the economic conjuncture, those features that power competition in capitalism, flowed strongly. Often the politics of trade union members was deeply resented as well. The expression of grievances of workers can reflect wider tensions about class within society and workers and their leaders can respond to those tensions by organising politically. Britain is the classic example of a European society where a Labour Party contested office in elections from the very early 20th century onwards, sometimes successfully. In continental Europe, labour was a powerful component in socialist parties that might have unions standing in a somewhat different balance. Another variation was typified by the USA where unions came to establish a close and friendly relationship with one political party but with no formal ties between them. The unions rather formed an interest group whose influence varied with different candidates for office in different eras.

However, bosses generally also understood the need in normal circumstances of a kind of useful and predictable order in the workplace on which they could count in order to do business. Where tensions and conflicts lead to resistance, this can cause anarchy and chaos that discourages investment. A strong effective order based on a deal with a trade union could resolve this problem. Consequently especially as capitalism became more organised on national foundations, management was not at all necessarily hostile to unions which they found useful in dealing with the actual innumerable problems that arose on the factory floor and other workplaces. The nature of the firm and the kind of business involved has certainly been a factor in promoting variable attitudes. Negotiating with unions might be a powerful control weapon if it was not possible to disregard the interests of workers altogether.

In addition management of a different sort inevitably plays a role. The state may simply be in the hands of people eager to do the bidding of capitalists but in general it has a wider and more complex field of action and it needs to consider the role of workers as legitimate citizens whose rights demand recognition. Complicating this are the politics of labour. Politicians may be beholden to organised labour, or to some fraction of organised labour, for getting into power. Even fascism in Germany and Italy, while suppressing the trade union movement which certainly had affiliated with absolutely the wrong kind of politics for them, created substitute institutions in order to deal with what were still seen as a potentially legitimate voice of labour. In the Communist world too, while independent trade union activity was suppressed, unions that were said to represent workers were in place and actually sometimes could take up grievances deemed to be legitimate. As a result, union politics are not necessarily straightforward. Unions may do deals with unlikely bedfellows and they may come into conflict with political regimes usually thought to be their dear friends. They can be awkward allies.
Finally, it is important to perceive the union as a field involving individuals. For the intelligent, determined and ambitious, the trade union is sometimes the route to success and power for politically very skilled individuals. These are the heart and soul of union militancy at key moments. In the nationalist era, some striking African illustrations of men at the highest level of political activity here would include Sekou Touré, long-time president of Guinea and union radical, Hamani Diori, first president of Niger and a union moderate and Tom Mboya of Kenya, who was perhaps somewhat in between. It is interesting to note that Niger was a country with a tiny proportion of organisable wage workers; union power was at first sight absurdly weak.

If we look for more contemporary figures, they are still with us: Frederick Chiluba, the miners’ leader who became president of Zambia, Morgan Tsvangarai, the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) who failed to become president of Zimbabwe, Cyril Ramaphosa, deputy president of South Africa today who rose to fame as the miners’ leader just like Chiluba, or the irrepresible Adams Oshiomhole, presently governor of Bendel State in Nigeria. Individuals of this calibre tended to come, not from the ranks of the unskilled and illiterate, but from the ranks of white collar workers, elite in educational terms and usually government employees in one or another department. They exemplify the potential of unions for offering such individuals their chance for leadership and power in life. Without taking away from characterisations of such individuals either as fearless and honest leaders always willing to take up the cudgels for the workers or as dastardly sell-outs in the pay of bosses or foreign interests, in general it is best to see these are outsize figures, sometimes heroes and sometimes villains, as performing on a stage with complex roles to play that alter over time. Their activities also are critical for understanding particularly the political aspect of trade unions. And that aspect inevitably is what engages the social scientists, apart from narrow specialists in law and industrial relations normally with little interest in history and inevitably it will dominate this narrative as well.

In many parts of the world, including in North and to a lesser extent West Africa, what we can loosely call guilds are vastly more ancient in derivation than trade unions. Guilds however had a somewhat different character that involved control over trade standards, admission of self-employed artisans (whom they represented primarily) to a trade and often linked merchants whose needs for trust and security they could benefit. Trade unions defined by skill in Europe did genuinely have an important historic link to guilds in their origins and some of their culture but they also marked a distinct break with the guild form of organisation. Moreover as capitalist economic structures took shape, the organisation of skilled workers generally became overshadowed in the 19th century by the less skilled even though they remained mainstays of particular unions.

**Pioneer Days: The Transfer of the Trade Union Idea to the African Continent**

In the years after Gandhi’s departure, Natal Indians organised urban-based unions as their participation in cane field agriculture diminished. The two best-known figures associated with these were the Rev. Bernard Sigamoney and Albert Christopher. Christopher had been active in the 1913 strike while Sigamoney learnt considerably about unions from white radicals in South Africa. These unions, none of which obtained any legal recognition for long, were designed in good part to create job opportunities for the ex-indentured Indians in the wake of white prejudice and exclusionism. (Freund 1995) Simultaneously, Indian workers, notably on the railways and also with an indentured past, organised unions that also achieved just very limited gains, in Kenya. (Singh 1969, chapter 6) Labour was structured severely on racial lines in inter-war Kenya but the potential for African workers to learn from the talk and activities of Indians was there.

European artisans and skilled workers were far more significant in this respect than Indians if one takes the whole of Africa. And in colonial situations they generally had the rights of citizens so their ability to create and sustain unions, often with a motivation to keep together a bounded working class, was much greater. In Alexandria, Greek cigarette makers were the pioneers of trade unionism before the end of the nineteenth century; exclusion of Egyptians and creation of a bounded Greek working class was inherent in their activities. (Beinin and Lockman 1988) At the same time, citizens of France had the same right to form trade unions in Algeria as in France. (Weiss 1970) This included a very limited number of Algerians who qualified as voting citizens. Small numbers of skilled French workers, for instance on the railways,
established trade union rights, even in French West Africa where they just numbered in the hundreds, to which they held on effectively until independence.

The most important phenomenon of this genre existed, and to some extent, its historical heirs are still of some importance, in South Africa. Jon Lewis traced the origin of craft unionism at the Cape to the 1840s. By the 1880s engineering workers and builders had established branches of existing British unions both in the Cape and the much newer colony of Natal. (Lewis 1984) Craft unions at the Cape also attracted workers from the group of people deemed to be Coloured, neither colonising whites nor subject Africans. Lewis is one of many authors who capture the delicate and complex business of melding organisation and race on paper. Too much exclusion leads to the possibility of employers colluding in the formation of a competitive union that may agree to lower wage rates; this has been critical to trade unions shifting on racial policy in trying to steer between the practical needs of workers, their prejudices and the changing dictates of state policy.

However on the gold mines, the most dramatic example of capitalist investment outlet on the African continent, things had to be different. White workers included thousands of white miners, originally immigrants from Britain but especially after the first massive failed strike in 1907, increasingly Afrikaner men off the farms, who had some sense of how to survive in a mineshaft, but no certifiable skills. Africans could learn these skills on the job too with time. In early decades, pay was good but men died in horrific numbers in accidents in the mines and of lung diseases from the mine dust. For the organised miners of the Witwatersrand, racial exclusion from key positions in the labour force was an absolute desideratum. Miners’ organisations called four epic strikes starting in 1907, charged up at the threat of dilution to their trade as they saw it. All were epic events for the whole population of the new city of Johannesburg and they culminated in the so-called Rand Revolt in March 1922 as the industry appeared to demand restructuring. The revolt spread to other workers and called forth the spectre of a kind of white soviet in South Africa. This insurrection ended in severe repression and a death toll that included judicial execution. (Krikler 2005) There was no question on the part of management of getting rid of white labour on the mines but there was also an absolute rejection of the idea associated with the Labour Party politician Frederick Creswell of running mines purely on the basis of white labour. This was an unstable phase of trade union history and probably two outcomes need to be stressed.

The first was incorporation. It should be pointed out that there was a significant Labour Party in South Africa to which Creswell belonged and which reached electoral heights in the election following the suppression of the Revolt. It formed a junior partnership in the Pact government of 1924-33 and again joined the government of General Smuts during the World War II years by co-optation. The Pact government mapped out a policy designed to achieve labour peace which certainly included recognition of unions. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 paved the way for the formation of the South African Trades and Labour Council to find traction and for a system of procedures to govern labour relationships within the citizenry. This form of trade unionism was a significant link in the chain of institutional structures that created a solid basis as a foundation for racialised labour citizenship in South Africa. (Davies 1979, Yudelman 1984) Plenty of whites remained working in deep level gold mines but they either possessed definable skills or were relegated to supervising black labour.

It should be noted that the union culture tended for long to be dominated by British immigrants and their sons. Afrikaners infused their own intense nationalism into their politically related organisations more generally and were not necessarily comfortable, especially on the mines and the railways, with the pragmatic elements of the SAT&LC and its compromises on race in some situations. They rather looked towards the politicians to create a chasse gardée for themselves. One source of tension was the policy of replacing blacks with whites as unskilled workers with wages that were very low for whites but higher than blacks earned. The Pact promoted this as a means of attacking the problem of ‘poor whites’. This workforce, mainly on the railways but also in forestry camps, for instance, was the object of government paternalism. Like most nationalisms, Afrikaner nationalism was very much slanted to promote the cause of Afrikaner businessmen and Afrikaner civil servants so there was also a second tension which made less skilled Afrikaner workers, even while getting minor government representation in time, discontented although of course they had the right to organise unions. The white mineworkers, for instance, never organised a strong union until the 1970s. This part of the story is hardly irrelevant to what follows: the

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2 This structural weakness was captured in Frederick Johnstone’s classic Class, Race and Gold.
struggle to incorporate and the complex consequences would play themselves out in black Africa in later generations in very comparable ways.

The second aspect of the story is that individual white unionists came to understand, just as the Indian radical Makhan Singh in Kenya did, that a genuine trade union drive that would bring about substantial change for workers and a voice in building society depended on transcending racial lines. In French North Africa, the post-World War I emergence of the *Confédération Générale des Travailleurs* (CGT) under strong Communist influence, certainly allowed for far-seeing individuals to encourage the construction of new unions in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

This is a story that has been well-told for South Africa with much detail. Given the obvious salience of race and the wide-spread union movement, this is not surprising. Frederick Johnstone unearthed from the National Archives a little of the story of the Industrial Workers of Africa, who tried to inculcate trade unionist and socialist ideas in Johannesburg during the World War I years. (Johnstone 1979) The key figure was Brian Bunting, an educated English immigrant and future Communist Party militant. Jonathan Hyslop has unearthed the influence of another such figure, the Scotsman J. T. Bain, on black strike activity at this time. (Hyslop 2004) The reason why it is so difficult to pick up the thread is that black workers, with their myriad reasons to revolt, also were capable of opening their ears and eyes and learning to imitate the whites without traceable contacts. There was an unprecedentedly large strike of black mineworkers in the harsh conditions of February 1920 about which little is known; it is thought that some 70,000 men went off at least one day during the strike week. Here there were no organisational repercussions. (Bonner 1979)

In South Africa, we can see two further lines of development in the 1920s that have deservedly attracted more attention. The first was the melding of very small socialist groups into a Communist Party. The Kremlin at a great distance wanted to go much further than Bunting in the creation of a socialist movement that would ally itself with the new Soviet Union and the assumption was that the native people of South Africa needed to come together to form a revolutionary ‘black republic’ of workers and peasants. Agitation by the fledgling party was accompanied by efforts to organise black workers, barred from any legal recognition. Simultaneously, the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union arose out of dockworkers’ strike in Cape Town in 1919. The key outside agitator here, again someone who seems to preface later union leaders in Africa at more favourable junctures—although 1921 did not seem at first so unfavourable—was an educated Malawian, Clements Kadalie, who ultimately settled in South Africa.³ The ICU eventually organised many tens of thousands of black Africans during the 1920s, mostly in parts of the countryside where more directly capitalist labour relations were increasingly taking hold, and many of whom really did not grasp the conditions of a plausible trade union. This was the despite the efforts of William Ballinger, a British trade unionist recruited by Kadalie to try to create a union recognisable to British workingmen in this stony soil. The ICU was really, according to Helen Bradford, a black protest movement rather than a recognisable trade union. Kadalie for instance, who focussed on making speeches, deplored the use of the strike weapon. (Bradford 1983; Bonner 1978) Here again there was a very clear precedent for the trade unionism that would follow with far greater success in South Africa and elsewhere in later years.

The final trend worth noting in this period was the organising work of Solly Sachs, a man who experienced phases in the Communist Party. Sachs organised the women in the Garment Workers’ Union, Afrikaners who were increasingly threatened with undercutting in Johannesburg by women of colour, Indians and Coloureds. He therefore struggled to organise the whole labour force and encouraged the hatching of an unrecognised equivalent ‘parallel’ African union in the Communist fold. Sachs was only successful for a time; eventually these women were successfully undercut by cheaper workforces in Durban and Cape Town, the coastal cities, where no whites were employed. He was also unsuccessful in getting Afrikaner women to vote for a party hostile to the racial system at the ballot box. (Berger 1982)

The story of Sachs and the Garment Workers is probably most unusual because of the role of women, two or three of whom became impressive political figures in time of their own accord. However it resonates with how inter-war unionism developed in other parts of Africa whereby white or Indian cores started to reach out to African affiliates and begin a process of incorporation, ultimately uncontrollable.

³ However, Kadalie in turn derived some of his ideas from a British immigrant who understood union organisation well named Arthur F. Batty.
that led to the wider inoculation of union ideas. For instance in Libya, a former Fascist of populist inclinations turned Communist named Cibelli began after the Allied liberation of this territory in World War II to organise Arab workers. (Norman 1965) In North Africa, the proximity of Europe and the relative frequency by which Arabs crossed the Mediterranean to work made for a myriad crosshatch of influences. Most of the time they faced an extremely hostile administration in North Africa but in 1936 the astonishing victory of a Popular Front government in France friendly to unions and hostile to formal racial barriers, provided a turn-around for two years that proved ultimately to be an important platform for organisational gains after the war. In Algeria, the CGT began deliberately the organisation of Muslim workers after 1936 along somewhat paternalistic lines. As in Libya, it was the Fascist defeat which led quickly to the emergence of a more substantial union movement in Tunisia at first under the wings of the CGT. (Ahmed 1966)

By this time, Egyptian unionism had already advanced if in a stuttering way. Even before World War I in sectors in the modern economy, railway workers, tramway operators, gasworks and electrical plant workers began to organise unions. A big step occurred when the Wafid Party came to power in 1924-30. Wafid was a largely middle class formation with a strong nationalist focus on the complete independence of Egypt. The 1919 disturbances it instigated involved many organised workers in an essentially nationalist cause. Wafid was prepared to tolerate and even encourage trade union formation in what was still a country almost totally lacking in substantial modern industry. It needed the support of workers but, by contrast to nationalists in independent Africa several decades later, Egypt was not fully self-governing and the Cairo regime lacked the ability to control them. Moreover the British became willing to set up a system of negotiations with workers that would deflect inflammatory actions. Behind the scenes, this dependence on nationalist fervour pushed the General Federation of Labour Unions in the Nile Valley towards dependence on relatively well-off patrons. Indeed with the nationalists under wraps and Wafid back on the streets in the 1930s, it was rather a committed member of the royal family, ‘Abbas Halim, who served as generous patron to much of what union militancy existed. (Beinin and Lockman 1988)

By contrast to these ambivalent and complex stories, even under the apparently democratic rule of the first republic, the Portuguese government was not prepared to tolerate strike action at all by the União Ferroviário in 1925/1926 where an individual dispute blossomed into a long strike that was mercilessly crushed. The union, actually quite long-standing, was destroyed, workers at best retired and at worst sent into exile and a completely new authoritarian work order restored. This in fact heralded the end of republican democracy in Mozambique and Portugal itself. (Pennevenne 1985, 86-87)

The Heroic Age: African nationalism and African trade unionism 1935-60

The years identified in the sub-title of this section represent a phase in which strikes and trade union activity often took centre-stage in the course of African political and social development. A number of the great strikes, with varying levels of union organisation involved, have themselves received very considerable scholarly attention, especially in countries where union activity was virtually new. These include the rail strike in the Rhodesias in 1945 under the auspices of a new union, (Lunn 1987, Phimister 1987; Vickery 1998/99), the copper mines’ strikes in Northern Rhodesia of 1935 and 1940 (Butler 2007), the Mombasa dock strikes of 1939 and 1947 (Cooper 1987), the strike on the railway system of French West Africa in 1947-48 (Cooper 1997, 1998; Jones 2002, the Nigerian general strike of 1945 (Falola 2009), the 1948 Enugu Colliery Shooting event (Brown 2003) and the 1947 general miners’ strike in the Gold Coast (Crisp 1984) which spread to other sectors. In Egypt too, the new big textile mill at Shubra-al-Khayma north of Cairo in 1946 went on strike in a major event but the strike was broken. Without a political reform context, while unions could legally register with the state after 1942, labour activity was far more restrained. (Beinin and Lockman 1988) The Congress of Non-European Trade Unions in South Africa flourished in South Africa for a time, notably during the war years, but the epic gold miners’ strike under the nominal leadership of the Communist Party trying to form a union, was extinguished, also in 1946, signalling a period of decline for many years. (Moodie 1994) The dominant party of General Smuts came around to favouring legal registration of black unions although this had not yet been enacted when he went down to electoral defeat in 1948, but the exclusion of black public sector workers and above all in the critical gold mines from trade union of activity was always part of the deal.
The continental strike wave of the middle 1940s both represented a dramatic change itself but also contributed to the beginning of the end of European colonial systems significantly. The place for narratives of strike history lies elsewhere; here some general themes will be gathered together. The modern economies of African colonies were very substantially affected by the Great Depression which drastically cut the demand for industrial raw materials (although not precious metals). From about 1935, however there was a notable revival in mining and secondary industry that went together with the growing wave of rearmament in Europe. Poorly-paid African workers (almost always male) now had an unprecedented opportunity to make their potential strength heard. This demand for especially mineral products and the concomitant pressure on transport systems bore up into the 1950s. Although there was obviously a difference between colonies, in general, it cannot be said that an African working class was replacing the world of cultivators and pastoralists in general. Workers existed within a world of partly self-sufficient agriculture and a burgeoning informal commercial sector; they were not proletarianised in the classic Marxist sense comparable to the fate of European workers in the 19th century. However, the very heart of these economies did rely on African labour, at least accustomed and partly trained, to make offices function, run the transport services, particularly the railways but also the telegraph and post offices, and to dig gold, copper and other minerals which were at the heart of the economy of the day. Thus their bargaining position was surprisingly strong and especially in the hands of agile and determined leadership.

As to the mass of workers, it is not really possible to reduce their sense of anguish at what remained of crude racialised colonial culture, and their sense of hope at the start of change, to the conventions of collective bargaining. Thus Ken Vickery writes that ‘…at its heart, the 1945 Rhodesia Railways African strike was not so much about human grievances as it was a desperate assertion of basic human dignity.’ (Vickery 1999, 63) Jasper Savanhu, an early union leader in Southern Rhodesia, declared that the strike ‘had proved that Africans were born…The days when a white man could exploit us at will are gone and gone forever.’ (Lunn, 1987, 139) Carolyn Brown points to the persistence into the late 1940s of employed ‘hammock boys’ on the Enugu coal mines who physically carried white supervisory staff into work each day; these humiliating distinctions were deeply resented. (Brown 2003, 291) Carolyn Brown attributes the deaths associated with the 1949 coal miners’ strike in Nigeria to the incompetence and poor judgment of British non-commissioned officers, completely unable to grasp the outlook of Igbo miners, their considerations and perspectives, albeit here a miners’ union had some purchase on the situation. A key factor in the great French West African rail strike was the demand for the end of distinctions between white and black employees.

The common feature of this period is the intervention of forces outside the labour workforce which set in place the systems of industrial relations that have taken root since that time in Africa with obvious variations in individual cases, notably the colonial governments. These were alarmed at the potential, sometimes activated, for anarchic and destructive labour revolts. From 1935 a British Conservative government underwent the shock of labour unrest in various parts of the empire, often outside Africa. For instance in 1938 a big cane workers’ strike affected the sugar island of Mauritius. It is from the strike really that labour organisation and indeed a Labour Party, arguably the most successful within the African Union, took off from this juncture. With the war over, the British economy was in poor shape and depended heavily on colonial exports and the defense of the pound zone. Officials worked hard to create predictable labour systems with acceptable conditions and hierarchies and rising levels of productivity and that meant recognising trade unions. Particularly during the period of Labour Party rule in Britain (1945-51), this involved sending to Africa experienced trade unionists who would teach their African counterparts the right way to go about structuring an organisation and working towards a rational bargaining system.

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4 A later but aligned perspective should be considered in assessing the great strike of South West African contract workers in 1971. This was really a revolt against the entire contract labour system which was thereafter somewhat reformed. However, the most salient result was the creation not of a trade union federation, although this did happen in exile conditions but of the Ovamboland People’s Organisation soon after renamed the South West African People’s Organisation or SWAPO. This is still the governing party of Namibia. There was no repeat of this great industrial movement and the unions that gradually established themselves have no reputation particularly for militancy or impressive organisational capacity. In other words, a labour movement fed directly into a successful formative nationalist movement. (Bauer 1998; Jauch in Beckman et al 2010) The first president of Namibia, Sam Nujoma was a former railway worker involved in these events although not as leader; he was never a trade unionist. (Bauer 1998)
Reforming the rules governing the civil service and work for the government itself often came top of the list and after that were dealings with big corporate entities, notably those which managed major mine resources. Top of the list was surely the Copperbelt, where the 1935 and 1940 strikes found organisation in beni dance societies and the Watchtower Movement derived from the Jehovah’s Witnesses rather than even nascent unions. In 1947 William Comrie was sent from the British Trade Union Congress to help create a non-political, bargaining orientated union for African miners capable of effective negotiating capacity. The African Mine Workers Union was created in 1949 and the Trade Union Congress of Northern Rhodesia two years later. (Larmer, 2007, 33)

In Southern Rhodesia, African trade unionism took root particularly in the growing rail and industrial centre of Bulawayo. Tim Scarneccchia recreates some of this atmosphere and describes the careers of Charles Mzingeli, leader of the Southern Rhodesian branch of the ICU and a slightly later figure, Reuben Jamela. Mzingeli established an important friendship with a Labour Party politician, Gladys Maasdorp, who offered help to build African trade unionism. While Mzingeli could point out the injustices of African life in the country on the right occasion, he actually was a classic early figure who did not much take up national politics. (Scarneccchia 2008)

An important aspect of colonial intervention into the shaping of trade unions in Africa was the impress of Cold War ideology. The British were not shy in their willingness to violate any of their own rules to bring down Communists as they did in Cyprus or British Guiana but in fact the British colonies did not have so much potential subversion to root out. In France, by contrast there was a large functioning Communist Party which at first formed part of the government after the war. The CGT certainly influenced West African and especially North African unionists once the post-war dispensation allowed for the continuation of the reforms effectively permitting Africans to enter civil society in the colonies legally. Communist links were very significant in the extent to which unions began to be able to function effectively. It was the West that broke off from the World Federation of Trade Unions to form the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1949 and it was a feather in the cap to get the increasingly important trade union movement in Tunisia to sign up early on. As a rather naïve American observer of Libya noted with a wink, ‘…more than a few of the future political leaders of the nation are destined to emerge from the Libyan labor movement...’(Norman, 1965, 54), albeit the weakest in North Africa. Cold War politics strongly invested international trade unionism and played a corrupting role in Africa where individuals who took the right trips to the right conferences were supported and others effectively blackballed. This also removed them from the approbation or otherwise of the rank and file. Indeed skilful manoeuvres between West and East could allow a leader considerable autonomy and headway.

The reform era which permitted trade unions to organise, wage strikes and earn respectability and clout also opened the door to a rapidly emergent African nationalism which moved quickly in key countries to force the pace of political reform into a process of rapid devolution, partly affected by the declining economic weight of the African resource economies. The relationship of trade unionism to nationalism, a major subject in the literature, became extremely important in this context.

African nationalists, albeit confronting different regimes in political outlook, were also deeply interested in exploiting new openings to advance their own agendas. Putting it simply, they were able to leverage timid colonial initiatives, intended in a gradualist spirit and often without endangering the interests of white settler communities, into major political concessions that could speed up the drive to independence that would proceed at a far faster pace than anticipated. Moreover they could fasten on the ability of strikers seriously to cripple the economic life of colonies, at a time when the halting post-war recovery of France and Britain depended on them to some degree. In the Gold Coast, the mine and rail strikes of 1947-48 paved the way for a rapid political advance. The Burns reform of 1946 had already opened the door towards self-government but a radical movement then undermined the idea of a slow transfer of power to a small, largely coastal, elite of professionals and businessmen. They were of course aware that to strike basic communications facilities and mining establishments, whether state or private, was also to strike right at the heart of the increasingly technocratic colonial state they dreamt of subverting. Kwame Nkrumah was the man who would break away from the originally formed political party of this indigeneous elite and enthuse a much wider public. In Nigeria, independence would not come before 1960

\[5 \text{ Until 1946, white unions hadn’t got really organised either on the copper mines.}\]
with many issues to be settled outside the sphere of labour but Brown has noted that the Iva Valley massacre of striking coal miners near Enugu in 1949 initiated a wave of sabotage and violence in eastern Nigerian cities and that ‘most Nigerians cite the Iva Valley Massacre as a primary event ending British colonialism in Nigeria.’ (Brown 2002, 283) In both cases, union recognition and devolution were roads to a new kind of political order.

However in many, probably most cases, the path was more crooked, and there were important variations. In the French colonies, a complication was the role of the CGT and its links to the French Communist Party as the Cold War deepened. However, the PCF in France accepted the idea of a French Union and discouraged or opposed nationalist movements aimed at independence. Thus until the final collapse of French rule in 1962, it opposed Algerian independence and Algerian trade unionism played little role in the midst of a brutal ongoing armed struggle (Weiss 1970). By contrast, in Tunisia the main body of the trade union movement left the pro-Communist WFTU for the ICTFU in 1951 of which it became a steadfast and important member. An American observer considered it ‘a pilot movement for free trade unionism’. (Beling 1965, 101) A dockers’ strike sustained by an affiliate of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens sealed a crucial alliance between the union movement and the Neo-Destour Party which Habib Bourguiba would lead to independence. Once the UGTT joined the ICTFU, Bourguiba actually attended the next general meeting of the convention of the more conservative of the American labour federations, the American Federation of Labour. (Beling 1965; Ahmed 1966)

Near the other end of the African continent, the Southern Rhodesian government was anything but eager for a peaceful road to majority rule. From the late 1950s after some rather quiescent years the nationalist movement leapt ahead although it was fraught with divisions and the thrusting ambitions of new actors. In this context, the most senior trade unionists such as Mzingeli and Jamela were effectively bypassed and marginalised (Scarnecchia 2008). Here the historical course was more like that in Algeria than Tunisia; after the Universal Declaration of Independence in 1965 the nationalist movements were illegal and turned to an armed struggle. Although certainly trade unionists sometimes got involved and were imprisoned and tortured, the movement as a whole, which contained links to the ICFTU-- which did support African nationalism purged of any Red elements (Raftopoulos and Phimister 1997)--was rather weak and played little political role in the UDI years. The contrast to draw with Britain’s other major settler colonies, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, is striking. In Kenya, while officials balked at dealing with radicals, they gradually came to terms with trade unionism. Cooper shows how a generalised sense of insurgency and discontent that would sweep Mombasa in waves gave way to a situation where the crucial port workers accepted for the most part a structured and licit trade union organisation with rights and a place in civil society. (Cooper 1987) Moreover in Tom Mboya, a leader who was respected in the West but was no stooge and able to assist in trade union development under some real condition of autonomy, a key figure was found with no equivalent at the time in Southern Rhodesia.

On the Copperbelt, the situation was somewhere in between. (Henderson 1973; Larmer 2007) The legal union movement, the African Mineworkers’ Union, also found a substantial but politically moderate leader in Lawrence Katilungu. Katilungu played an important role in tolerating the actual creation of a Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in 1953 but as Northern Rhodesian black nationalism took off, the union came into increasing tension with it, foreshadowing the important historic opposition between left nationalism and union organisation in this economically important hub. Still the union was prepared to join a United Trade Union Congress which itself in 1961 affiliated with the United National Independence Party led by Kenneth Kaunda, which would take Northern Rhodesia out of federation with Southern Rhodesia and create the republic of Zambia in 1964. Here the point was not the good will of UNIP but the fact that the AMWU had been able to steadily improve the prospects and wages of black miners and with them of the mining towns. At the same time, these miners jostled with the large minority of white workers who continued to earn far more in a racially defined workplace so they had themselves a deep commitment to nationalism. This is perhaps a key general comment to make as well: the ordinary worker, whether in Dakar or Bulawayo, was moved by nationalist rhetoric and did not understand trade unionism in this era as something apart from politics, deracialisation and an end to colonial rule. Katilungu was sidelined and driven from office in 1960, sharing the fate of his less politically driven colleagues south of the Zambesi. Where colonial rule continued without plans for change, notably in Portuguese colonies of course, repression of worker movements inevitably continued.
Awkward Customers

Towards the end of his study of labour and colonialism in post-war Africa, Cooper points to the Schadenfreude apparent in comments from British and French colonial officials witnessing the end of the road and thinking about their African successors having to deal with these awkward customers, the trade unions. Would they have more success in this department? In fact, the story is a complex one and the phases shift such that it is really impossible to come up with a concrete answer for the fifty plus countries of the continent as governments come and go.

The new governments’ views on labour were changeable and at times one aspect dominated over others. On the one hand, the labour movements were an important and impressive power base that leaders were most reluctant to see pass to a legal or illegal opposition. Moreover, it continued to be the case that unionised workers for either multi-nationals or the government itself were in strategically very crucial positions to make publicity, dominate the capital or prevent strategic Installations from working so their influence in a strike was outsize. On the other hand, most African countries ceased soon to be democracies and Presidencies resented sharing power. If there were to be unions, they needed to be structured logically and hierarchically with recognisable leaders themselves under the watchful eye of those in power in the state. Moreover, development, according to the theories of well-disposed economists such as Simon Kuznets and W. Arthur Lewis, meant competitiveness and competitiveness meant keeping the wages, especially of low-skilled workers, down. Eventually according to the Kuznets theory, with developmental success would come higher skill levels and higher wages. For Lewis, this meant that the peasant masses would start to be mopped up in modern forms of employment. Key nationalist figures such as Senegalese President Léopold Sedar Senghor took this to heart. Lewis himself was for a time a key figure in the policy entourage of the Osagyefo, Kwame Nkrumah.

However in some countries the state did not exert very tight controls. In Senegal unions were closely linked to particular political parties. The Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal was aligned with ruling party but eventually it acquired more autonomy. Rival federations emerged and Alfred Inis Ndiiaye sees this drive to autonomy as a central theme of union history. In 2000 the CNTS finally abandoned the party link as it was swept from power. (Ndiiaye 2010) The Nigerian Labour Congress, which had enjoyed considerable autonomy once reorganised by the post- Biafra War military regime despite the state’s intentions, continued a relatively autonomous existence until it was suppressed for a time, first after a general strike in 1988 and then by the kleptocrat-dictator Sani Abacha between 1994 and his fortuitous death three years later. It had been formed from a multitude of smaller unions forced to create a federation and was later also forced to abjure links with any particular political party during the phases of civilian rule in Nigeria. Andræ and Beckman stress that by the time of the revival from the Abacha years, the unions organised two million Nigerian workers.6 (Andræ and Beckman 1998)

Unions were especially significant in North Africa given the relative complexity of the economy despite the repressive examples of Libya and Algeria.7 In Egypt, the Nasser military government at first ruthlessly repressed an important strike (Kafr-al-Dawar, 1952). However Nasser found the union movement important to encourage, empowered it while inserting state controls and allowed it to expand, creating the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions, intended to replace numerous patrimonial unions while pursuing ambitious plans to advance the industrial development of the country. This was hardly a hands-off labour regime but in its socialist phase in the 1960s there is no doubt that workers were able to achieve higher living standards, the working class grew substantially and the working class received unprecedented acknowledgment as a force in society. The aura of this lingers until today. An important wing of the trade unions as of recent years still thinks in terms of the Nasserist tradition, a kind of parallel to the Peronist tradition of Argentine labour politics. (Beinin and Lockman 1988, Posusney 1997) As Posusney points out, attempts at liberalising the economy at the expense of workers already on the part of Nasser’s successor Sadat, and then of Mubarak after Sadat’s assassination, were frequently

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6 They argue convincingly for a union and labour history separated conceptually from the usual political narratives.

7 To be fair, however, the union movement in exile during the Algerian war for independence turned to workers’self-government models à la yougoslave and these had some purchase and significance under FLN rule.
attempted, met with stolid resistance and were often compromised or withdrawn. (also see Beinin 2001) Union leaders won lustre saving jobs in pursuing defensive strategies while incurring state patronage.

A striking feature of North African trade unionism has been the important role of highly skilled, professional workers. This is one reason why the UGTT after a period of strife was able to adjust to a changing economy in Tunisia. Indeed whatever its limitations, Beinin has described the Tunisian union confederation as notoriously the 'strongest labor federation in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s.' (Beinin 2001, 137) Tunisia by comparison with Egypt reads like the story of a good marriage with bad interludes. The excellent initial relations between the Bourguiba regime and the union movement, a powerful component in his support network, went through different phases as economic conditions altered affecting employment opportunities and in response to government frustration at overly contentious internal union democracy. Despite a paper organisation based around logic and order, in reality, Tunisian unions formed a lively political debating society under the surface and frequently unionists challenged federation and government policies (Cavallo 2008).

The two obvious wings of Tunisian labour consisted of white-collar workers and proletarian men in extractive industries. Their impressive respectively chosen leaders, Ahmad ben Sallah and Habib Achour, alternated dramatically in the favour of the state in a complex political game that shifted around. Achour was the hero of a series of strikes that broke the labour peace and defied attempts at economic rationalisation in 1969 but subsequently he became a close ally of Bourguiba. However things became more difficult as economic conditions changed with greater problems of unemployment and insecurity. Thus episodes of repression were followed by renewed linkages under Bourguiba and later Ben Ali. (Ahmed 1966) Owen reports that both Tunisia and Egypt represented models taken up throughout the entire Arab world in terms of the incorporation of labour. (Owen 2002)

Morocco was another story again. Here there were several union federations and unions operated more freely but as pressure groups linked usually to political parties with more and less influential periods depending on the balance of the day. Here too the politics of state-union relations could be byzantine. Relatively good labour legislation was matched by poor implementation and surveillance. (Cairioli 2011)

Independent Ghana’s cocoa economy on which the state depended was in trouble by 1960 and the new industries that the Nkrumah government set up unprofitable. The result was collision: unlike Nasser and Bourguiba, Kwame Nkrumah was unable to offer workers much and the offer with time was steadily reduced. The result was that the radical state and the unions fell out for all the fine plans aimed at a developmental trajectory. An iconic moment was the large-scale failed transport strike of 1961 as economic conditions were deteriorating fast, centred in the port and railway twin cities of Sekondi and Takoradi. By this time, as Richard Jeffries writes, the CPP had long since alienated the one-time star of the railway union show and scourge of colonial officiodom, Pobee Biney. Biney, whom Jeffries describes as a militant nationalist and an anti-Communist socialist, was a sad case who rejected the prospect of a political career and by 1961 was employed as a security officer. (Jeffries 1975) Unsurprisingly after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the new Ghanaian rulers let the trade union movement, not that they much liked it, go its own way organisationally as times became harder. In various stages, workers experienced a phase of pro-union government under General Ignatius Acheampong (1972-78) who courted them in fact and then fairly harsh conflict with Jerry Rawlings when he came to power and imposed a neo-liberal settlement on the country not long after his 1981 coup.

Nigeria provides very good examples of the situation of a relatively free trade union movement albeit one which has failed to realise the long-standing dream of forming a union-friendly Labour Party. However the NLC, which proved able to accommodate independent-minded trade unionists despite the fears of democrats initially, failed to prevent key units of the labour movement from suffering the moral and physical decline in phases that has too often been seen in the international history of labour.

Nigeria is a society shot through with patronage structures and the unions have certainly fallen victim to them both before and after the NLC was born. Thus Paul Lubeck reported on a textile union in Kano where ‘...the union deteriorated into a management-sanctioned extortion agency, forced workers, especially recent rural origin migrants, to pay initiation fees and monthly dues...when interviewed, almost all workers denounced the union as useless, corrupt and exploitive…’ (Lubeck 1975). In a contemporary study of the tobacco factory in Zaria, Dorothy Remy described the union as ineffectual and the labour
structure dominated by an ‘ethnically-based patronage system’. (Remy 1975, 176) Yet the Nigerian union movement has hardly been moribund. It went on an impressive general strike in 1964 and Andrae and Beckman stress that large industrially structured factories also generated not merely union activity but a labour regime but one shot through with the participation of relatively democratic union power by contrast to the patrimonial social ties reported by Lubeck or Remy in smaller plants. General strikes later followed by commissions advocating large salary increases (Adebo, 1970/71, Udoji 1975-76) were massively popular events that particularly improved the life chances of civil servants. In the 1980s and later, the unions led general strikes in 1981 and 1988 (Andrae and Beckman 1998) and they structured a major range of protest actions over 2008-09. They were in the vanguard of organising resistance to increases to the low domestic petrol price, a historic public benefit which did not suit liberal economic strategies. The strength of the union movement has partly lain in the private sector; in between the Sahara and the Limpopo, Nigeria had the strongest industrial economy outside of state control by a long way but it has been badly affected, often devastated, by Chinese imports. (Sha 2012)

For another consideration of a relationship that was not merely a contentious marriage but one that ultimately fell apart, one could turn back to Zambia and the copper miners whose product fell precipitately in value, turning into shreds national development planning based on newly-nationalised copper. Even before that, the copper miners and indeed the Copperbelt region and the important Bemba ethnic group who were strongest there, had taken the form of a challenge to President Kenneth Kaunda. In 1971 Simon Kapwepwe, Copperbelt politician, tried to establish a rival political party to UNIP but was nipped in the bud by the proclamation of the one-party state. The stifling of union influence in Lusaka created a seed of alienation that started to blossom as the economy faltered and Kapwewe began to be remembered as a forerunner of justifiable dissent. (Larmer 2008) A decade later, it was clear that this had begun a restless yearning for independence and a loss of faith in the union that the state could ever be a real workers’ state even though the conflict between them was not entirely overt until late in the 1980s. It is uncertain what might have happened had the one-party state not been in effect. As in Ghana, while it is not that the unionists were not infused with nationalism, especially vis-à-vis expatriate whites, it was a different shade of nationalism than the form politicians such as Kaunda were trying to consolidate. (Larmer 2007)

Trade Unions and Struggles for Democracy in Africa 1990-2015

A new approach to trade unions and politics in Africa has surfaced linking trade union activity and militancy to political struggles against authoritarian regimes. This approach is influenced by the idea of civil society as a force for good. This is not a question of Gramscian civil society where the idea was to infuse and transform civil society with revolutionary transformational ideas. It fits rather the broader, essentially liberal, picture of a society of free institutions and forces operating as interest groups. Labour in this perspective is something less than a voice speaking for all of society. Nonetheless this new democracy literature is very respectful of the positive influence that organised workers are able to bear on society. (Kraus 2007)

There are therefore elements here which easily refer back to the post-World War II heyday of union emergence. Unions have continued to occupy both strategically pivotal positions in their relevant sectors; in addition they can focus popular anger, as was done in a number of massive protests in Nigeria over petrol price rises and galvanise a much bigger public. Kraus has surprised us with a list of countries where trade union protest has been very important in regime change: Mali, Niger, Congo and even the Central African Republic, countries virtually lacking in industrial production. (Kraus 2007, 2) However, he also mentions a major strike wave in Algeria in 1987-88 and here we have exactly the situation which would recur in quite a few other places: a strong state with historically Left credentials that at one time offered workers a sense of centrality in the development process and benefits within that process that were tangible. In Algeria as elsewhere, the changes in world capitalism from the later 1970s made this increasingly untenable. Such governments went in for structural adjustment, partly through compulsion from aid donors. Cuts in the very large previously secure workforces in infrastructural and industrial operations, that were not profitable and now vulnerable to privatisations, squeezed the life out of the political compacts typical of the 1960s in country after country.

In Algeria, the big strike wave led to the union movement moving away from an institutional alliance
with the state on a subordinate basis to a freer situation as existed in Nigeria or Kenya already and was simultaneously manifesting itself in Senegal. In Ghana, the Trade Union Congress chafed under the military rule of Jerry Rawlings and led protests especially as the regime adopted a democratic dispensation and was eventually replaced. (Abrahamsen 2000).

When the TPFL succeeded in ousting the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in 1991, this group of revolutionaries with a strong socialist formation, allowed a long repressed union movement to reform but in so doing they replicated the conflicts typical of a generation before and the unions were shut down with leaders exiled. The state again classically created a new federation under tighter control. This has not worked out well despite Ethiopia’s impressive development project. Unions disliked the restructured federal policy of Meles Zenawi still in place and one may well wonder if union incorporation as a state strategy will not be abandoned in time. (Markakis 2011) Alternatively it is possible that the high growth figures of the early 21st century will build towards structural transformations with wide public benefits as in China.

A far better-known situation given its historical importance was the one in Zambia. UNIP’s rule weakened steadily in the 1980s and the government was forced to rescind efforts to raise prices and, on the mines, to reduce services; as it became more threadbare, the state’s once substantial services diminished in value. (Larmer 2007) Kaunda was in such a weak position that he was forced to concede a return to multi-party elections in 1990 after twenty years. The man of the hour, and his best-known and most formidable opponent, was the miner leader Frederick Chiluba, who became the front-runner of a new political party that won the national election of 1991. Obviously trade unionists at first expected that he would do everything he could to shore up a deteriorating living situation. Instead Chiluba famously asked the mineworkers to ‘die a little’. The Zambian economy, given the hostile prescriptions of aid donors, was in terrible shape. Ever tighter austerity was called for and at the end of the decade, the mines were returned to private ownership as were other national economic institutions. Chiluba became a very rich man, belying his former reputation for probity, in this hard-nosed environment. The Chiluba Labour Code outlawed sympathy strikes, opened the door to contract work, and limited collective bargaining across the industry. Through the first decade of democracy, the lives of miners became harder and step by step the union movement lost members and traction and began to separate itself from the state. In the Zambian case this would push by steps towards a separation from party politics entirely (Larmer 2007) The Zambian narrative however enables us to underscore an important point. African workers have not necessarily turned against dictatorships; they have turned against dictatorships imposing structural adjustment and hitting at their material interests. This in turn may well make them see the Leader of the day as the enemy who must be toppled. However in general democracy has not of itself brought better conditions economically or, more crucially, a change in priorities. Nonetheless workers are apt to settle for autonomy, organisational rights and the ability to take on the state or employers on particular issues, especially concerning dismissals or a loss of valued benefits.

In Zambia there has lately been a definite renaissance of a sort. Disorganised Zambian initiatives had little to do with it. Instead it was the product of a dramatic increase in demand for Zambian copper amongst many other natural products, above all by the rising economic star of China. The unions had their traditions and revived but they were and are no longer united and their economic demands have varying levels of success. There are many wildcat strikes and, particularly in the time of President Michael Sata, the state has intervened in particular cases to save jobs or intervene on behalf of workers, as a kind of patriotic patron. The Chinese are quite willing to recognise and negotiate with the fragmented mines union movement but organised workers have to cope with a very large unorganised contract work component. Conditions are still far worse in construction, where Chinese corporations are equally active and almost no union activity occurs. (Lee 2014)

South of the Zambesi, an interesting history also unfolded. When the Lancaster House settlement brought an end to the guerrilla war and allowed a universal suffrage election which brought the ZANU-PF government to power in 1980, there was an outpouring of worker activity and even some factory takeovers where the union movement had shown little militancy for many years. The new government responded with severe repression, worker leaders being imprisoned and tortured. The government proceeded then along lines now very well-established in Africa to create a Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions, rationalised and closely watched. Certainly there was hope that a dynamic economic policy would be accompanied by the state expediting improved labour conditions; this was borne out to a limited extent in
the next few years. However with the end of Zimbabwe’s status as a Front Line state, pressure from the West to rationalise, reduce government budgets and tear down protectionist barriers intensified; Zimbabwean-instituted structural adjustment—ESAP—failed to improve the core economy. As organised workers saw their wages fall in value, they rallied behind a trade union movement now infused with vitality led by Morgan Tsvangarai; conflict and strikes intensified. In 1999 Tsvangarai, at first uninterested in party politics, accepted the leadership of the Movement for Democratic Change to challenge long-time President Robert Mugabe. (Raftopoulos and Phimister 1997; Matombo and Sachikonye 2010)

The MDC was no labour party; indeed Tsvangarai was no socialist. Strongly supported by foreign funded NGOs, leaning on the grievances of ethnic siNdebele speakers and with the assistance also of the remaining white community where no love was lost for Mugabe, it never produced any clear strategy aimed at workers and, when finally in 2008 it entered the government as a junior partner, it cannot be said to have done anything concrete to sustain the unions. Indeed it can be argued that the movement fell into the arms of what would normally have been the workers’ antagonists. Obviously, the union membership which by the late 1990s were already becoming victims of state-directed violence and persecution, favoured an opening up of the political system and the widening of Zimbabwean democracy but were hardly stalwart supporters of neo-liberal policy; the relationship with the MDC weakened. In the end Mugabe remained in power despite the poor economic condition of the country which greatly reduced the number of the regularly employed. It was the recharged unions which failed to create a telling new kind of politics. (Yeros 2013)

The complex relationship of trade unionism, democracy and the state is at least as central to an assessment of what has gone on yet further south beyond the Limpopo.

The literature on South African unions is so large that only a very brief set of ideas will be set forth here. (but see Freund 2007) During the 1950s, the Trade and Labour Council dissolved and a sharp divide existed between the successor Trade Union Congress (which also shed the most right wing member organisations) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions, overwhelmingly black in membership. SACTU was strongly influenced by the illegal Communist Party and turned its attention in time to the armed struggle adopted by the African National Congress primarily. By the middle 1960s, while not actually defunct, it hardly existed except amongst a few bureaucrats in exile. However from the start of the next decade, a new wave of strikes and labour resistance were set in motion in at first prosperous times and devoted young activists helped to forge new unions that liked to describe themselves as non-racial and independent. The state, partially responding partly to a general new spirit of resistance as the economy went into much lower gear and partly to disorder in the workplaces, set in motion, via the Wiehahn Commission, steps which would start to legalise these unions in 1979 and permit their registration, at first a matter of deep contention.

The success of the new unionism was spectacular marked by bigger and bigger strikes, whether legal or not took place, and the ANC, despite its attachment to SACTU, began to realise the importance of the movement. In 1985 in Durban after lengthy discussions, the Congress of South African Trade Unions was born. Soon after a delegation went to Harare and agreed to suborn itself politically to the ANC. This was an extraordinary movement that developed a strong tradition of democratic leadership through its shop stewards, the culture of report-backs and a discourse about radical social change. (Baskin 1991; Friedman 1987, Seidman 1994) It lacked significant middle class allies and was also often utopian with contradictions that took time to surface; it never held the ANC accountable. COSATU restructured the differently constituted unions into large bodies that gradually and inevitably, especially after the negotiations that led to the end of the apartheid era, became bureaucratised and distant from ordinary workers.

In the early period of ANC government, trade unions were empowered by favourable legislation. After all, the biggest general strike of all in 1992 had brought four million workers out in the streets. With their write-off membership fees, provident and investment funds, they were by African standards organisations with real financial clout. Trade union leaders were taken up into cabinet positions, top posts in the party and parliament as indeed continues to be the case to the present and the government defines itself as the core of a Triple Alliance with the Communist Party and COSATU. However, initial ambitious ideas whereby the unions would help mould social policies of real substance never came about. (Freund 2013)
The secretary-general of COSATU, Jay Naidoo, was quickly removed from his super-cabinet post aimed at realising the union-backed Reconstruction and Development Program. The National Economic Development and Labour Council, which was initially proposed as a powerful consultative corporatist institution, never acquired teeth. The second ANC president, Thabo Mbeki, was business orientated and had a poor relationship with COSATU and its ideals. The unionists co-opted by the government showed little interest in holding to those ideals in any case.

The union movement, looked at more profoundly, also came up against serious structural issues. (Buhlungu 2005, Barchiesi 2011, Webster and von Holdt 2005) It was unable to save jobs where restructuring took place or to prevent a massive infusion of contracts that replaced permanent workforces in many sectors. It could not organise domestic workers, security workers or agricultural workers beyond very small numbers. COSATU came to depend more and more on state employees such as nurses and teachers as its core members. Yet the lack of real independence for union leaders rankled. From 2012 the important National Union of Mineworkers started to lose members to new upstart militants with little ideological coherence; the discontent of platinum miners at conditions which had been part of a negotiated bargain led to a situation where more than 30 miners were killed during a strike at Marikana. (Alexander 2013, Hayem 2014) Tensions with the other strong private sector union, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, also came to the boil and in 2014-15 NUMSA broke away, the general secretary of COSATU was removed and the question of a new independent trade unionism advanced. It might also be mentioned that Solidarity, which arose out of the more pragmatic fragments of the former white union movement, has deracialised formally and has the reputation of a very professional and successful organisation focussed on skilled workers. (Visser 2008) What brings this story in line with events further north is the gradual disaggregation of the state-union alliance and the thinking behind it although at the time of writing this process is still far from complete.

At the other end of the African continent, the Arab Spring in 2011 had some of the same impact as the liberation movement in South Africa, different but with parallels, in which trade unions and their political involvements were very important. In 2006 a massive strike broke out at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in a small city, al-Mahalla al-Kubra. This giant textile mill dominated the local economy. The strike, which concerned withheld bonuses (and involved a considerable number of women) was a complete success and the state, which owned the plant, gave in. This strike is generally seen as having been a great wake-up call for Egyptian workers. The Nasserist labour system was by this time in decay. Workers constantly had to be anxious about the growth of privatisation which could cost jobs and about heavily bureaucratised structures which offered little space for protests or solidarity. (Visser 2008) Tensions with the other strong private sector union, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, also came to the boil and in 2014-15 NUMSA broke away, the general secretary of COSATU was removed and the question of a new independent trade unionism advanced. It might also be mentioned that Solidarity, which arose out of the more pragmatic fragments of the former white union movement, has deracialised formally and has the reputation of a very professional and successful organisation focussed on skilled workers. (Visser 2008) What brings this story in line with events further north is the gradual disaggregation of the state-union alliance and the thinking behind it although at the time of writing this process is still far from complete.

The bracing new politics flowed in and out of labour contexts. Still more complicated was the situation as political organisation formed but without an alternative that spoken clearly to workers taken up in these new currents. Masses of people turned to the venerable Muslim Brotherhood Party, the Wafd’s old rivals, which captured the presidency in democratic elections and the more radically Islamic Salafists. The new president Mohammed Mursi turned to old ETUF bureaucrats as his allies. These had no programme for labour beyond minor concessions and trade unionists divided between those whose hostility to Mursi was such as to push them to mesh with many supporters of the old regime into the arms of General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi who seized power in 2013 and those who continued to stress the belief in political democracy first and foremost. A prominent unionist in time-honoured fashion was named al-Sisi’s Minister of Labour. Up against an entrenched system enmeshed with military power in the economy and
a formidable establishment embedded in the Egyptian state, the labour movement relished its new-found freedom but did not really find a structural form to bring significant institutional change to bear. (Alexander and Bassiouney 2014)

This conjuncture, still perhaps far from an outcome, seems less favourable than the apparently parallel situation in Tunisia. Tunisia also had a very well-established harness to hold in place the labour movement created in Bourguiba’s time. Especially under his successor Ben Ali, who first used and then turned against the unions, the movement nevertheless tended to break away and become genuinely far more independent while hosting a rich array of political ideas and traditions never entirely abandoned. Here too the Arab Spring revolt, in putting paid to Ben Ali, had an important labour component. The phosphate miners of Gafsa struck at the start of the crisis and the regime disintegrated when the UGTT called a general strike in Tunisia. However the unions, who established from this point a reasonable understanding with employers, stayed politically neutral as Tunisians voted and formed a critical bloc of stability that has so far helped to keep Tunisian democracy in operation.

In Conclusion

This discussion has hopefully indicated that the union movement in Africa has undergone an evolution that can now be traced briefly. With organisational ideas brought in through settler communities in colonial times and encouragement from colonial reform regimes that felt the need for a less despotic order in work contexts, trade unions emerged in Africa and acquired membership and leadership in the African population. The late colonial context was such as to promote an insoluble mix of ideas that married nationalism, the striving for independence and hostility to racial privilege, with more traditional trade union demands.

While the picture is not uniform, independence then brought up a radically different situation whereby the state, typically the biggest employer of labour, tried to create a different balance, reorganising federations, co-opting militant leaders and serving as patrons to a working class that could benefit from legislation stabilising jobs and conditions. The results here were variable and depended increasingly on the economic situation. Where economic decline was engaged by fierce structural adjustment imprecations, workers were alienated from the nationalist state. They turned against it and, where they could, worked towards making unions more independent.

The call for political democracy played another siren song. It is possible to say that workers who struggled to build up trade unions bought first into the dream of national independence under a party run by indigenous Africans at one time and, at another, they have bought into the dream of democracy. Neither trajectory has however been more than ambiguously or temporarily successful by themselves in making a better life for most members. Today organised workers in Africa can look back on a rich history with many lessons; they take up the cudgels for their interests willingly and effectively very often but, lacking a more wide-reaching agenda, the arrival of a democratic dispensation has by no means necessarily brought material rewards. Whether they will search for a new answer remains to be seen.

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The Migration of Ethiopian Female Domestic Workers to the Middle East: Towards an Understanding of the Conundrum

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Introduction

Labour exchange has long been a medium of interaction between peoples of different countries and continents. Africa and Asia are among these continents who have had historical experience of interactions among their peoples. There were times when Asians had immigrated to Africa looking for wage employment. A case in point is the story of indentured labourers in South Africa, Mauritius and East Africa. So did Africans to Asian countries for the same purpose. The relatively recent of these migratory process was the one in which millions of Ethiopian female domestic workers flocked into the Middle Eastern countries namely; Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain and other Gulf States.

For decades since the 1960 and 1970s varying number of Ethiopians went to the above-mentioned destinations to make a living out of a wide range of employment opportunities, predominantly menial jobs, those economies have offered. The subject has also captured the attention of academics and other writers alike with some degree of success in providing a glimpse of the causes and patterns of the migration of Ethiopian women workers that has taken shape from the middle of the twentieth century all the way to the present. But then an air of confusion, marked by blurred boundaries among some of the technical terms used both in public discourse and academic literature, prevailed. Despite their different meanings, concepts and terms that often been compounded together include, among others, trafficking and smuggling, and especially the Amharic word delala (literally broker). Before we follow the strands of issues related to the origins and genesis of the migration of Ethiopian female domestic workers (EFDW here after) in this paper, we need to set a conceptual clarity by way of providing a working definition to most of the hazy terms and concepts often used in the narration.

In this paper we shall try to provide a sober analysis the various factors responsible for these exodus of Ethiopians to the Middle East which are generically known as the “push and pull” factors. Not withstanding with the sentimental conclusions by a good number of writers as though labour migration is a unique curse that has befallen Ethiopia humiliating its citizens and tarnishing its image, I argue in this paper that it is of mutual benefit to both the supplier and the destination countries. For Ethiopia especially, other than the huge remittance money it generates, the labour migration under study could be seen as a “vent for surplus[labour]” for which there is an abundant supply beyond the capacity of the economy to absorb. Under normal circumstances and if properly managed, it is a form of wage employment or trade in labour for which Africa and Asia have had a historic tradition that goes back to the 19th century if not beyond.

The number of emigrants from Ethiopia showed a marked rise during the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. Right form the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, owing to local and international developments the smooth flow of migrants and their
lives in the destination countries faced a new predicament. One can hardly claim business as usual in a situation where media outlets were filled with reports of horror and outrageous crimes as exemplified by the following piece from an English news paper in Ethiopia. “In recent years the upsetting news of suicides, killings, beatings or violence and other inhumane acts have been everyday occurrences from the Gulf States in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular.” (The Reporter 7 December 2013). This paper attempts to investigate what went wrong, and where did it go wrong, in the otherwise smoothly going process of labour migration remunerative to all parties involved. Through an objective examination of the political sociology and power relations in the labour migration operations, this paper attempts to demonstrate where the major loop wholes were created, and what should and/or could have been done to keep the industry legal and sustainable.

An Overview

The ideal point to start the discussion in this paper would be to provide a working definition for the unit of analysis- the Ethiopian female domestic workers. These are Ethiopian women who have been migrating to countries of the Middle East seeking wage employment. The various renderings in the discourse dealing with the migration of Ethiopian women to those countries has often been confused with other criminal acts such as human trafficking and smuggling. The problem of capturing the precise meaning and essence of very crucial concepts such as labour migration, human trafficking and smuggling, distinct from one another, has become more discernible even in some research works. (provide examples). By describing the what of labour migration, and clearly identifying the points of divergence and convergence with other forms of cross- broader movement of people, not only would I provide a conceptual clarity to the various key terms and concepts, but also attempt to cleanse it from the generalizations, confusions and putative assumptions that tends to put all in one pack, or use these terms and concepts interchangeably as though they are one and the same. This in part is what it takes to do justice to our understanding of the phenomenon and dynamics of the migration of Ethiopian domestic workers that took shape in much of the second half of the 20th century and after.

A range of alternative mechanisms have been used to facilitate transnational movement of people from one country to other countries. Some are legal and others are illegal. There are those migrants who made it to various destinations through the active role played by traffickers, smugglers and organized criminal groups, their lives often exposed to enumerable risks that might even lead to loss of life en route. These all could be put in one bracket as illegal operations. Article 3 (A) of the 2000 “UN Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons…” provides the following definition that helps to uncover what is meant by Human trafficking including its characteristic features;

Trafficing in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, [emphasis added] of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.

On accounts of the Palermo Protocol , therefore, the least one can say is that the use of force or other forms of coercion is essential to determine whether or not an act of trafficking is committed. Nevertheless, the main problem arising from this very broad and fluid definition is that, it casts doubt even on those migrations which start as a voluntary and legal process. For example, there is a possibility for some of the migrations facilitated by legal operators and through contractual agreements to end up with abuses, coercion, unpaid wages and systematic bondage, such as the one imposed by the sponsorship systems in most host countries. This indeed may allow some one to argue that a condition of trafficking has occurred. In this case evidence of consent and willful actions of the
migrant at the recruitment stage and in the process of migration will be invalid if the consent is believed to have been gained through deception or under the threat of force. What matters more, however, was not the consent as such but the means the consent has been secured. On the practical plane, however, contracts for domestic work have been signed willingly without the need to go for coercion or deceptions (Jureidini 2008:136).

The two terms of “trafficking” and “smuggling” seem to share some commonalities that make constructing a sharp divide between the two a very difficult enterprise. The fact that the Ethiopian law has not provided a precise legal definition to those terms/concepts is another inhibition to furnish a standard definition with any degree of confidence and credibility. The prevailing blurred boundaries between those concepts continued, and will continue for some time creating inconsistency in the discourses and even in the application of the law when transgressions are committed. Of the various definitions about “trafficking” and “smuggling,” and differences between them, I found the following succinct explanation by Lois Shelly comprehensive and instructive, hence worth quoting here:

Illegal movement of persons generally encompasses two related activities: migrant smuggling and the trafficking of persons for the purpose of exploitation. In short, both activities involve the recruitment, movement, and delivery of migrants from a host to a destination state. What separates the two activities, however, is that the traffickers enslave and exploit trafficked persons, while smuggled migrants have a consensual relationship at the onset with their smugglers. Moreover, many smuggled individuals are free at the end of their journey or after a period of indentured servitude (Shelly 2010:8).

The role of intermediaries in this growing industry has always been unavoidably indispensable. They are very important actors facilitating all the require formalities to get through from the stage of recruitment up to the final departure. In the Ethiopian context, the intervention of intermediaries might take multiple forms at various stages, but the actors are known by an almost generic Amharic designation Delalal, the English equivalent of which is broker. People in this category chiefly include owners of the legally established Private Employment Agencies, unlicensed brokers and unlicensed private operators. The tendency of using a broker and a licensed agent interchangeably is a major source of confusion. Neither is there a clear legally endorsed definition and usage of these particular terms. At times there are also social networks such as relatives and friends, whether paid or unpaid to deliver the service of bridging connections between recruiters/employers and prospective domestic workers (Fernandez 2013: 823).

The other major misapprehension that surrounded these actors has been the arbitrary use of the labeling “legal” and “illegal.” In some writings all those migrations facilitated by unauthorized private operators and through social networks are compounded together and labeled as “illegal” often with the same scale and tone as human trafficking and smuggling. They often are described as the sources of all evils that take place whether in the course of migrations or after arrival in destination countries. On the one hand, there are unlicensed intermediaries and operators who facilitate the trans-border movement of Ethiopians fulfilling visa procedures and by means of air transport. On the other hand, a lot more young Ethiopian female workers also flew to various destinations after securing work contracts through informal social networks. Family members, relatives or friends of either the employer in destination countries or the prospective migrants who have an earlier connection are instrumental in these kinds of operations. Officials in MoLSA claim that, over the past couple of decades, an equally large number, if not more, female domestic workers must have left Ethiopia through these irregular channels without being registered on the record and their contract detail unknown to the Ministry (Interview with Astawesegn). My impression is that it may be reasonably fair to refer to those migrants in this category as “undocumented/unauthorised emigrants” than “illegal emigrants.”
Some concepts and phraseologies clearly from the domain of work and labour relations have become salient in the works of reporters, professionals and junior researchers to express the prevalent exploitations, abuses and wide range of maltreatments migrant domestic workers are subjected to in the destination countries. For Example “debt bondage,” “modern day slavery,” “forced labor,” “white slavery” are some of these arbitrarily used phrases. (MoFA & MoLSA 2010:13-14). This they do by associating labour migrations with the acts of human trafficking or smuggling, or by just focusing on the abusive practices some victims experience in destination countries. Apparently people are less cautious and negligent to draw an appropriate demarcation while making reference to the two different things labour migration and slavery. They equate, with little or no pain, labour migration with slavery using eye-catching phrases such as “modern day slavery.” Presumably, writers might have used this style with the purpose of increasing the readability of their piece, or else they themselves were emotionally carried away at the time of writing.

Origins and Genesis

The above being said, we can now move on to the early origins of the migration of Ethiopia female domestic workers to various destinations in the Middle East. According to one recent study, the beginning of migrations in Ethiopia’s more recent history, goes back to the 1960s. Most of these migrations were either for education, and at times, for religious purposes (Asnake & Zerihun 2015: 106-107). I don’t intend to treat these particular types of migrations in any detail here, partly because they had less to do with labor migration, and partly because of the reason that destinations, to a large extent, had been western countries and some holy places of Islam and Christianity. This means they are less relevant to the stated objectives of this paper. Moreover, the size of the migrants that made exit through these means was insignificant and the impact minimal. Those migrations with profound socio-economic impact are yet to come. The closing years of the 1970s and the early years of the 1980s are said to have marked the beginning of labor migrations of a substantive scale and magnitude from Ethiopia to Arab and Gulf states. It was Ethiopian Muslim women pilgrims who traveled to Saudi Arabia to perform the rites of Hajj and Umra who first ventured to take both the risk and initiative of working as housemaids than returning home. Risk because these Ethiopian migrant workforce in Saudi Arabia were few in number because of various constraints until the size started to swell significantly in the decades to come (ibid; Emebet 2001:4).

Meanwhile, the military government of Ethiopia for the first time in history signed a bilateral labour agreement with the Socialist government of Bulgaria entitled “Protocol Regarding Ethiopian citizens Acquiring Training and Employment in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,” in the Year 1985. According to the original agreement 486 Ethiopians were to go to Bulgaria to acquire vocational training and get employment there for a total period of 60 months. The training format included a mid-level professional training in the areas of construction, machine building, light industries, agro-industry and maritime technology along with a six months language training (MoLSA Archive Folder no.5.2 pt 21). At last, a total of 492 Ethiopian youngsters from the age of 18-26 flew to Bulgaria in Mach 1985 - only 480 in the first group- to be followed by the rest 12 on the basis of the permission of the government of Bulgaria for their inclusion (A letter written from MoLSA to MoFA dated Yekatit 15 1978 E.C.) The derg government was conscientiously involved not only in the recruitment of this contingent but also by conducting a preliminary assessment sending a committee of experts to Bulgaria.

The early 1990s could be taken as a milestone in the history of labour migration from Ethiopia to countries of the Middle East. This decade witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of labor migrants

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1 On page 21, note 9 there is a discussion about a practice that was interpreted as “debt bondage.”
to Middle Eastern countries to have reached unprecedented new heights. According to one source, Lebanon alone was receiving 1000 female domestic workers from Ethiopia every month towards the end of the 1990s. It is important to note that only about half of these migrants used the legally recognised channel in order to make their exit from Ethiopia (MoFA & MoLSA 2010:7). Various internal and external factors were responsible in creating a favorable condition for such an exodus of migrant labourers to those destinations at that particular time. One such internal development with a considerable effect on the rising number of migrants was the lifting of travel restrictions imposed by the military government of Mengistu Hailemariam (1974-1991). The new EPRDF-led government that seized power in 1991 displacing the derg regime outrightly restored freedom of movement of Ethiopian citizens. Several Ethiopians unconditionally obtained passports and other travel documents which hitherto was an extremely painstaking process to the effect of deterring many young Ethiopians from traveling abroad (De Regt 2007:11; Asnake & Zerihun 2015: 109).

Fundamentally, however, the same old “push and pull factors” which are widely known in theories of migration as have been the underlying causes for labour migration do exist in the same or slightly different form to trigger the migration under discussion here. Among others, the rising demand for labour in Arab and Gulf states following the oil boom was a major “pull factor” that effectively motivated a lot of young Ethiopians to opt for migration to that part of the world. We also have the benefit of a hindsight to prove our premise that the subject under discussion indeed one among the many facets of labor migration. Further confirmation to this is the fact that the dominant majority of the emigrants are unemployed job seekers. According to one source unemployment and a very low family income are cited as have been accountable for women workers to emigrate looking for job and a new future. As can be learnt from the quote below, even the closet government Ministries to the issue at hand (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), seem to have acknowledged this fact.

Regarding their employment status the study confirmed that 73.3 % of the emigrants were unemployed prior to their emigration, while only 26.7 % were employed. What this implies is that one of the push factors that forced these women to emigrate was unemployment or their determination to get jobs. Low family income by itself had its role in pushing these women to go abroad. 45.2 % of those women [under this study] reported that their family income before emigration was less than 500 birr, and the study also shows that 86.8 % of these group came from a family that had six or more members. (MoFA & MoLSA 2010: 6).

Without downplaying as how significant is the pressure from families in forcing young women to look for jobs and better opportunities, it is worthy of note that the facts on the ground do not lead to conclude that poverty takes paramountcy over the labour element as a “push factor” for cross-border migration. The very poor and destitute ones could not afford the cost of cross-border emigration, and the rich, unless they are uninformed, will not consider sending their children to the Middle East as a good option. In fact an ILO sponsored study in 2011 preferred to take the stance that the two “push factors” are not mutually exclusive (ILO 2011: 8).

As this issue is very relevant to my argument, I would like to elaborate it a little farther. In as much as these migrants were unemployed youth the nation’s economy was unable to absorb, their emigration to other places where they can deploy their energy and make a living out of it, and even support family, is very normal gauged by whatever standards. Some of the outstanding positive impacts of migration induced some countries to acknowledge it as part of their long-term poverty reduction strategies. For example, apart from the huge financial benefits drawn from remittance, countries such as Ethiopia have been working hard to attract investment from its Diaspora population.
This indeed looks commendable as long as their migration is well managed and follow the legal procedure and channel.

It is against this backdrop that the “vent-for-surplus” model has been endorsed here as relevant in the analysis of the economic underpinnings behind the cross-border migration of EFDWs. First and foremost, labour migration has for long been a major vehicle used to circumvent the problem referred to in economic discourse as ‘disequilibrium in factor proportions.’ It is all about the incongruity between surplus labour and available resources, chiefly land and capital, in a given economy. The logic is simple. Leaving aside structural determinants, there is always the contention among labour, capital and natural resources. Development and Economic growth would be at a jeopardy when one of these factors has too much to supply, or too less to supply, disproportionate to the other factors of production (Myint 1965: 481).

The original assumption in the vent-for-surplus theory was that underdeveloped economies should enter into international trade so as to use their idle resources efficiently in order to respond to the rising demand from export trade. It is the idea of making effective use of resources call it, “surplus,” “idle”, or “abundant,” firmly poised in the vent-for-surplus theory, that impresses us here. In fact, Africanist scholars such as J.S. Hogendorn and A.G. Hopkins, had reservation on the fact that this model didn’t give the African farmer the place it deserves as a decisive actor in development Endeavours. What is relevant to us here is that they endorsed the basic assertion of this theory that Africa had land and labour in abundance, which are essential factors of production (Tosh 1980: 81; Smith 1976: 426). The most important bearing this discussion about the vent-for-surplus theory to the subject of female labour migration from Ethiopia is that it buttresses the argument that labour migration is not a curse or an evil misfortune that hit an unfortunate country or region in as much as the labour set for exist is surplus and not yet absorbed by the economy. This is demonstrably true given the fact that the most conspicuous “push factor” elaborately expressed in the literature is the dream for employment opportunity and better future. According to a survey collected by Gallup in 2007 46% of the Ethiopian youth have the “wish” to get the opportunity for exit even when they were well aware of the risks involved, sometimes leading to death before reaching the desired destinations. According to the UN Refugee Agency report more than 51,000 Ethiopians found themselves to have risked their lives in 2013 alone because of a risky journey to the Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden (Freedom House Report, 2014). My point is that distinctions have to made between migrations for employment on the one hand and criminal activities such as human trafficking and smuggling on the other. Sober and objective analysis is equally in the service of the interest of the nation.

Coupled with this, among the “push factors” that need to be considered here are local and regional political developments that were taking shape, during the 1990s, in Ethiopia and the Horn region at large. Among others, the impact of civil conflicts, regime changes, state collapse in the case of Somalia, and famine and drought that bedeviled most countries of the Horn are worth mentioning. (Asnake&Zerihun 2015: 108; De Regt 2007: 6-11).

The migration of a large number of Ethiopian job-seekers to the destinations mentioned above steadily increased all the way through the 1990s. Beirut was the most popular destination of Ethiopian migrant domestic workers in those days. According to an official report from the Ethiopian Immigration and Citizens’ Affairs Directorate, the total number of Ethiopian women workers who got exit visa to Lebanon in the three years from 1996-1999 was 10, 761. Other estimates suggested that there were 17,000 Ethiopian female domestic workers residing in Lebanon in the year 1999 (Yoseph et al. 2007:36). Those involved in this transnational movement of labour were to a large extent young and female high school dropouts whose age was between 18-24. (MoFA &MoLSA 2010: 7)

The growing number of emigrants dictated the government of Ethiopia to intervene in one way or another. The first practical measure on the part of the government of Ethiopia was the passing of
“Proclamation 104/1998.” Prior to this enactment, for some years in the past, MoLSA used to register and give permit to Ethiopian workers who apply to travel with Ethiopian Embassy officials and Missions assigned abroad, and to a few other Ethiopian citizens who had sought and found a job in a foreign company, or a business enterprise stationed outside the Ethiopian border. The new proclamation was intended to provide a legal framework for the participation of the private sector, through the establishment of Private Employment Agencies. It was a major breakthrough that migrant domestic workers had to sign a contract document that holds their rights as well as obligations.

Private Employment Agencies are entities formally established by law, as provided by the “Private Employment Agency Proclamation” (Proclamation No. 104/1998), so as to “protect the rights, safety and dignity of Ethiopians employed and sent abroad.” Proclamation No. 104/1998 was the first legislation purposefully aimed at regulating the operation of agencies involved in the migration of domestic workers. Those domestic workers whose exit from Ethiopia was facilitated by PEAs were required to enter into a written contractual agreement often signed by themselves. A signed copy of the written contract had to be submitted to MoLSA for record. Stated in the contract, among others, were information about the identities and address of the concerned parties, the employer and the employee, the type of service to be delivered, including the responsibilities of the PEA involved. Other privileges of the migrant worker clearly stated in the contract document include; salary, free round trip air ticket, insurance coverage, paid leave, free provisions of food and accommodation, readily available visa and work permit from the receiving country.

Twelve years later a second Proclamation, “Employment Service Exchange Proclamation” (Proclamation No. 632/2009) was Issued by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The new proclamation made significant amendments to Proclamation 104/1998 in view of providing better protection to the rights, safety and dignity of Ethiopians. Some of the new amendments appeared to have paid attention to the regulation of non-state actors involved in this thriving industry. The Proclamation unequivocally expressed this intention when it states that the need to revise the previous Proclamation was “to define the role of Employment Agencies” and “strengthening the mechanism for monitoring and regulating domestic and overseas employment exchange services.” Both these Proclamations indeed were expressions of the government's resolve to facilitate the smooth flow of the labour migration and provide protection to its citizens. However, for broader range of reasons and new challenges, as it unfolded in the first and second decade of the new millennium, this wasn’t enough for maintaining the smooth perpetuation of the practice as it used to be.

What Went Wrong Along the Way

The fact that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, had become the most popular destinations of EFDWs overtaking Lebanon as of the dawn of the new millennium is a major departure form the past. A labour market information Bulletin published by MoLSA covering a period of one year from July 8, 2011 to July 7, 2012 discloses that out of a total of 187,935 female workers whose contracts were registered by the Ministry 158,963 (85.21%) of them were bound for Saudi Arabia. Second place was Kuwait which had taken 28,476 (14.47%) female domestic workers from Ethiopia during the above-mentioned period (MoLSA, EPD:50).

2 Interview with Astawesegn Mulat, MoLSA employee. Interviewed on May 19, 2015.
3 The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs started Issuing licenses to Private Employment Agencies some three years later. According to the recollections of Meselech Assefa the first Agency to obtain a license from the Ministry and start operation was “Mesekerem Private Employment Agency” which was sending female workers to Lebanon. Interview with Meselech Assefa, Team Leader in MoLSA in the Training and Contract Approval Section.
The other most important new development taking shape during the first decade of the new millennium was the meteoric rise of the demand for cheap unskilled labour and the uncontrollable emigration of women workers from Ethiopia using all available channels, whether legal or illegal, formal or informal. Multiple of global and local factors are accountable for this to happen at the time it did. Among others the most crucial new development was the imbalance between available labour and labour market both in the supplying and the receiving nations. The problem was further accentuated by major structural changes in the economies of some destination countries with a profound consequence on the demand for unskilled labour. As coping strategy, those countries had chosen to rely on migrant labour, especially for the 3D Jobs- “dirty, degrading and dangerous,” as they are contemptuously known (ILO 2011:11). The level of poverty and lack of adequate access to employment opportunities, relatively more severe among young women, were among the well known local “push factors” that made the supply of women workers to spill over (Interview with Mezegebu; ILO 2011:11).

Along with the legal channels of emigration, illegal trafficking and smuggling of migrants became more and more rampant to meet the ever increasing demand for cheap labour. The mounting demand for more and more Ethiopian housemaids and the lack of any special effort to address this unprecedented demand on the part of the supply side created a space for human traffickers and illegal brokers one author aptly refers to as “ Merchants of Labour.” According to a study conducted by IOM the emigration of a greater proportion of EFDWs was facilitated by traffickers and illegal brokers (Dallalas) through both official and unofficial channels. Only 10.9 % of the migrants used the intermediary role of Private Employment Agencies which are recognized by the Ethiopian law (MoFA &MoLSA 2010:19). For a wide range of reasons human traffickers than PEAs, were able to win the hearts of potential domestic workers and emerged as dominant actors in facilitating the cross- border emigration of workers. Some sources boldly express that it was not so much the comparatively less financial coast that migrants are supposed to pay for trafficker that swayed them to prefer traffickers and illegal brokers over the PEAs than the unduly long time the legal procedure takes. The agency people point their fingers to the “inefficiency” of MoLSA bureaucracy (to which the government designated the work of registration of contracts and facilitating other obligatory formalities (including a fee payment of 312 birr per applicant) as responsible for much of the tardiness in the process.

Notwithstanding with its position as one among the major suppliers of female migrant labour, the government of Ethiopia was not ready to put in place an appropriate migration policy, migration administration and institutions that could capably keep its head above waters in those difficult times (ILO 2011:15). In fact the government of Ethiopia had passed a new law, Proclamation no. 632/2009, to cope up with the pressing situation that had unfolded. Nevertheless, its effect was not to add to the efficiency of the bureaucracy engaged in migration administration commensurate to the burgeoning demand. The burdensome legal requirement and increased level of accountability, which Fernandez calls “tightened regulations,” on PEAs turned to be counter productive. One such disincentive was the large amount of bond money or “License Fee,” which had been USD 30,000 according to Art. 23

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5 Although very much informative, this source failed to mention to which year/s this particular figure refers to.
6 An interesting show case was what had happened in 2011. Upon the request MoLSA officials, and being convinced that this would curb the problem of delays in the process of expediting registration and other formalities in the Ministry, the Association of PEAs had to employ 42 IT professionals for a budgeted government Ministry (MoLSA) paying their monthly salaries for over a year period from 23/11/ 2011 – 7/7/2013. This is without mentioning a grant of 15 computers made to the same Ministry by the same Association with the hope of improved service. Interview with Ato Mezegebu and Ato Menker Mahtework (another official in the Association of PEAs. Interviewed on 17 June 2015).
(A) of Proclamation 104/1998. The amount had been doubled in Proclamation 632/2009. There was the joint liability clause, with the employer abroad, in case of contract violation and litigations that also discourages PEA owners. In consequence, their number significantly dwindled in the immediate aftermath of Proclamation 632/2009 (Fernandez 2013: 819-820). One can imagine the strain this might create on an inefficient and weak migration administration. On the other hand, this would clearly become a heaven sent opportunity for traffickers and smugglers that creates an even wider space to operate.

Numerical evidence\(^7\) can be poised to testify that the pinnacle of this mass exodus of EFDWs to Middle Eastern destinations had been the year 2011. In the wake of the official decision by Indonesia, followed by the Philippines, not to send their citizens to Saudi Arabia, countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf States had to turn to Ethiopia and the Horn region for their labour needs. What prompted such an action by the two leading suppliers of unskilled labour to Saudi Arabia was chiefly the beheading of an Indonesian housemaid, in June of that same year, convicted of murdering her employer. In addition to this, the government of Philippines was already discontented by the gross human rights violations and abuses its citizens working in Saudi Arabia were subjected to, hence followed the example of Indonesia to ban the migration of its work force to that country. The immediate consequence was that Saudi Arabia suffered from chronic labour shortage which ultimately forced the government to present an official request to the Ethiopian government to fill this void by providing as many domestic workers as possible. The government of Ethiopia unconditionally agreed to do the requested favor to Saudi Arabia without any effort to consider why the two former suppliers took such a drastic measure. It was equally bizarre why the government of Ethiopia failed to make any special preparation (for example, a state-level bilateral agreement) for this emergency situation and quickly conceded to the request of Saudi Arabia. On the part of the multitude of young job-seekers, this news was viewed as a “glad tiding” with a pervasive influence in the entire nation. Thousands of unemployed women flocked to Emigration Offices to secure their passports. Private Employment Agencies on the one hand, and illegal traffickers and smugglers with their respective brokers on the other, became the busiest people in the country trying to recruit as many potential domestic workers as they could (Zerihun and Asnake pp. 110-111).

This prompt response on the part of the Ethiopian government gave a respite to their Saudi counterpart. The least could be said, however, was that the government of Saudi Arabia simply passed the burden to the government of Ethiopia which was subsequently overtaken by the pressure to administer the surging number of prospective migrants. An official in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry had been quoted in 2013 to have said “Ethiopia is the only country around the world which can currently meet the large demand of Saudi families for domestic servants” (The Reporter 19 October 2013). Coupled with this, the same local English news paper The Reporter, on its headline of the October 19 issue made an estimate that the “Arab nation looks for some ten thousand maids per month.”

The year 2013 was a momentous year in many ways in regard to the subject under discussion. Firstly, proportionate to the alarming number of Ethiopian emigrants who had already left and still wanted to leave as fast as possible, came reports of suicides and horrendous abuses of Ethiopian nationals followed by a large number of bags holding corpus of Ethiopian victims. Although a comprehensive data showing the exact figure of returning bodies of abused and murdered Ethiopians is lacking, some reports and news articles such as the following was a common place. “In recent years the upsetting news of suicides, killings, beatings or violence and other inhumane acts have been everyday occurrences from the Gulf States in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular” (The Reporter 7 Dec. 2013). Such a state of affair didn’t change up until the Ethiopian Government banned migration

\(^7\) See this figure in the Labour Market Bulletin published by MoLSA cited above. It shows 158,963 female domestic workers traveled to Saudi Arabia from July 8, 2011 and July 7, 2012. Note that these were only those who traveled using officially recognized channels and their contracts registered by MoLSA.
to the Middle East for labour purposes. In fact this is not a very strange news in Ethiopia since the 1990s. Accounts about the fate of the bulk majority of Ethiopian migrant workers in the Middle East have been fully tainted with stories of abuses and at worse, “suicide” and murder. Probably what is new this time around is the scale of the abuse and murder that victimized EFDWs in the Arabian peninsula and Gulf States.

On 24 October 2013, amidst the mass migration of EFDWs both through legal channels and by traffickers via very risky routes, and amidst the news of abuses and violent crackdown on migrants in Saudi Arabia (Ethiopians included), the Ethiopian government abruptly banned any travel for employment to Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East. Varying reasons had been given from various sources. Officials of the Association of PEAs recount that the reasons they were given when ordered to stop operation were problems related to the issues of legal, structural and administrative weakness in the operation. On the other hand, what could be drawn from some media reports was that the Ethiopian government seemed to have galvanized a new resolve to stop traffickers and their growing role in the migration process. For example a local news paper, in a tone of restating the stance of the Ethiopian government, pointed fingers to illegal trafficking as the source of all evils. “Countless Ethiopians have lost their lives,” writes The Reporter (26 Oct. 2013) “and undergone untold physical and psychological trauma due to illegal human trafficking.” However, notwithstanding the ideal logical steps of reinforcing and supporting the legally operating groups, by the same order the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [sic] “barred” the work permit of PEAs from the same day on (ibid).

Where exactly it went wrong? The allegations are triangular and all parties have their own complaints and accusations laid against one another. Evidences are showing that all have a share to take. A lot has been said through international and local media as well as research works that EFDWs were subjected to all sorts of ill- treatments in the hands of their Saudi, Kuwaiti and Lebanese employers. Pages do not suffice to list down the varying forms of abuses and maltreatments. First and foremost was a harsh working condition which was largely manifested in the form of, heavy workload, long working hours (often more than 12 hours, sometimes even up to 18 hours a day), denial of wages and unreasonable deduction of wages even when payment was made (ILO 2011: 51-53; MoFA &MoLSA 2010:14).

Evidence also shows that EFDWs also suffered from a situation of systematic labour exploitation referred in some studies/reports as “debt bondage” or “forced labour, or modern slavery.” The most prevalent form of a “forced labour, or slavery-like situation” that EFDWs often experienced during their stay in one or the other destination countries were, among others, strict control on their daily movement by keeping them in only one compound for years and hiding work permit and other travel documents so that they will not escape or go somewhere else. More glutinous than all in this category was the order to work for relatives and neighbors without one’s consent on extra time which is more or less like supplying an unpaid labour on loan (ILO 2011: 14; MoFA &MoLSA 2010:14). Foreign agents or at times employers could also ‘transfer’ the employee with all her documents to another agent or employer, irrespective of the contract obligations, provided that the original agent or employer gets substantive financial benefits. It was to such state of affairs one returnee referred to as “in effect, I was sold.” (Yoseph et al. 2007: 50).

When one talks about systematic control imposed on emigrant EFDWs, it would be relevant to bring the kafala system into the limelight. No matter destination countries who had put this regulation in place try to justify the intent as something different, the kafala system was a systematic

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8 Drawing on a statistical information from Bole International Airport Quarantine Office, one author documented that 67 bodies of Ethiopian women arrived from Arab countries between the years 1996-1999. No detailed information about the cause of death and police report attached to the bodies except a fictitious reason “felling from 3/9th floor of a building” and “hanged herself.” This figure did not include the rest who had lost their lives abused and murdered but their bodies not discovered (Emebet p.23).
control that inhibits the freedom of movement, and impose strict control/bondage on the immigrant worker. By derivation, the Arabic word *kafil* refers to the person of the sponsor. The *kafala*, a conventional practice (not legally codified) common in most Middle Eastern countries, was a system of sponsorship that requires an immigrant worker to have a *kafil* (a sponsor) a citizen of any of those countries. Only the sponsor and/or the would be employer, will have the right to facilitate for the immigrant worker to secure work permit as well as the *Iqama* (“residence permit”). In the end, the immigrant had to get the permission of the *kafil* any time they wanted to change an employer. It is a criminal act, punishable by deportation, for an immigrant to “abscond” or change an employer without the consent of the *kafil*. Most sponsors made effective use of this practice by reserving the right to hold the documents of the immigrant with themselves. In effect, this traditional arrangement would certainly give *kafils* a special power to keep an immigrant worker under their strict control as much as they wanted (Fernandez 2013: 829). The paradox is that although legal in rhetoric, the practice is meant to give a full right of physical and psychological control to sponsors over migrants.

Leaving aside the unreported ones, there are plenty of reported cases of physical, sexual, and emotional abuses on EFDWs working and living in the Middle East. There is no shortage of information about the diverse forms of abuses, physical and sexual assaults female housemaids of Ethiopian origin suffered in the hands of their employers in the above-mentioned destination countries. This is best evidenced by the reports of international organizations such as the Human Rights Watch Report of the year 2009, and that of the subsequent years. A sizable number of EFDWs were murdered by their employers, sadly without any proper criminal investigation or sufficient explanation for the causes of their death which allowed the perpetrators to live with impunity. Suicide cases, as mentioned above were numerous (Asnake & Zerihun 2015:117-118; MoFA & MoLSA 2010:14-16; Yoseph et al. 2007:50-53). Both the trafficked and those who had emigrated through the legal channel could experience the same kind of tribulation despite the fact that the later had a signed contract document that was presumed to provides a legal protection to the rights of the worker.

On the home front, the PEAs were subjected to sharp criticism both legitimately and illegitimately. Some of the legitimate allegations against the PEAs include that some of these agencies were operating in accordance with the law, and sometimes evade it using their legal identity as a cover. For example, using their legal identity, they work with international traffickers to send workers through illegal channels bypassing registration and other formalities at MoLSA. Some of them recruit emigrants by telling them false information and fancy promise. Some agencies do this either themselves or pay commission to local brokers to recruit poor uninformed victims on their behalf. Others were practically heedless to the protection of the rights and safety of their clients which are clearly stipulated by the law. Moreover, they often are apathetic to help or react when complaints are filed by victims. It was not totally unfounded that some PEAs charge emigrants varying amount of fees for their services in the name of air ticket, or work permit or visa, which are all illegal according to Art. 15 of Proclamation no. 632/2009. In some cases this payments might be done by deducting from the salary of the emigrant after she begins working in the destination country. Another transgression of the law was recruiting under-aged children, below the age of 18, which again was prohibited by Art.16 (2) of Proclamation no. 632/2009 (MoFA & MoLSA 2010: 21-22; ILO 2011:36; Interview with Astawesegn). There were also cases of underreporting of already processed emigration cases by PEAs. For wide range of reasons, such as maximizing income through tax evasion and avoidance of accountability, PEAs were accused of deliberately reducing the number of domestic workers whose cases they processed and get registered in MoLSA files (Fernandez 2007:825).

Rather than reacting to all those allegations one by one, PEA owners emphatically underscore that their role and positive contributions were not properly understood by the government and the public alike. They go on to enunciate that they have become targets of unscrutinised media

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9 It is from this practice that some writers argue a “debt bondage” situation occurs.
10 In fact, officials from the Association of PEAs interviewed by this author admitted some of the wrong doings by some members except that they did not accept all these allegations in their entirety.
denigrations. Misleading information both from authorities and media people that tarnished the image of PEAs was ubiquitous all the way through the second decade of the new Millennium. A confused usage of the terms; broker, trafficker and/or “agents” (which infer to PEAs) in discourses and rhetoric about migration was the trend than an exception. In their speeches and writings, very many people were negligent to draw a clear line of demarcation between unlicensed brokers and traffickers on the one hand and the legally operating PEAs on the other. No one had anticipated the ultimate damage that this caused on the PEAs established by law. The Amharic word dalala, literally broker, (with or with out the prefix “illegal”) had been widely used on media reports to represent all of us in the business indiscriminately, especially when news of horrible criminal incidents or abuses come home from destination countries, goes the complaints of PEA owners. Although there are more than three stakeholders in the entire operation, on several occasions we had been made scapegoats when things went wrong and reports of abuses on EFDWs became widespread. The public was told in general terms that the main issue is failure on the part of dalalas to protect citizens from this or that abuse. And the bad thing is the large majority of people can hardly make a distinction between agencies operating legally and the illegal delalas. Note that a great many people in the general public didn’t even know the very existence11 of overseas Employment Agencies established by law (Interview with Mezegebu and Menker).

According to the PEAs they are misunderstood. Their role and purpose is quiet to the contrary. Although it is a livelihood to the people engaged in the business, what they are doing as a major non-state actors is an essential complement to the effort of the government to effectively expedite the emigration of citizens to whom freedom of movement is their constitutional right. In as much as the government could not provide a comprehensive and efficient service on its own, the PEAs claim that their function is instrumental and irreplaceable in this unstoppably growing industry.12 What profits all stakeholders, they claim, is to strengthen and support the licensed PEAs and encourage their legal operations.13 Undue pressure and unnecessary requirements from the PEAs create delay on the service delivery. Some individual owners of PEAs harbor the complaint that Proclamation No. 632/2009 itself gives a domineering power to the state that treats PEAs as rivals than as complementary legal entities. This state of affairs proved counter productive favoring illegal channels to expand and grow, and traffickers to mushroom. Moreover, the fight against traffickers lacks the desired level of conviction and commitment. It is weird and complex to understand how domestic workers kept on traveling to destination countries after the official ban via Bole International Airport, with “tourist visa” on the one hand and a plastic bag for holding their things on the other (Ibid).

The two successive proclamations by the Ethiopian government,14 could be taken as pointers that there was a measure of attention, on the part of the government, given to issues related to overseas labour migration. Nevertheless, enforcement of those laws, whether owing to lack of “political will,” or “lack of capacity,” was major failure that led the whole system to falter and ultimately dysfunction.

11 I have got a confirmation from the Association of PEAs that none of their member agencies, individually or collectively, tried to promote their business through any of the existing media outlets, as is common in most business enterprises which are selling goods and services in this country. This adds credence to the assertion that not many people know even the very existence of PEAs.
12 The situation in the Gulf States, in the period under discussion, had been in favour of the expansion of these non state actors. The high prevalence of brokers in most economic sectors in the Gulf States (Hertog 2010:2-4) was an additional incentive that gave a special stimulus for brokers and intermediaries in Ethiopia to establish connections and work with this counterparts both officially and unofficially.
13 The current president of the Association of PEAs told me that they had worked to create awareness in the establishment that strengthen the legal line and operation of legally established PEAs would generate a sum of 3 Billion birr annually, excluding the widely acclaimed income from remittance.
14 In fact there are some provisions in the constitutions (see article 32 of the FDRE Constitution) and the 2004 new criminal code of the Ethiopian state (articles 596-598) prohibit the trafficking of persons, with harsher penalties on those engaged on the trafficking of women and children.
Almost invariably spelled out by researchers and stakeholders who are concerned with migration of EFDWs was the incapacity in government ministries and agencies to discharge their duties in facilitating the emigration of these Ethiopians. The other one is the lack of coordination among government agencies in regulating and monitoring illegal operations and bringing illegally operating brokers and traffickers to justice (ILO 2011: 64). Once again it is a widely held view by most people who know the industry from closer distance that it was the bureaucratic inefficiency and the time consuming process than the cheaper price in the informal and illegal channel that lured potential female domestic workers to turn to unlicensed brokers and traffickers. Moreover, the long list of preconditions (listed from A-H in Proclamation 632/2009) including the other obligations in the Proclamation are repellants for business people to engage in the business. Broadly speaking, regulatory power better be distributed among non-state actors (especially the licensed PEAs), than being excessively centralized in the hands of an inefficient state apparatus.

The Ethiopian Government, is also accused of its failure to adjust with changing global circumstances that affect the socio-economic conditions in destination countries. For example, the global economic downturn between 2008-2012 had seriously affected even the economies of the oil rich countries so much so that they revised some of their rules and regulations to mitigate its impact. One such coping strategy was laying off migrant workers. Employers became apathetic to employ domestic workers beyond the bare minimum. Even when they do they were insistence to cut salaries and other expenses required of them to cover the necessary cost. The general trajectory shows that there emerged a higher preference among employers in destination countries for smuggled and trafficked workers whose over all cost were lower than those migrants with legal contractual agreements. The aggregate of all these was the ebbing of the demand for the legal immigrant workers which sorely damaged the business of the PEAs in Ethiopia. Conversely, the overall situation became favorable for traffickers and smugglers. The bad thing was that there was no assessment of those international developments and timely reaction on the part of the Ethiopian government (A letter written to the Prime Minister:4).

One of the most conspicuous void in the effort to ensure the regular migration, and the protection of the rights of citizens in destination countries, was the lack of attention to strengthening diplomatic relations and bilateral labour agreements with destination countries. This includes the opening of special departments or labour attachés in the destination countries whose prime focus is addressing of complaints and proactively work towards the mitigation of abuses and other problems Ethiopian migrant workers encounter. The absence of legislations that treat the rights of domestic workers in the labour laws of most destination countries calls for some sort of governmental –level agreements with host countries. Moreover, it has become abundantly clear, from the experiences of other countries, and our own experience, over the last decade, that the efforts on this frontier would discourage human trafficking and illegal channels. It would also be instrumental in the protection of the rights, safety and human dignity of these Ethiopian nationals deployed abroad. Most importantly the Ethiopian PEAs could have benefited a lot from this kind of arrangement. For example, such a structure would have helped them to check out the legality of their partners abroad, monitor their operations and force them to share the accountabilities that they hold, as per Proclamation 632/2009 regarding abuses on EFDW in destination countries. Technically there is no room for PEAs to be accountable or to file complaints in any legal court in destination countries unless through their counterparts (“Sister Associations”) in destination countries (A letter written to the Prime Minister 2010: 7; MoFA &MoLSA 2010:32, 46; ILO 2011: 64). However, available information show that only with Kuwait that the Ethiopian government had signed a “one page” bilateral agreement which informants downplay as “nominal,” just of paper value, not binding. In effect, signatories proved to be less committed to its actual enforcement (Interview with Mezegebu).

15 On both the two Proclamations it was stipulated that MoLSA in consultation with the MoFA would “assign labour attachés as may be required,” a provision that never been enforced despite an evident need for one.
The political decision that banned migration to the Middle East for employment reasons, on 24 October 2013, could be taken as a major watershed. A prelude to this decision was the predicament migrant workers from different countries in Saudi Arabia faced. This was the decision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to deport illegal migrants. Notwithstanding the biased hyper media reports that inflame anti Saudi sentiments among Ethiopians followed by waves of anti-Saudi condemnations, the truth of the matter lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia was “over flooded” by illegal immigrants, about 9 million migrant workers in a country of 27 million citizens. The progressive rise in the number of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia had a lot to do with the labour laws and sponsorship system of that country that punishes illegal migrants with fines whenever they want to leave. Over the years, the number of illegal migrants who could not afford to make the payments for getting an exit visa greatly increased the size of illegal migrants who lived and worked underground in that country. The year 2013 was not the first time the government of Saudi Arabia made an announcement to all illegal immigrants to legalize their status, otherwise face deportation. This year alone the deadlines given to legalize the status of illegal immigrants were extended twice, for the three months in the first instance and for four months in the second, and November 3, 2013 being the last. In part, the reason for as many Ethiopians failed to legalize their status in time was complacency that emanated from the misleading track record of the Saudi government often unable to implement similar announcements in the past. But other than these, those eligible to use this opportunity to legalize were only those who entered the country through legal contracts and “abscend” or changed employers, those who came in the name of Hijira before 2008 and stayed in the country and others. In any case with the expiry of the deadline given, the government of Saudi Arabia, this time kept its words and started deportation of illegal migrants unable to legalize their status, irrespective of their country of origin. The difference is that migrant workers from countries such as Philippines and Indonesia worked assiduously to legalize their status, with substantive help from their governments, were salvaged from the upcoming mistreatment and outrageous human rights violations, and hence reduced the scale of causalities (The Reporter 30, Nov. 2013).

According to one report the Ethiopian Missions in Riyadh and Jeddah were able legalize the status of “nearly 40,000” 16 workers in seven months time, which was a peanut given the nearly 1.5 million migrant Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia. In my view those, officials in the Ethiopian missions must have been overwhelmed by the size of migrants who wanted to legalize, or else they were not up to the required level of conviction and readiness to offer help to those unfortunates. Although the government at home did not make an official pronouncement that allows to establish a correlation between the crackdown in Saudi Arabia and its own decision, the decision to ban the migration of Ethiopians to Saudi Arabia and other destination thenceforth was the reaction of the Ethiopian government to the mounting public outrage about the predicament of Ethiopian migrant workers in that country. Be that as it may, the entire industry is now in a limbo with all the legal operations obstructed for a long time since October 24, 2013, albeit that the much more risky operations of illegal trafficking and smuggling have continued unabated. All stake holders are expectant of a new law which supposedly incorporates all positive inputs from various deliberations, expert opinions and lessons from past experiences, which we are told to have reached its final stage by the time this paper was finalised.

16 An article on the Reporter 30, Nov. 2013 entitled “Untold facts about the current problem of Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia” refers to this figure as “very Impressive.” However, how impressive this was could be gauged at least by the number of returnees in several rounds. The official figure according to IOM was about 120,000 (The Reporter, 7 December 2013).
Conclusion

Studies dealing concerned with causes and patterns of migratory labour constituted an integral part of African labour history since the colonial period. Ever since the last half of the 20th century, however, the history and political sociology, forms and a range of transnational movement of the African labour force in search of wage employment have made a fairly good intrusion into the academic literature. The migration Ethiopian female domestic workers to the Middle East, in much of the second half of the 20th century and after, is a relevant case that deserves adequate attention and analysis. The major argument this paper tried to articulate is that it is a normal process of labour migration seeking wage employment and better pay. It is a useful economic enterprise for the migrant. Equally useful for countries involved in the process both as supplier and as a destination for this energetic work force looking for a better future. I tried to expound my argument that the emigration of female domestic workers from Ethiopia should not be viewed as catastrophe because of some anecdotes of abuses and harassments in destination countries. Rather what one learns from a careful analysis of the sources is that it is a vent-for surplus labour not yet used domestically. Sustainable use of these benefits require the laying down of all the necessary structures, legal framework and institutional set up, as well as strengthening mutual understanding with destination countries. Failure to comply with these requirements and externalise the responsibility of malfunctioning amounts to what the saying goes, ‘those who can not dance blame it on the floor.’

This paper tried to do justice to a subject not as such under reported but rather widely adulterated by misconceptions and confusions. In addition to providing clearer meanings to some broadly used concepts and phraseologies, the modest attempt in this paper will stand as a reminder for researchers and commoners to take the necessary precaution in their usage of some of the key terms and concepts in any discourse about EFDWs. Most of all, through the succinct discussion into the nuances of some of the designations and labeling used in the discourse, this paper sanitized the blurred boundaries between illegal acts and legal operations in the business of labour migration.

The violence that the crackdown in Saudi Arabia resulted in was partly an irresponsible act of an irrational mob. The unfortunate predicament that all migrants in Saudi Arabia in general and Ethiopian migrants in particular faced was partly the result of lack of adequate attention, mismanagement and absence of appropriate structures and institutional set ups both at home and abroad. Most importantly, however, rampant trafficking and smuggling through illegal channels such as the gulf of Aden and Yemen greatly contributed to the swelling of the size of illegal migrants form Ethiopia. In addition to strict regulation on illegal operators and prosecution of traffickers and smugglers, as repeatedly suggested by many other studies, I have shown in this paper as how illegal migration could be considerably discouraged through supporting licensed and legally established operators and by providing them all the necessary institutional and legal backing.
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6
Trade Unions in Kenyan History

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INTRODUCTION

To date, apart from earlier works by Singh (1969), Mboya (1986), Lubembe (1968), Sandbrook (1975), Kitching (1980) and Stichter (1982) which are thematic in approach, there have been limited systematic studies on labour history on Kenya in general and the role of workers' organisations in Kenyan history in particular. A number of scholars however have discussed the evolution of wage labour and its consequences in Kenya (Stichter 1982:17, Van Zwanenberg 1977: 60-70, Brett 1973, Zeleza 1982, Clayton 1964). Samir Amin (1974), discounts the notion that African workers are a “pampered class” and argues that unskilled labourers are a deprived lot. Sandbrook (1975: 44) has ably shown that solidarity among African workers is facile because of poor trade union(ism) and wide dispersal of workers. While contributing on the relationship between the labour movement and the first independence government in Kenya, Sandbrook (ibid.) observes that the colonial government’s stringent measures against radical trade unions led to the emergence of “bread and butter” trade unions characterised by ethnic and clientelist politics. Mboya (18-20) and Singh observe that trade unions were formed by genuine workers to fight for their rights and privileges and contend that trade unionism and nationalism are inseparable. Lubembe (1968) analyses the labour movement in Kenya and concludes that colonialism introduced and facilitated the exploitation of labourers through institutionalisation of low wage policies. Mboya, Singh and Lubembe being pioneer trade unionists in Kenya, as authors provide a framework upon which studies on labour history and labour movement can be centred. However, much of what they have written is urban orientated. Mboya, Singh and Lubembe’s observations are very central when assessing the role of Workers Organisations in Kenyan history.

Trade unionism denotes an aggregation of individuals united by such factors as work, working conditions or the wage. It can also be defined as an organization of workers who have joined together so as to try to improve their interest (Moraa 2006). These individuals normally possess common institutions and foster a spirit of sympathy between members (Iliffe 1970:119). Trade unionism is therefore a consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership who desire to advance the strength, liberty or prosperity of workers. That is why the Trade Unions Act of Kenya (Cap 233) defines a trade union as an association or combination whether temporary or permanent of more than six persons the principal objects of which are under its constitution, the regulation of the relations between employees and employers or between employees and employees or between employers and employers or a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment (cited in I. Davies 1966: 15). In developed countries like Britain, associations of wage earners first appeared in the late 18th century mainly as a result of the development of factory industry. In Kenya it was different having started prior to the industrialisation process which predated the colonial era. The colonial period only shaped that workers' organisations as unions came into being as vehicles of protest against poor working conditions. The employers involved were foreign and the working conditions were attributed not only to the disorder and uncertainty caused by the growth of money economies and commercial production, but equally to outside intervention (ILO 1978:125). The main focus of the study is therefore to examine how this new orientation shaped the emergence and sustenance of Trade Unions in Kenya.

The perspective on the working ideal is important in the study of Trade Unionism in Kenya because earlier studies have not addressed it. A study on workers organisation in Kenya cannot be properly understood and appreciated if it is treated as an isolated social, economic or political feature, since it is
rooted in the concept of "working ideal". We are identified first and foremost with our "work". Our lives are also regulated, for the most part, by the national state in which we are born or reside which goes a long way in shaping work. From childhood, we are inculcated in work and taught the particular virtues of work. At the root of the working ideal is a vision and a working culture. According to this vision, we have distinct groups of workers, peculiar and unique. Each employer defines the identity of its members because of the specific work ethic it moulds on the individual worker. The key to that culture is history which binds present and future generations of workers. The working ideal involves more than a special vision of the world and entails a kind of solidarity and work programme. This ideal inevitably leads to workers’ organisation or trade unionism, a programme of action to achieve and sustain work. The solidarity that a trade unionist desires is based on the possession of the labour, not any labour, but individual and collective labour (Aluchio 1998: 8). A trade unionist therefore desires to secure the working conditions of the worker, instilling in the worker a sense of kinship and brotherhood and building the future on it.

Accordingly, trade unionism involves four important elements: a vision, a culture, solidarity and a policy (Ndalilah 2005: 170). This is the context of understanding trade unionism in Kenya. Of the three East African countries, Kenya was destined by its climate and rich agricultural land to bear the greatest weight of European settlement and rule. In consequence, it developed the most sophisticated economy, and as a result, too, to date trade unions have waged the most protracted struggle.

This chapter is an exploration of a still largely unmapped area of recent Kenyan social and economic history. It deals with the role of workers’ organisations in Kenyan history and attempts to answer the following questions: What socio-economic and political processes and events generated labour in the colonial and post-colonial periods? How did African workers react to various government policies which were geared to ensure labour supply and why? What is the impact of workers’ organisations on Kenyan history?

**Early Forms of Protest**

According to Stichter (1975 a), there were four main stages through which socio-economic change occurred in Kenya from the colonial period onwards, namely the initial phase of territorial conquest, the phase of establishment of the migrant labour system (1903-1925), the phase of consolidation growth and the emergence of contradictions (1925-1955), and lastly the post-migrant phase. These stages also catalysed the development of labour activism.

Labour protests began with the forcible establishment of the labour system, aimed at avoiding or limiting African involvement in it. As economic pressures to provide labour replaced coercive ones, protest turned towards attempts to control workers’ options (Stichter, 1982). The thrust was towards freedom of mobility in response to the need to raise wages through strikes. As differentiation and dependency increased in the third phase, active labour organisation and militant labour action ensued between 1939 and 1955, finally merging with nationalism and the struggle for independence.

In the initial phase (1914-1930) of colonial rule, African reaction was either ethnic or communal, not class-based (Stichter, 1982: 158). This “primary response” of ethnic communities to foreign rule meant acceptance or rejection of the provision of pre-capitalist tribute labour, the first form in which the British extracted labour from African societies as some accepted it while others rejected. The arrival of European settlers and the forcible establishment of the migrant labour system led to a further and more profound economic disruption (Kanogo 1987:164-180). To Africans, the short-term material consequences of the new order were overly negative.

Organised African labour protest in Kenya dates to the First World War and due to the exceedingly harsh conditions that emanated from the War. The wartime experience on both Africans and Europeans was of great significance in the post-war period as they could not be expected to come back and be contented with the terms and conditions of work at home. Most of them therefore became militant leaders of workers, but the colonial government did not allow them to organise themselves. was The rise of the millenarian movement that expressed feelings of deprivation and reflection of European impositions (Stichter, 1982). But these protests were not strictly composed of labourers, as they were wider political- nationalist movements in which protest against labour conditions was part-albeit a very important part of their
concerns. The movements, then, presage the eventual alliance of labour and nationalist movements in the independence struggle. These responses therefore, pioneered the trade union movement in Kenya in particular and East Africa in general.

The second form of protest was by the African chiefs and the educated few like Harry Thuku who had worked as clerk in Nairobi. However, both groups were limited to the wage-earning population and their impact was felt in rural areas. The third form of protest concerned the specific strategies of labourers themselves. Avoidance of recruitment, desertion from employment, seasonal work, boycotts of bad employers and passive resistance on the job were the most important and effective strategies of resistance by labourers (Stichter 1982). Others included feigning of obedience or of illness, avoidance of assigned work, avoidance of long contracts and labour recruiters, drinking beer on the job, and theft (Aluchio 1998: iv). Employers constantly complained of inefficiency and dishonesty on the part of labourers (Ndalilah 2005). From the labourers’ point of view, laziness, theft and minor deceptions were a measure of freedom or personal dignity, or protest against low wages, late payment of wages or deductions. Both desertions and on the job protests were not simply individual responses, but were more often collective. Sometimes labourers reacted to close supervision and paternalistic tendencies precipitating labour militancy (Ndalilah 2005: 173). Resistance also took shape from the work regime on European farms and importantly from the fact that most African labourers had rural connections (ibid). This is because the lived in rural areas but left to work on European farms. Sometimes they would sneak home even when they were on duty. It should also be stressed that strict supervision and control of labour was a central element in the relationship between employers and workers (ibid). This influenced the genesis and shape of workers organisations in Kenya.

Trade Unionism in Kenya, 1945-1960

In the years between 1945 and 1952 in Kenya, there was a militant upsurge of labour protest. The war led to organisation among urban skilled manual workers, an increase in strikes and labour unrest, culminating in the 11-day general strike in Mombasa in January 1947. The War had changed the labour market and conditions in Kenya with the increase of factories to fuel the war industry. It also led to the formation of the movements, the first organisation to represent the urban African workers in Kenya. After the war, labour organisation grew and encompassed the Labour Trade Union of East Africa and the East African Trade Union Congress, both interracial organisations led by the Indian trade unionist, Makhan Singh based in Kenya.

The rise of militant trade unionism is attributable to both socio-economic forces and state policy decisions. At this time, a peripheral capitalist economy based on part time migrant labour evolved into one based on full time wage labour. It depended on wages, drawn into the modern capitalist economy but kept on the lower levels within it. It led to the formation of an urban African working class, the architects of a militant and nationalist labour movement. Immigrant Indian workers, long proletarianised, created a more class conscious and less nationalist version. Both were met, however, with an alternately repressive and paternalistic counterattack from the colonial government, and a struggle ensued over the kind of trade unionism. Alternatively there was the local militant “populist” conception of unionism by African and Indian workers, and on the other, a moderate “economist” one imposed by the colonial power.

The expansion of a secondary industry led to increased occupational specialisation and also stabilised wage earnings leading to the rise of the first genuine African labour organisations. But incomes could not satiate the new consumption demands stimulated by urban life (KFL No. 10, 8 July 1955, Van Zwanenberg: 3). In addition, the converse of increasing stability for one section of the wage-earning class was perpetuation of low wages, low skill, and part-time labour for the bottom section (Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 1945: 37). A 1950 survey in Nairobi found that 58 per cent of those employed in private industry and 30 per cent of those in government service were in the near minimum wage category (East African High Commission, 1951). They spend their income on food and were always in debt. This is what I have called elsewhere (2012 b) “debt bondage.” The underlying contradiction was expressed in industrial and political unrest. To this extent, the Carpenter Report was correct in attributing industrial unrest to the labour migration system. Although most of the urban poor were not actual members of trade unions, they formed a reservoir of discontent that trade union activists could draw at times of need.
As suggested in Stichter (1975 b: 259-275), labour organisation began in the transport, building and garment industries out of their undoubted deprivation. Average annual earnings for employed Africans increased steadily between 1946 and 1952 (Kenya Colony and Protectorate. 1955). But average incomes for employed persons of other races also increased, so that the large racial differential did not appreciably decrease (Parker, 1949:9). Hence, in the labour movement there was a growing consciousness of racial barriers to economic advancement, and growing nationalistic feelings. Thus, organised labour movements in Kenya in general were born of rising economic expectations, led by a middle group motivated by relative deprivation. In these cases, it was the hope of amelioration of grievances and consciousness of oppression that motivated protest. Once formed, post-war labour organisations became radical, a course which culminated in the involvement in the Mau Mau rebellion.

Reform Responses and Accommodation of Wage Labour, 1940-1963

The colonial government adopted various measures and strategies to control labour consciousness and unionisation. Before the 1940s, the colonial state was hostile to the formation of African trade unions (Lubembe, 1968: 52-55) and discouraged them in the agricultural sector (Sandbrook, 1975). Trade unionism in Kenya dates to the 1930s, when the Labour Government in Britain pointed out that trade unions protect labourers from abuses and exploitation by employers. Thus, in 1940, under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, grants could only be provided to a colony on condition of a free functioning trade union movement (ibid). As a result, labour organisation emerged earlier in urban areas in Kenya, due to the concentration of labourers in close proximity, good communication and literacy. Casual and unstabilised labourers and the migrant labour system that characterised European farming were an obstacle to collective labour consciousness and organisation. But poor working conditions ushered in an underground labour consciousness. The colonial government embarked on piecemeal measures to contain the rising labour consciousness. This led to the adoption of various measures and strategies to control both labour consciousness and unionisation in the colonial economy.

The enactment of the Trade Union Ordinance in 1937 mandated any organisation purporting to be a trade union to either apply for registration or cease operation. European settlers used the press, for example The East African Standard which was under European control, to clamp down on the nascent trade unions terming trade unionists as irresponsible agitators. However, pressure from the British government, led to the creation of the post of Trade union Officer to guide trade unionism (Singh, 1969). Thus, in April 1947, James Patrick became the first Trades Union Labour Officer in Kenya attached to the Labour Department with the duty of fostering "responsible" African unionism. But because not all officials and few settlers or employers favoured trade unions for Africans in the near future, priority was given to the development of works committees and staff associations as initial steps. In the words of the Trade Union Labour Officer in 1947:

it was our policy in the Labour Department that every encouragement should be given to the development at the present moment of Whitley Councils or Workers Committees in view of the fact that the native was not yet far enough advanced to accept and operate the proper principles of trade unionism (Kenyan National Archives, LAB 9/372/107).

In the same year (1947), F.W. Carpenter, the acting Labour Commissioner stated that, Africans would only be allowed to form trade unions as long as they embraced the tenets, purposes and organisation of trade unions (Singh, 1969). Patrick, asserted that he would not sanction the formation of trade unions by uneducated labourers who still lacked good qualities of leadership and organisation. He also claimed that the upsurge of trade unions could provide opportunity for agitators to create political unrest in the country. This led to the rise of “Bread and Barter” trade unions (Sandbrook and Cohen, 1970:40). At the same time, the European settlers also opposed to the formation of trade unions, especially in the agricultural sector arguing that it was premature and would only lead to agitations. For example, in the 1940s, the government was hesitant to register trade unions for fear that they were political organisations masquerading as trade unions. The 1948 Colonial Annual Report quotes the Labour Commissioner stating that:

Considerable difficulty arose over the misconception in the mind of the African of the true purpose of a trade union, partly due to a growing political consciousness.
On this part, action had to be taken to guide certain African associations chiefly formed for political motives, but calling themselves trade unions, into a one formal channel of trade union practice (Singh, 1969).

In 1949, a trade union registration ordinance, the Compulsory Labour Act, and a Deportation Ordinance were introduced to control unions and workers and limit their political power. During the early 1950s the colonial government sponsored the establishment of staff associations and works committees, and established a statutory wage determination machinery in various industries. It closely controlled internal activities of trade unions through the Registrar of Trade Unions with the powers to deregister the unions and compulsory arbitration. Thus, the government was overtly following a policy of union recognition. The Act at least gave workers limited freedom of association and the right to organise through the "Staff Associations and Works Committees." However, these associations and committees were weak, easy to manipulate by the authorities.

The first workers’ strike in Kenya was led by the African Workers' Federation, in Mombasa in January 1947 against the poor working conditions at the port of Mombasa. As a general workers' union with a nationalist orientation, the Federation was precisely the kind of labour organisation to which officials would be opposed. Formed by Chege Kibachia on the first day of the strike, the African Workers Federation aspired to unite all African workers. As the organisation grew, it received support from across sections of workers in Mombasa (including the large mass of workers in Mombasa port), and indeed from the unemployed apart from the best-off white collar Africans. Chege Kibachia, travelled throughout the colony urging workers to join and received substantial support in many towns and on agricultural estates. In particular African Workers' Federation leaders met in Nairobi with representatives of the associations of skilled manual workers already in existence by July 1947. These associations formed a branch of the Federation. Chege Kibachia and other African Workers' Federation leaders were arrested and the organisation declined.

In the meantime, in 1947, Patrick, the Trade Union Labour Officer began a series of lectures on trade unionism which many African labour leaders or aspiring labour leaders attended. He wrote and circulated literature on trade unionism emphasising that trade unions did not have political aims, and were formed not to call strikes, but to avoid them (Stichter, 1972). With the gradual decline of the Federation, and because of the power Patrick wielded in recommending to the Registrar whether or not a union should be legally registered, he found in the years following 1947 some response among Africans to his activities promoting "proper" trade unions. The main centre of his activities became Nairobi, where he counselled groups of white-collar, skilled and semi-skilled workers who formed small occupational or staff associations. Among the African workers' associations in existence which the Trade Union Labour Officer counselled were the African Tailors and Button Hole Makers, the Kenya Houseboys Association, the Kenya Nightwatchmen Association, the African Painters' Union, and the African Masons' Association; all in the formal and informal sector. The only African unions registered this time were the Nairobi African Taxi Drivers’ Union and the Thika Native Motor Drivers' Association. As Makhan Singh (1969:162) in reference to the Tailors Association stated:

After Kibachia's arrest, when the functioning of the federation become impossible, they, like other trade unionists in Kenya, had no alternative but to form their separate unions, getting as much advice from the Trade Union Labour Officer as was possible and "reasonable"

There were two trends of labour organisation that emerged after the decline of the federation: one was the emergence of associations and Trade Unions that followed the British bread and butter prescripts and the second more political Trade Unions led by Singh and Kubai. In both of these cases, Patrick told leaders to aim at making their association a trade union, by first studying his works on trade unionism to understand the principles of unionism and trade union leadership. That is how their organisations could be registered legally under the provisions of the Trade Union Ordinance. The Kenya Houseboys Association, for example, a relatively large association under the enthusiastic leadership of Herbert Kaguma and Chege Kiburu with a predominantly Kikuyu membership found its application for union status opposed because "sufficient knowledge of the subject did not exist among the Domestic Workers" and because of the "difficulty of normal trade union negotiations"(Kenya National Archives, LAB 9/911/May 1949). In 1948 the domestic workers turned to Makhan Singh for help in drawing up a legal constitution and escalating
their drive to become registered. By mid-1949 an application had been made over the head of the Labour Department to the Attorney General (Kenya National Archives, LAB 9/911/Labour Commissioner to Attorney General, June 14, 1949).

The African initiative continued to mount with the legally registered Kenya African Road Transport and Mechanics Union, formerly the Nairobi African Taxi Drivers' Association, which extended its influence and membership and organised branches all over Kenya. Up until about October 1949, when its General Secretary M.A.O. Ndisi left for Oxford to study trade unionism, it enjoyed the support and encouragement of the Trade Union Labour Officer. Fred Kubai and other militant and politically nationalist leaders, took over the union and changed its name again to the Transport and Allied Workers' Union and allied with Makhan Singh's Labour Trade Union of East Africa. The Labour Trade Union campaigned for "equal pay for equal work" (Singh, 1969:173-188) and advocated for a central organisation of all trade unions to complete the alliance between Asian and African unions in Kenya. Predominantly Asian unions followed Singh's non-racial lead (Singh, 1969:199-200).

As an industrial strategy Singh's nonracial policy worked well in industries where the number of African workers was relatively small and did not immediately threaten Indian workers, and where Indians as well as Africans received very low wages. In these industries, employers were predominantly Indian, and an interracial union strengthened the position of all workers against employers. As a political strategy, Singh's alliance with African trade union and nationalist leaders was similar to those around the left-wing Newspaper the Daily Chronicles, that gave aid and a publication outlet to African trade unionism. Singh gave the same assistance to early African unions in a host of vital matters such as constitutions, correspondence, negotiations and office work. The alliance with Singh strengthened African political positions and facilitated a more articulate expression of African grievances.

The union leaders took up the struggle to better the conditions of African workers. The shift of emphasis was apparent when Fred Kubai, the foremost African labour leader, after the suppression of his alliance with Makhan Singh, did not return to specific industrial issues and opted to take "the force of the African workers into Kenyan African Union (KAU)" (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:269). The decision implied a wider consciousness of African grievances under colonial rule, rather than simply class ones. The unionists therefore became more militant in the pursuit of independence.

Singh's campaigns, on the other hand, reflected since the 1930s a straightforward class-conscious, pro-labour philosophy. At the formation of the Labour Trade Union of East Africa in 1935, he emphasised that "the capitalists were enjoying upon the labour of the workers, and this was a great injustice" (Colonial Times, 27 April 1935; see also Singh, 1969:176). He was influenced by South African and Indian communist trade union leaders. Although the Labour Trade Union was loosely connected to African trade unionism in Kenya before the war through overlap of leadership with the Kikuyu Central Association, its main concerns then were reforms in various sectors (For example, see Singh, 1969:80.). After the war the union campaigned for both "equal pay for equal work" and equal racial representation on the Legislative Council. It was also at this time that a concerted effort was made to unionise African workers.

In the context of the post-war discussion of "multi-racialism" and political representation for non-Europeans, the Kenya African Union at first demanded greater African representation in the Legislative Council, while the East African Indian National Congress was for equality with Asians. By April 1950, the Kenya African Union and the East African Indian National Congress were jointly opposing European domination and advocating non-racial common roll elections. Trade unionists, led by Singh, called for immediate independence. But in the arguments supporting his political positions Singh went further than the Kenya Africa Union or the East African Indian National Congress and African unionists, proposing (1969:178) the direct representation of labour through trade unions, because all other options before the committee "in one form or another, guarantee monopoly of all the elected seats to the commercial and higher sections, who are either ignorant of labour problems and needs of the labour, or totally opposed to the realisation of its aspirations." He also proposed full adult franchise for all regardless of race, property or education. Thus, Singh consistently opposed racial domination. He saw it however as the outcome of income inequalities operating in the interests of capitalists. In May 1949, the East African Trade Union Congress was formally launched with Makhan Singh as General Secretary and Fred Kubai a President. Affiliated also were the Tailors and Garment Workers Union the Typographical Union of Kenya and the Shoemaker Workmen Union. The other Asian trade unions declined to affiliate. By 1950 the
Domestic and Hotel Workers Union and the East African Painters and Decorators Union, both unregistered, and the East African Seamen's Union in Mombasa, had affiliated. The East African Trade Union Congress received the official support of the Kenya African Union and Jomo Kenyatta, the British Trade Union Congress and the World Federation of Trade Unions. Therefore, the basic functions of the trade unions were taken over by overtly political organisations.

The Labour Department's attitude towards union development was negative. From its point of view, the Labour Trade Union and the East African Trade Union Congress were "irresponsible" and "political" just like the African Workers' Federation. The Department continued its policy of dealing with Asian and African unions separately, strengthening separation of union structures, a policy Singh (1969:224) saw as amounting to "divide and rule." Officialdom regarded Singh as an agitator and made much of his supposed Communist affiliation. The official government newspaper, Baraza, said of the Trade Union Congress that:

"it was formed by a small group headed by an Indian who is known to be if not an actual Communist. It has sought and obtained recognition from the World Federation of Trade Unions which is a Communist dominated body" (Cited in Singh, 1969:223).

According to the Labour Department Annual Report, it was a "steady progress made in the field by the subversive and anti-British element developing in the trade union movement" (1949:35).

The East African Trade Union Congress supported the large taxi-cab drivers' strike in Nairobi in October 1949. It pressed the government to apply the International Labour Organisation Conventions on the conditions of labour in Kenya. The Congress also took more "political" stands. In March 1950, with the support of a groundswell of African and Indian public opinion in Nairobi, it opposed the granting of a Royal Charter to the European-controlled Nairobi Town Council. The Congress therefore led a mass boycott of the proposed Civic Week celebrations. Kubai and Makhan Singh openly advocated for independence in Kenya under a democratic government "in which workers could have their own share" (Singh, 1969:254). The government arrested Kubai and Singh in May 1950, on the charge of being officials of an unregistered trade union. The action resulted in the general strike in Nairobi lasting nine days. But the strike did not secure their immediate release and the East African Trade Union Congress declined through lack of leadership.

After the strike from late 1950 to mid-1952, the government and the Labour Department took a more gradualist and repressive policy. The Labour Commissioner stated that:

There is obviously some doubt whether the Trade Union movement is applicable here. We are committed to foster it but obviously our experience has already shown it. we must go about it another way and much more slowly (East African Standard, 13 July 1950).

In this spirit the Department engaged in delaying tactics, effectively discouraging various workers' associations. The carrot and stick approach, however, did not succeed in producing a trade union nationalistic in orientation or "excessive" in its demands. It did succeed only in driving unions into more political activism. In the next phase of labour organisation, after the release of Kubai in February 1951, the cumulative effects of this policy, together with other social forces, pushed many unions even further into underground political activities, into oath-taking and the Mau Mau rebellion (Stichter, 1975b).

The colonial government believed that Africans were not ready for trade unionism. Control over trade unionism became more stringent with the enactment of the 1952 Trade Unions Ordinance. Trade unions were urban-based and as already noted, a large percentage of labourers in colonial Kenya were employed in the agricultural sector. Yet, until the late 1950s, no legal forum for agricultural labourers had emerged (Singh, 1969). In 1952, the colonial government declared a state of emergency to control the Mau Mau uprising. African labourers on European farms long regarded by the colonial government as Mau Mau supporters were restricted on the farms. The colonial government also arrested officials of urban based trade unions thought to be sympathetic to the Mau Mau struggle (Mboya 1968). During the emergency period, when all African political activities were outlawed, the urban based trade union movement was at the forefront in the articulation of African grievances both locally and internationally. At this time the major political party, Kenya African Union (KAU) was banned but trade unions were allowed to function.
Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) substituted the persecuted nationalist party and spoke for the people, both politically and in the industrial field. This movement also put the Kenyan map in international forums. It wanted more aid for African education and declared its support for trade unionism.

The economic policy then, entailed integrating Africans in the colonial economic system (Cooper, 2004: 1-38). A series of reform documents were produced aimed at increased African socio-economic opportunities to create a bourgeois class with strong interests in the existing colonial capitalist economic structure. These documents included that of the Carpenter Committee under F.W. Carpenter the Labour Commissioner, to examine the low wage structure to the African labourers (Carpenter, 1954) and reform the colonial labour structure disturbed by the Mau Mau (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1954-1995). This would limit the tendency of labourers’ oscillation between wage employment and the African farming sector (ibid.). This confirmed the view held by employers that, in paternalistic relations supposedly characteristic of the European farming sector, independent trade unions were regarded as inimical since they interfered with business harmony (Kenya Federation of Labour, 1955). However, trade unions were used by African labourers to fight for better working conditions. Others were the Report of the East African Royal Commission (1953) which called for the breakdown of the colour bar and deracialisation of the white highlands. The Swynnerton Plan (1954: 21) recommended consolidation and registration of land for better management and to enable individuals to secure loans for self-improvement. The Report of the Committee on African Wages proposed a definitive move to a high-range economy in the urban sector. Lastly, the Lidbury Commission on the Civil Service recommended deracialisation of pay scales and increased African participation in the Civil Service.

The turning point in the trade union movement occurred in 1958 when the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) and the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) entered into a recognition agreement. The government agreed to recognise and bargain with the unions. This agreement fostered the development of Unions as they exist, and resulted on their reliance on the government. In the late 1950s Kenyan unions were powerful and dictated their terms to the emerging political parties. In 1960, at the annual conference of KFL union leaders observed that trade unions had a right to comment on political matters. "In spite of these bold remarks, the union leaders dropped the idea of leading a "class" party when the Kenya African National Union (KANU) formed the Government. The KFL Secretary General, Minister of Labour immediately curtailed the interests of economic growth. Thus, in 1962, the government, the employers and the unions met and drew an Industrial Charter which assisted the growth of both unionism and the system of industrial relations in Kenya.

In 1962 a confrontation developed in the elections which preceded independence. The decision was that unions would not enter candidates or behave like political parties. Thus, 1962 marked a clear departure of unions from the political scene in favour of the economic sphere of activity. For more than a decade after its registration, KFL remained the only truly national organisation. In the early sixties, a fierce rivalry emerged in the labour movement. This was caused by those opposed to KFL leadership who wanted KFL to disaffiliate from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) because ICFTU was a pro-west movement. They did not like KFL's proposals on economic planning, because the government lacked "dynamism" in the matter and intensification of the Government's Africanisation policy" (Aluchio 1998). Ultimately this rivalry led to the formation of the Kenyan African Workers Congress (KAWC) in 1964. In an effort to reduce the friction and negate international union influence, the government deregistered both KFL and KAWC in 1965. The government also cancelled all affiliations of the unions with bodies outside Kenya and established a single organisation, the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU). By 1996, COTU had twenty nine affiliated unions representing almost over 400,000 workers (Aluchio 1998: iv).

Other trade union centres were: East African Trade Unions Congress (EATUC), established in 1949, Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU) (1952), the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) (1955) and the Kenya Africa Workers Congress (KAWC) (1964).

As with most national trade unions, the basic functions of COTU are to assist, service and co-ordinate the activities of its affiliates and to represent the affiliates' interests before government and other outside bodies. The early sixties also witnessed an accelerated strike rate partly due to the cost of living and low wages but there was a drop between 1962 and 1963 due to the impact of the Industrial Relations Charter of 1962. This trend continued after the establishment of the Industrial Court in 1964.
**Challenges to Trade Unionism in Kenya**

From the hesitant beginning in 1950’s and nationalization action in the early 1950’s, to growth and consolidation in the 1950’s and 1960’s, trade unions in Kenya have paralleled and greatly contributed to nationalism and the realization of independence. During the darkest days in the 1950’s it was the trade union movement which occupied the centre of the political stage. However, after Kenya became independent, trade unions struggled to find their role in the new nation, the disagreements within the trade union movement grew within Kenya Federations of Labour (KFL). Moraa (2006) ascertains that the legislation and establishment of Central Organization of Trade Unions has substantially restricted the independence of trade unions in Kenya. Although there is little government intervention in the administration either of Central Organization of Trade Unions or individual unions, there is significant government control over both trade union structure and the settlement of industrial disputes through the Ministry of Labour.

There are many challenges that have faced trade unions in their operations in Kenya. Trade Unions have experienced serious difficulties almost everywhere and are losing members. Few countries have unionization rates above 50 per cent, while others have less than 20 per cent of non-agricultural workers in unions. The Kenyan economy is largely agricultural based and therefore the working class has been small. This has adversely affected potential membership of unions and their capacity to bargain with employers on equal terms. Mutunga (2006) contents that without job security and with high unemployment, the result of course is that labour is cheaper and workers are hired and fired at will. Along with this, unions are undermined, not to mention the phenomenon of more and more cases of gross violation of labour rights and out right union busting.

The government and employers look down upon trade unions and preconceive them as chaotic and irresponsible organizations whose major aim is to disrupt peace, order and good governance. This perception attracts government and employers into affairs and activities of trade unions and thus tempts the government and employers to control trade unions activities. Political interference and intimidation thus, has been a feature of the Kenya industrial relations system. The activities of trade unions have occasionally attracted the attention of the political establishments. At times there has been no clear difference between trade union leadership and the political leadership. Trade union officials have at times doubled as politicians and vice versa and this has tended to be prejudicial to trade unionism. Ghai and McAuslan (1970) argue that the legal status of Central Organization of Trade Unions is that of an independently registered trade union federation but actions of the government have appeared at times to assume it as an adjunct to the administration. Trade unions activities in Kenya have therefore not been clearly divorced from the politics of the day.

Kenya has not been left out and has been affected by globalization. Kenya liberalized her economy in 1994 and implemented structural adjustment programme prescribed by the World Bank and the international monetary fund. Consequently, through the Finance Act No. 4 of 1994 an amendment was introduced to the employment act. The amendment was on regulation of union involvement in declaring workers redundant and related safeguards and procedures. One of the trade unions objectives is to fight for job security and workers benefits therefore; legislations such as amendment No. 4 of 1994 that was introduced when Kenya liberalized her economy adversely affect the role and effectiveness of trade unions.

The trade unions have increasingly been faced with financial constraints emanating from the following factors, among others: loss of members as a result of organizational restructuring, leading to loss of revenue since trade unions depend on members’ contributions in order to undertake their operations; splitting of the of the trade unions, for instance Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers from Kenya Nations Union of Teachers, thus reducing the financial base from membership contributions; and mismanagement of funds by the union leaders (COTU,2009).

COTU has not been very effective over the last two decades mainly as a result of rivalry and internal problems. Most trade unions do not consider COTU as effective, particularly in the areas of collective bargaining and settlement of disputes. the Government demanded that all registered trade unions with exception of Kenya Civil Servants Union (deregistered in 1980) and Kenya National Union of Teachers (delinked from COTU in 1970) to join COTU. The reason for delinking the two trade unions from COTU was that the two unions are silently categorised as offering essential service, and are governed by the
Interventions to the factors above include the growing perception that labour will have to develop new strategies, including strategies that complement local organizing with international campaigns (Tilly 1995). Several new strategies are emerging or evolving from old strategies. Targeting multinational corporations is an old strategy but it may be taking on new essential forms (Anner 2001: 67-76).

Codes of conduct and private monitoring mechanisms have offered yet another albeit controversial venue (Fung, O’Rourke, and Sabel 2000). Experience has demonstrated that as with all organizations, trade unions are sensitive to wider issues and events, particularly labour market changes and the impacts of neo-liberal state policies. Such developments have heralded a necessity for trade unions to adopt measures of organizational change, in order to identify means for reform and revitalization. The fact that trade union movements represent a majority segment of the Kenyan society, they contribute to the socio-economic development of the country (Hoque and Rahman, 1999: 35).

CONCLUSION

This study has traced the rise of trade unionism and its role in Kenyan history. It has analysed both the colonial and post-colonial government’s policies towards African responses to wage employment. It has been noted that trade union movement in Kenya started long before independence and was involved in the fight against colonialism (Moraa 2006). Accordingly then, Trade union leaders took up the struggle to better the working conditions of African workers (Ndalilah 2012 a). But initially the colonial government opposed any welfare organisation for African labourers. Although the colonial government did not succeed in creating a "non-political" union movement, it did reduce substantially the militancy with which the movement pursued its nationalist and industrial aims. Cooperation with the Labour Department was a condition of survival for the union movement, and union leaders were successfully steered in a "bread and butter" economist direction. This has continued even in the post-colonial period as a way of containing the nascent trade union movement and worker militancy.

However under this scenario there was an apparent shift of emphasis when African Trade Union leaders, after the suppression of Trade Unions, opted out of specific industrial issues to take the force of the African workers into Kenyan African Union (KAU) the first political party in Kenya. The decision implied a wider consciousness of African grievances under colonial rule. After independence faced with challenges emanating from the political class, Trade Unions have been an appendage of both the government.

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Part 3

*Industrialization and State in Africa : Comparative Perspectives*
From an Industrial Powerhouse to a Nation of Venders: over Two Decades of Economic Decline and De-industrialization in Zimbabwe 1990-2015

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Introduction

At independence in 1980, the incoming government under Robert Mugabe inherited a very thriving and diversified economy underpinned by three key economic pillars, namely agriculture, mining and manufacturing. Zimbabwe was the most industrialized country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of South Africa and was a major exporter of manufactured products to its neighbours. By 2015, however, the country’s industrial sector had all but collapsed following years of economic problems that resulted in serious de-industrialisation as factories closed and relocated to neighbouring countries and thousands of workers were thrown out of employment. By the middle of 2015, Zimbabwe had become a nation of vendors, with an estimated 90% of its population unemployed and struggling to eke out a living in the mushrooming informal economy. After a brief discussion of the growth and performance of the sector in the colonial era and the first decade of independence, this paper traces the decline of the country’s manufacturing sector1 from 1990 to 2015 and attempts to account for this decline.

The colonial era to 1979

As noted, at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was a leading manufacturing hub, second only to South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa. The history of the early development of this sector has been recounted and analysed by numerous scholars, including, G. Arrighi Roger Riddell, Colin Stoneman, I. Phimister, A. Mlambo et al, Pangeti and Ann Seidman, (Arrighi, 1966; Phimister, 1991; Riddell, 1988.; Riddell, 1990; Stoneman, 1990; Stoneman, 1981, Mlambo, 2000; Mlambo and Phimister, 2006; Pangeti, 1996; Seidman, 1982) among others, and will be summarised very briefly here. Early Southern Rhodesia’s economy was based mainly on mining and agriculture, but, gradually, a manufacturing sector emerged and grew, especially in the wake of the country’s attainment of responsible government in 1923 when colonial settlers took charge of their destiny and resolved to develop the colony’s economy in their own interest. In the 1930s, the colonial state began promoting the sector by, among other activities, investing in the country’s iron and steel and cotton industries. Thereafter, manufacturing benefited from the de facto import substitution industrialisation imposed on the country by the Second World War and, subsequently, from access to the larger domestic market provided by the Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963 (Phimister and Gwande, 2015). As a result, the country’s manufacturing sector grew significantly to contribute 20% to the country’s GDP by 1965 (Stoneman, 1990, p. 246).

The unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the government of Southern Rhodesia under Prime Minister Ian Smith in 1965 brought down international economic sanctions on the government in

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1 Under this label are included roughly 10 categories of manufacturing, namely, foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, textiles, clothing and footwear, wood and furniture, paper, printing and publishing, chemicals and petroleum products, metals, non-metallic minerals, transport and transport equipment. See ZIMSTAT, 2010.
retribution for its illegal action. This virtually imposed an import substitution industrialisation regime on the country, as it had to produce most of what it used to import to cater to the needs of the local population. In a determined effort to keep the country’s economy viable, the Rhodesian government introduced a number of interventionist and protectionist policies which helped the manufacturing sector to grow and made the country almost self-sufficient in meeting its consumer goods needs (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 1). Among the policies and instruments used were “exchange and import controls, tariffs, and joint state-private ventures” and maintaining African workers’ wages low in order to maximise profits (Seidman, 1982).

The close cooperation between the colonial government and local industrialists, in their joint determination to combat international sanctions, made measures such as foreign currency and import controls tolerable and effective, while necessity promoted innovation and the development of the critical skills required by the sector (Ndlela and Robinson, p. 2). As a result, the sector’s contribution to GDP had risen to 25% by 1974 (Stoneman, 1990, p. 247). The sector was then characterised by a growing dominance of transnational corporate capital which was channelled into the country through subsidiaries in South Africa as a sanctions-evading strategy, a focus on catering to the “luxury and semi-luxury requirements of the High-income (white) minority”, and a concentration in two urban areas, namely, Salisbury (Harare), and Bulawayo, with 47% and 22%, respectively (Seidman, 1982). Thus, while Zimbabwe inherited a highly developed and sophisticated manufacturing sector which was second only to South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa, it was a sector that benefited mostly the minority white population.

The colonial economy had been built on a racially inequitable basis that favoured the white settler minority at the expense of the African population. Many obstacles were crafted to keep Africans out of any meaningful participation in the country’s economy except as cheap labour or petty business operators. For instance, they could not legally own land in parts of the country which were designated ‘white areas’, which also happened to include all urban and mining centres and areas where commercial agriculture was possible. This automatically meant that Africans could not become owners of serious manufacturing businesses, mines or commercial farms.

Secondly, colonial financial institutions would not provide loans to African entrepreneurs who were regarded as high risk and who, in any case, had no collateral. This meant that Africans could only operate small retail shops, grinding mills, tuck shops, bars, eating houses in the African townships and in the African Reserves or they became transport operators, mostly as bus owners. This is precisely the paradoxical situation of a country that had a highly sophisticated and thriving manufacturing sector, while, “most Zimbabweans cannot yet afford to buy the goods manufactures by the modern manufacturing sector”. In the meantime,

[T]ransnational mines dig up and export the nation’s mineral wealth, a narrowly circumscribed manufacturing sector produces luxury and semi-luxury goods for the high-income majority. These have emerged out of a century of colonial rule as prosperous enclaves in a sea of poverty (Seidman, 1982).

In effect, therefore, the incoming independence government had inherited a highly unequal economy in which the country enjoyed “one of the highest average per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa, but the majority of its population remains among the most impoverished in the world” (Seidman, 1982). The challenge was how to redress this imbalance, while maintaining the country’s position as a premier manufacturing economy.

The first independence decade, 1980-1990

Notable efforts were made in the first independence years to improve the quality of life for the African majority who had been marginalised under colonialism. The rapid expansion of education and health services and the improvement of the ordinary people’s access to these, the pro-worker legislation that included minimum wage regulations, among other measures, are well documented (Mlambo, 1997). With regard to the economy, in general, and the manufacturing sector, in particular, there were several uncomfortable continuities into the independence period. For instance, the industrial economy, as was also the case with commercial agriculture, remained in the hands of the white minority and their transnational
corporate partners, with a few co-opted African elites in junior positions, needed mostly for facilitating access to the post-colonial ruling elite and policy makers. Thus, in the words of Brian Raftopoulos, many years into independence, “the economic structures that produced and sustained a white elite . . . [were], in their essentials, still prevalent” (Raftopoulos, 2000, 713-745). Such remnant inequalities were, eventually, to lead to the development of several indigenous business lobby groups demanding a share in the country’s economic cake and was, arguably, the driving force for the country’s indigenisation policy in 2008 (Mlambo, 2015).

There were also continuities in government policies towards the manufacturing sector. Like its colonial predecessor, the government also employed a variety of interventionist and protectionist tools to promote economic development despite the occasional talk about the need to liberalise “foreign exchange and trade regimes” (Stoneman, 1990, p. 249). As Ndlela and Robinson note, at independence, “the new government maintained the panoply of controls over the economy; with the apparent intention of using state intervention to redirect development to benefit the mass of the population” (Ndlela and Robinson, p. 5). However, the measures that had worked so well under UDI because of a close relationship between the colonial state and the private sector dominated by corporate capitalism because of their confluence of interests was to become strained in the independence period in the absence of such a rapport, more so when government’s pro-labour policies were seen as interfering with private capital’s profits. Also, as in the colonial era, post-colonial industrial strategy was predicated, as it had been in the colonial era, on the “dominance of foreign and settler capital, the orientation towards production for an elite” and “an expanded state role”, using an institution inherited from colonialism, namely, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) dating back to 1963, and “the balance between import substitutions and export orientation” (Stoneman, 1990, p. 248).

Despite these and other challenges, the economy, in general, and the manufacturing sector, in particular, performed well for most of the 1980s. During the 1980-82, the economy boomed, averaging 10% growth. Thereafter, the growth rate declined to an average of 5.5%, which was still higher than for sub-Saharan Africa during the decade. Fuelling this economic growth was growing domestic demand, as workers’ wages were increased due to government interventions, government’s redistributive policies that saw a vast expansion of education and health facilities, and the opening up of external markets, among other factors (African Development Bank, p. 3). Regarding the manufacturing sector specifically, the country’s picture looked very promising enough at the end of the first independence decade to lead economist Roger Riddell to write, with great optimism, that:

The story of industrialisation in Zimbabwe is undoubtedly one of success. Among the main achievements are the following: widespread and sustained expansion; a deepening of the industry structure with the development of substantial inter-linkages within manufacturing and with other sectors of the economy and the evolution of a manufacturing sector much of which appears to be internationally competitive. . . In spite of foreign exchange shortages, new investment in manufacturing is continuing (Riddell, 1988, p. 74).

Even more ironical in the light of the subsequent rapid decline of the country’s infrastructure, was Riddell’s unbounded praise for Zimbabwe’s infrastructure. He commented:

Similarly, the physical infrastructure is improving while, in general, being maintained in a high degree of efficiency with the electrification of the railways system, a highly inter-connected and well maintained road system, adequate electrical power to sustain rapid and, it if were to occur, even more electrically intensive manufacturing expansion and an increasingly automatic, satellite-linked telecommunications system (Riddell, 1988, p 74).

As will be shown later, the picture in the new millennium was just the opposite of the brave new world that Riddell had foretold.

The 1990s

Manufacturing grew sluggishly in the 1990s for a variety of reasons; the main one being the negative effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which the Zimbabwe
government started implementing in 1991. The economic reform programme was designed to revamp the economy through a raft of liberal measures that included the dismantling of price and exchange rate controls, privatisation of public enterprises, and trade liberalisation, among others (Ndlela, 2003, p. 134-135). A combination of factors conspired to render the reform programme unsuccessful, if not harmful to the Zimbabwean economy by its end. These included the weakness of the reform package itself (Mlambo, 1997), the very severe drought of 1992, and government’s poor implementation of the programme. Meanwhile the removal of price controls led to escalating inflation levels and a marked decline in consumer demand (Saunders, 1996).

Under growing economic stress, the manufacturing sector struggled, leading to some companies either downsizing or closing down. Particularly hard hit was the textile industry, which found itself having to compete with cheaper imports at a time when the economic climate was not particularly conducive. As a result the textiles sector’s contribution to manufacturing output declined from 11.3% in 1985 to 7.9% in 1995, while 87 companies in the sector had closed down by 1994 (Kanyenze, 2006, p. 280). As companies under stress were forced to retrench some of their staff, with 25,000 employees reportedly retrenched by 1992, the shrinking domestic market translated into weakening consumer demand, which further put a strain on the companies that remained operative. ESAP was thus deleterious to the Zimbabwean economy, in general, and to the country’s manufacturing economy, in particular. Whereas ESAP was “meant to herald a new era of modernised, competitive, export-led industrialisation”, the reality was that Zimbabwe’s high-performing economy of the 1980s was severely damaged (Saunders, 1996, p. 8).

Other challenges facing the manufacturing sector in this period were high interest rates, inadequate infrastructure, including insufficient and expensive electricity, limited telecommunications capacity and an inefficient and inadequate railway transport system, as well as liquidity challenges. The inadequacy of the country’s electricity supply system was evident in periodic load shedding that disrupted normal industry operations. The problems with insufficient infrastructural support were the result of bad management, corruption, poor maintenance and lack of investment in public companies or parastatals like the Zimbabwe Energy Supply Authority (ZESA) and the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) in the 1980s (Ndlela and Robinson, p. 2). As will be shown, the failure of such public companies was to propel the manufacturing sector into near total collapse by the second decade of the new millennium.

Added to these challenges was the very severe drought of 1992, which virtually turned Zimbabwe from the breadbasket of southern Africa to a net importer of basic staples, especially maize, at considerable cost. Given the very close linkages between agriculture and industry that will be discussed later, the crisis in agriculture inevitably impacted negatively on the manufacturing sector. It is estimated that the 1992 drought contributed significantly to the over 9% drop in the manufacturing sector’s volume of production (Ndlela and Robinson, p. 6). By 2000, manufacturing’s contribution to GDP had declined to 18% from 25% at the beginning of the 90s decade (African Development Bank, p. 7).

The descent into the abyss 2000 - 2015

The economy in general

Zimbabwe’s economic decline, which was a major part of what has come to be known as the Zimbabwe crisis, became pronounced from 2000 onwards but it can be argued that it had started in the late 90s as a result of some unwise decisions by the government. Two of the most cited ones are the decision to award large unbudgeted gratuities to liberation war veterans in November 1997 and to send Zimbabwean troops into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998 to defend that country’s president who was under attack from Congolese rebels. Meanwhile, under pressure from liberation war veterans who were demanding compensation for their sacrifices during the war, Mugabe unilaterally decided to award Z$50 000 (USD 3000) to each of the country’s approximately 60 000 veterans and other perks. This unbudgeted subvention to the liberations war veterans triggered a 74% decline in the value of the Zimbabwean currency against the US dollar in just over 4 trading hours on November 14, 1997 in what has come to known as Black Friday (Dewa, 2013, p. 3). The country’s economic decline and the rising

2 The crisis was also political, social and otherwise.
inflation and cost of living levels sparked off the December 1997 food riots and strikes that led government to resort to harsh measures to quell the disturbances and, arguably, contributed to the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition political formation. Then came the land invasions of 2000, associated with the government’s unplanned and rather chaotic fast-track land reform programme, which accelerated the country’s precipitous economic decline which is discussed below.

Except for a brief period between 2009 and 2013 when Zimbabwe’s compromise Government of National Unity (GNU) made up of the two MDCs3 and ZANU-PF was running the country, Zimbabwe’s economic performance in the twenty-first century has been disastrous. The country’s GDP declined consistently each year since 2000 until Zimbabwe’s ranking by GDP in the Southern African Development community (SADC) fell from its position as second only to South Africa in the late 1990s to tenth position in 2004, only managing to beat Madagascar, Swaziland, Malawi and Lesotho, which had even smaller GDPs (Zimbabwe Institute, 2007, p. 2-4). Reportedly, the cumulative decline of Zimbabwe’s real GDP growth was 50% between 2000 and 2008. Meanwhile, real per capita income fell from US$644 in 1990 to US$433 in 2006 and even further down to US$338 in 2008. The country’s poverty rate at 2008 was estimated at 70%, up from 42% in 1995, while unemployment was estimated at 80 per cent in 2008 (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 3). In addition, the country faced its greatest challenge in the form of unprecedented inflation which increased considerably from 2000 and reached triple figures in 2006, to then escalate into “hyperinflation in 2007 before peaking at five hundred billion per cent” at the end of 2008. Inflation was “fuelled by years of money creation to finance public expenditures and quasi-fiscal spending by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)” (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 3).

The establishment of the GNU in 2009 arrested the free falling Zimbabwean economy temporarily until the controversial 2013 general elections when ZANU-PF won overwhelmingly amidst charges from the political opposition parties of widespread rigging by the governing ruling party which, then, proceeded to dispense with the coalition. The temporary recovery had owed much to the GNU’s decision to adopt two key reforms in March 2009, namely, the abandonment of the now worthless local currency and the adoption of a multi-currency regime and the introduction of a cash budget system. This promoted macro-economic stability which was supportive of economic recovery and growth, with the country’s untenable inflation levels a thing of the past. As a result, real GDP grew 5.7% in 2009 (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 3). By 2011 the country’s growth rate had risen to 10.6%, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Siyakiya, 2014, p. 16). Unfortunately, the economic resuscitation period was very short, as economic decline resumed with a vengeance from 2013 onwards, as the ZANU-PF government seemed not to have any clue about how to arrest the economic meltdown.

As the economy rapidly contracted, the formal employment sector collapsed and more and more Zimbabweans resorted to the informal sector for survival. The informal sector had, of course, begun to grow during the ESAP days when retrenchments followed the difficult economic climate created by the austerity programme in the 90s. The result was that, the informal economy in the country was estimated at 59.4% of GDP in the 1999/2000 fiscal year, then, regarded as the highest in Africa whose average was 42% of GDP World Bank, 2003). In November 2000, the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries (CZI) reported that an estimated 1.7 million people were being supported by the country’s informal sector (Financial Gazette, June 2002). In 2013, reportedly, 84% of the country’s employed population of 5.4 million was in informal employment, while only 11% remained in formal employment and the balance was not classified (The Standard, Zimbabwe, 04/11/2013), leading Kumbirai Katsande, the then president of the CZI, to observe that Zimbabwe had become a “nation of traders” (http://africanbrains.net/2013/04/19- Biti, 2014, at http://www.zimbabwesituation.com ) or, in popular parlance, a nation of vendors. Clearly by the beginning of 2015, Zimbabwe had become a predominantly informal economy country where the formal economy employed only a minor fraction of its working population.

The Manufacturing Sector

Focusing on manufacturing, 2000 marked the start of a rapid and relentless de-industrialisation process, with the volume of manufacturing falling 33% by 2005 to stand at only two thirds of the levels at independence in 1980 (Zimbabwe Institute, 2007, p. 2-4). By 2008 capacity utilisation in the

3 The original MDC had split into two since its formation, with the main faction still led by its founder president Morgan Tsvangirayi, while the breakaway faction was under Welshman Ncube.
manufacturing sector was a mere 10% (Gadzikwa, 2013). As with the rest of the economy, the sector recovered following the March 2009 reforms that scrapped Zimbabwe’s local currency and introduced a multi-currency regime. It grew by 10% in 2009, with capacity utilisation rising from 10% at the beginning of the year to about 32.3% (Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, 2010, p. 11). This did not mean that the sector was out of the woods, by any means, as it continued to face a number of challenges, including erratic power and water supplies, liquidity constraints, and competition from imports (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 11-12). Nevertheless, the 2010 CZI Manufacturing Sector Survey reported optimistically: “Generally, the manufacturing sector is improving though at a slower than anticipated level”. Capacity utilisation had, reportedly, increased to 43.7% in the first half of that year, which was still very low but better than in the previous year. Manufacturing was then contributing 17% to GDP (Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, 2010, p. 12-13). After having risen to 57.2% in the first half of 2011, capacity utilisation fell to 44.2% by 2012, prompting the CZI to observe that the manufacturing sector was in crisis. Challenges were listed as “low product demand, lack of working capital, machine breakdown, high cost of production and cost of utilities”. The worst performing sub-sector was identified as leather and allied products, which was said to be operating at only 27.5% capacity (Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, 2012, p. 3).

In its 2014 report, the CZI noted that the sector was undergoing “serious de-industrialisation which has reached ‘catastrophic levels’” (Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, p. 6), with 4 610 companies having closed since 2011, resulting in the loss of 55 000 jobs (Zimbabwe Independent 19/06/2015). Blamed, once again, were “power cuts and costs, liquidity challenges, low domestic demand”, among other problems (Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, 2014, p. 6). Most badly hit was Bulawayo, the country’s industrial hub during the colonial era where most companies were located because of its proximity to Botswana and South Africa, which experienced crippling de-industrialisation in the period under review (Munyaka, 2014; Ndiweni et al, 2014; Mbira, 2015). Clearly, the manufacturing sector was hurting badly by the beginning of 2015.

**Accounting for Zimbabwe’s de-industrialisation**

In the light of the above, the question to be addressed is how did Zimbabwe move from being a country of considerable promise to being “low income country under stress” (Zimbabwe Institute, 2007, p. 6)? How did a country which was regarded as an industrial hub with the second highest level of industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa end up being dependent on the informal economy and presiding over a rapidly dying formal economy? The answer, it will be suggested, lies in a complex mix of government policies, corruption and incompetence, the privileging of political posturing in the international arena at the expense of economic development, and a variety of exogenous factors, some of which were out of Zimbabwe’s control. Without question, government policies over the years contributed to the steady decline and the current near-collapse of the manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe, beginning with the over-concentration on re-distributive policies in the 1980s, such as free education and health services, without paying enough attention to production and generating new wealth to fund such services. One of the areas to suffer because of this was the country’s basic infrastructure.

**Crumbling infrastructure**

While resources were spent liberally on providing free education and free health, very little investment was made in public enterprises that provided key services to the economy, in general, and to the manufacturing sector, in particular. Meanwhile lack of maintenance, gross mismanagement and corruption over the years eroded public enterprises such as the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Agency (ZESA), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Postal and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC), Zimbabwe National Road Agency (ZINARA), and others. These enterprises were allowed to deteriorate to an extent where they simply could not discharge their mandates of providing the services essential to keep the economy functioning optimally. Not surprisingly, the failure by these key institutions to keep up their end of the bargain undermined the economy, in general, and the manufacturing sector, in particular, through erratic energy supplies, poor water supplies, and transport bottlenecks. A good example is ZESA’s increasing inability to provide sufficient electrical power to enable the economy to function normally. Total supply has been far below national demand for many years and both domestic and commercial consumers
have had to endure lengthy and frequent power cuts, known in Zimbabwe as load shedding.

Equally disastrous in the long run was Government’s failure to maintain, let alone improve, the basic transportation infrastructure that it had inherited at independence, particularly the country’s roads and railways. The country’s once well-maintained transport system had become seriously inadequate by the second decade of the new millennium, with the national railway system having, virtually, collapsed. This meant that goods that used to be ferried around the country and to neighbouring markets by railway were now carried primarily by road, thus, hastening the deterioration of the country’s road network. The government’s inability to re-surface its roads resulted in potholes, damage to vehicles, and numerous traffic accidents, among other problems. It is not surprising, therefore, that poor infrastructure featured prominently in the 2012 CZI Manufacturing Survey which identified the most problematic factors negatively impacting the sector as: 1. Power cuts and shortages; 2. Inefficient railway network within the country; 3. Water shortages; 4. Poor road infrastructure; and 5. Absence of a well-developed rail network which links the country to the ports (Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, 2012, p. 14).

The great inflation

The poor fortunes of the Zimbabwean manufacturing sector cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the very damaging impact that the country’s unprecedented high inflation in the period up to 2008 had on the sector. Various factors help account for the sharp and disastrous rise in the country’s inflation between 2000 and 2008, including the controversial fast-track land reform programme and the farm invasions that accompanied it, the 2002 drought, and the ostracism of the country by some leading Western powers in response to the farm invasions and the growing anti-Western rhetoric that emanated, mainly, from prominent government officials, including the country’s President. In reprise for the farm invasions, the United States passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDER A) in 2001 enjoining the U.S. executive director of each international financial institution to oppose and vote against any extension of any loan credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe and any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution.

Other contributory factors were the increasing lack of international confidence in the country as a result of the controversial elections of 2000, 2002 and 2005 as well as the contentious 2005 Murambatsvina [removing the filth] campaign which destroyed informal urban dwellings and left thousands of poor people homeless in the name of urban renewal (Mlambo, 2008, p. 8-23). In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stopped its lending facility to the country in 2002 because of the country’s failure to service the huge debt that it already owed. As foreign currency reserves dwindled because of the above factors, among others, government resorted to printing money in its bid to address its budget deficit. Adding to the problem were the quasi-fiscal activities of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which, together, propelled the country towards one of the highest inflation levels known in history (Bloch, 2013; Siyakiya, p. 15). The high inflation levels depleted business’ capital resources so rapidly that they could not operate normally, while inflation also drastically eroded consumers’ spending power and resulted in dwindling local demand for manufactured goods. Thus, local business was caught between a rapidly declining domestic market and soaring operational costs due to inflation, among other challenges. The choice facing many companies was either to downsize or to shut down operations completely. Worse still, until the introduction of a multi-currency regime in 2009, the Reserve Bank discouraged savings by both businesses and private individuals by periodically and arbitrarily raiding bank accounts for foreign currency and compensating bank account holders with an increasingly valueless local currency. As expected this contributed to a serious liquidity crisis, resulting in banks not being able to provide businesses with investment or other capital (Bloch, 2014). As the Zimbabwe Government’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development admitted in 2014, the “shortage of long term financing has also made retooling a tall order leaving companies stuck with antiquated equipment” (Government of Zimbabwe, 2014, p. 8-9).

Indigenisation policy

As if the liquidity challenges were not enough, the Zimbabwe Government introduced very controversial legislation designed to promote the indigenisation of business operating in the country,
ranging from mines to manufacturing companies and other business ventures. In a bid to win popularity in the run-up to the 2008 Presidential elections in which the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) Party of Robert Mugabe was facing stiff competition from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai, the government enacted legislation to increase the African people’s control of the economy. Signed into law on April 17 2008, but only implemented in 2010 when government passed the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Amendment, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 14 of 2007 provided for a 51% indigenous shareholding in all businesses with a net asset value of US$500 000 and above (Government of Zimbabwe, 2007 and 2010).

As argued elsewhere, Zimbabwe is not the only or the first country to practice resource nationalism, as examples abound in nationalisation and/or indigenisation campaigns in newly-independent African countries such as Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda under General Amin, the Congo since the 1960s and, indeed, post-apartheid South Africa (Mlambo, 2015, p. 45-60). Resource nationalism is also not exclusive to Africa, as resource-rich developed countries, such as the United States, Canada and Australia have also adopted “resource nationalist policies that include the blocking of Chinese investments and the tightening of fiscal regimes in the extractive sectors” (McDermott et al, 2013). In Zimbabwe’s case, indigenisation policy was a response to a long-standing demand by indigenous business people for the government to redress the economic inequalities of the colonial past when the system had been so configured that only the white minority could take advantage of available economic opportunities. Throughout the 1990s, Black business lobby groups had been established and had actively pressured Government to level the economic playing field (Rafopoulos, 1996). While some measures to strengthen Black business had been put in place by 2000, in the view of the Black business group, much more still needed to be done. The economic nationalism that engulfed the country during the farm invasions and fast-track land reform programme seems to have intensified the demand for similar indigenisation in the business sector and the rest of the economy. In the run-up to the 2008 general elections, therefore, the ruling party decided to tap into these long-standing resentments to push for an anti-white and pro-indigenous law that would, hopefully, win it the much-needed political support.

While the success or otherwise of such economic nationalist policies where they have been implemented is debatable, it is clear that the policy has so far proved disastrous for Zimbabwe’s economy, in general, and for the manufacturing sector, in particular. This is because the legislation discouraged potential investors and made those already involved in the country’s economy to adopt a wait-and-see attitude regarding the implications of the policy on their investments in the country. The apparent confusion within government as to what the policy really meant, evident in sometimes conflicting public statements by government leaders, only made the situation worse as it suggested policy inconsistency and lack of clarity which made would-be investors even more hesitant. Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policy, thus, worsened the shortage of financial resources that was already crippling the local manufacturing industry, for as Zimbabwean economist John Robertson observes:

Without off shore financial support, it will be difficult for most companies in the country to recapitalize and procure new technologies. However, we are making it difficult for foreign investors to bring their money and expertise here. Unless the indigenisation policy is reversed, Zimbabwe will continue to de-industrialise (Cited in Kachembere, 2013).

While the other negative factors discussed in this paper clearly contributed to the country’s international image problem as an investment destination, there can be little doubt that the country’s indigenisation policy is one of the key deterrents to would-be investors, for as one economist pointed out, investors were unlikely to be attracted to invest in a country that was reducing them “to minority shareholders in their own companies” (Bloch, 2013). That the country is regarded as a poor destination for investment is reflected in its ranking at 171, out of 189 countries (down from 156th in 2010) in the 2015 World Bank/International Finance Corporation Doing Business report and a similarly low ranking in the World Economic forum’s competitiveness Index (http://www.tralac.org/bews/article/6625).
Another source of problems for local industry is what the manufacturing sector identifies as an unhelpful tariff regime that favours outsiders at the expense of local producers and which gives South Africa, Zimbabwe’s giant neighbour, unfair advantage. This can best be illustrated by focusing on the challenges facing the Zimbabwean Pharmaceutical industry, which is struggling as a result of the fact that the Zimbabwe Government’s duty regime is “giving South African products an edge on the local market” and destroying the local pharmaceutical industry sector. The main problem is that, while Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies exporting to South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland have to airfreight their goods at US$5 per kilogram because only the ORT International Airport in Johannesburg is the designated drugs port in South Africa, South African producers ferry their products into Zimbabwe at a mere US$0.80 per kilogram by road through Beit Bridge on the Zimbabwe-South Africa border, which is a designated drugs port for Zimbabwe. This makes Zimbabwean products uncompetitive both in Zimbabwe and in the neighbouring countries of South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.

In addition, Zimbabwean producers have to pay duty of up to 40% and Value Added Tax (VAT) of 15% on imported raw materials and packaging materials, while foreign producers land their finished products duty free in the country. Given the fact that, approximately, 99% of raw materials used by Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies are imported, the import costs are crippling, especially in the face of cheaper South African and Indian products. A more equitable tariff regime would, thus, help Zimbabwean companies compete more favourably both in the domestic and foreign markets (Gadzikwa, 2013).

In general, Zimbabwean manufactures have argued that their government has not protected them enough from cheap foreign imports, most of which are being brought into the country illegally or in violation of the country’s trade regulations. In a report, aptly entitled “Cheap Imports Choke Local Industry”, John Kachembere wrote:

Battery, oil, fats and textile manufacturers have been hardest hit by cheap imports, with most of the products originating outside the SADC Free Trade Area but attracting reduced duty when they should be subjected to prohibitive import rates (Kachembere, May 2014).

This unfair competition was, reportedly, undermining the viability of local manufacturers. For instance, the Chairman of the Leather and Allied Industries Federation of Zimbabwe reported in 2013 that “cheap footwear, estimated at about 3.5 million pairs and travel goods from the Far East, sometimes labelled as made in South Africa” continued to enter the country illegally. “Because of high production costs and aged equipment”, local industries could not compete with such imports in the domestic market and internationally (www.intracen.org/).

Local manufacturers complain about the widespread violation of rules of origin, “misclassification of goods when charging duty by customs officials, smuggling of goods into the country, and under-invoicing on imported products” as well as general corruption, presumably, of the Customs officials (Gadzikwa, 2013). Cheap goods from South Africa and, particularly, China were reported as severely harmful to Zimbabwean manufacturers. According to the CZI, South African producers and China accounted for almost 70% of goods imported into Zimbabwe. Increasingly,

Zimbabwean retailers rely on South African companies that manufacture soaps, detergents, cooking oil, dairy products, and other foodstuffs to beef up their stock, as local producers are struggling. Electrical and Household appliances produced by South African companies also dominate . . . this category . . . 41 per cent of the competition experienced by the local industry is emanating from South Africa, while China contributes 30 per cent” (Karombo, October 2014).

Confirming the damage to African industries caused by competition, particularly from China, with a special focus on textiles, Dhliwayo noted how the “huge influx of relatively cheap Chinese textiles and apparel has severely damaged the continent’s own production capabilities and output” and how African producers have found it very difficult to “compete with the low cost alternatives, which are appealing to many low-income earners”. It is argued that this is forcing local manufacturers to either shut down or downsize (Dhliwayo, www.consultancyafrica.com).
It is also contended here that among the factors that have been most disruptive to the overall Zimbabwean economy and to the smooth operation of the country’s manufacturing sector, in particular, are the violent farm invasions and chaotic fast-track land reform programme from 2000 onwards which were accompanied by mayhem and bloodletting from some liberation war veterans and other government supporters which did untold damage to Zimbabwe’s international reputation and standing (Muzondidya, 2007; Sachikonye, 2005). The negative impact of this controversial land-redistribution programme stemmed, first, from its disruption of agriculture which has traditionally been very closely linked with the manufacturing sector, both as a supplier of raw materials and as a consumer of finished products. Secondly, it earned the country a bad image which resulted in international condemnation, ostracism and sanctions by some Western countries and which, as argued above, made the country less attractive to investors. Lastly, the land reform led to the collapse of the agriculture industry which, in turn, led to the inevitable decline of the national economy as a whole and, inevitably, to the decline of the manufacturing sector. Before these aspects are explored in detail, it will be necessary to provide a very brief history of the land invasions or fast-track land reform.

As has been well documented, Zimbabwe’s land question has been part and parcel of the country’s history under European colonialism, starting with the hoisting of the British flag in Salisbury (Harare) by the Cecil John Rhodes-sponsored Pioneer Column in 1890. Thereafter, from the British South Africa Company government up to 1923, through the various Responsible Government regimes of Southern Rhodesia, to the Rhodesian Government of Ian Smith in the UDI era from 1965 to 1979, successive colonial governments grabbed land from the African majority through various land laws, the most infamous of which were the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. From the turn of the twentieth century, Africans were progressively confined to the so-called African Reserves that were strategically dotted throughout the country in a well-calculated attempt to keep African agricultural production from competing with white agriculture in the country’s urban markets by making sure that they were located mostly in arid and unproductive areas far away from the country’s major communication networks, such as railways and inter-city roads (Palmer, 1977; Mlambo, 2010; Mlambo, 2005).

Also well documented is the ever-present African resentment of colonial land policies which remained a source of friction between the races throughout the colonial period and, arguably, helped fuel the anti-colonial struggle that culminated in the armed struggle, as the two leading African nationalist movements, the Zimbabwe African people’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) took up arms to overthrow colonialism. The land question was discussed at the 1979 Lancaster

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4 The term “Jambanja” can be loosely translated as mayhem, upheavals or generally disorderly conduct.
House Conference which was convened by the British Government to find a lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s conflict and which almost broke down because the redistribution of land which the African nationalists were demanding had not been addressed to their satisfaction. The conference was only saved from collapse when the British Government, with the assured support of the United States, promised to help fund the acquisition of land from white commercial farmers for redistribution to the needy African population (Mlambo, 2014).

While some land reform was undertaken in the first twenty years of independence, the inequality of land tenure between the two races remained an ever-present challenge, as various factors militated against a comprehensive and thorough land reform exercise that would put paid to the century-long problem. This created a potential dangerous situation for the future of the country by keeping alive a very sore issue that could be manipulated for political gain by the ruling party should the need ever arise and which would enable it to use the white population which hogged the land as a convenient scapegoat to blame for the country’s problems and in order to mobilise the African masses behind it. Arguably, this is what occurred in 2000 when the newly-established MDC posed a serious threat to ZANU-PF hegemony and the latter needed an issue around which to mobilise support for itself (Mlambo, 2014).

The land invasions that commenced in 2000, together with the government’s fast-track land reform programme rapidly changed Zimbabwe’s land ownership structure; removing almost all white commercial farmers from the land and replacing them with African farmers. The manner in which this was done earned the country the condemnation of some Western countries which, as noted earlier, imposed targeted sanctions on some members of the Zimbabwean Government and select companies. More importantly for purposes of the current discussion, land redistribution resulted in a precipitous decline in agricultural output for a number of reasons. Many of the beneficiaries of the reform had no farming experience and some proved to be mere ‘cell phone farmers’, who did not run the newly-acquired farms as proper businesses by were content to direct farm activities by phone from the comfort of their city homes. The majority did not have the necessary capital to invest in essential inputs and equipment to make farming a viable business activity. Furthermore, because they did not have title deeds to this newly-acquired land, the new owners could not use their land as collateral to raise investment capital through applying for bank loans. Then, of course, matters were not helped at all by the fact that the country suffered several droughts in the period under discussion. The result was a dramatic slump in agricultural production that turned a country which had earlier been the breadbasket of the region into a basket case which now needed to import basic foodstuffs to feed its population.

The decline of agricultural production was well documented by Zimbabwean economist John Robertson in a study published in 2012 which shows a steep drop in, for example, the production of the staple maize crop from 2 million to a mere 600 000 tonnes between 2000 and 2012 and wheat production from 300 000 to 10 000 tonnes between 2001 and 2012. There were similar steep declines in the production of other crops like coffee and flue-cured tobacco as well as in beef production (Robertson, www.mikecampbellfoundation.com). According to the African Development Bank, agriculture had declined “steadily and drastically over the years” and its share in GDP fell from 22% in 2001 to a mere 10% in 2008. This was attributed to the effects of the fast-track land reform programme, “erratic weather, limited access to finance, infrastructure bottlenecks, control, of producer and food prices, and large scale underutilisation of land”. Lastly, the Bank highlighted the “lack of security of tenure” as an impediment to meaningful investment in agriculture (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 5; Mujeyi, 2010, p. 6).

With respect to the manufacturing sector, the decline in the country’s agriculture was catastrophic. This is because manufacturing in Zimbabwe has traditionally been very closely linked to agriculture as both a source of raw materials and as a market for finished products. In the words of an African Development Bank study,

The manufacturing sector has almost always had strong linkages with the agricultural sector, with agriculture sourcing from it over half of intermediate goods, such as insecticides, stock feeds and fertilizer, while nearly half of agricultural produce is supplied to the manufacturing sector. The performance of the two sectors is, therefore, closely correlated. The collapse of agricultural activities associated with the implementation of the fast track land programme by the government had a devastating impact on the manufacturing sector in the past decade. Between 1999 and 2008,
manufacturing activities experienced a cumulative decline of 92 percent (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 7).

Clearly, therefore, once the Zimbabwean agricultural sector started ailing as a result of the unplanned and chaotic land invasions of 2000 and the hastily-implemented fast track-land reform, the decline of the country’s manufacturing sector was to be expected, given the very close linkages and symbiotic relationship between the two economic sectors.

Lastly, both a cause and a result of the country’s economic decline and the near collapse of the manufacturing sector is the brain drain that has bled Zimbabwe’s human resources capital steadily since the late 1990s as technicians, engineers, local entrepreneurs and other skilled personnel key to the continued wellbeing and expansion of the country’s economy fled both the ruling party’s increasing political intolerance of dissent and its ever ready resort to violent methods of silencing opposition, as well as the plummeting economic conditions. Estimates of Zimbabweans living in exile place the total number as high as 5 million people, many of whom are professionals who would have contributed meaningfully to Zimbabwe’s economy but who have been forced by various circumstances to emigrate to South Africa, Britain and other European countries, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and numerous other destinations. Given the fact that Zimbabwe’s population is approximately 14 million, having such a large section of its population living in exile is a significant loss to the Zimbabwean society, in general, and to the country’s economy, in particular, especially given the quality of that exile population and its developmental potential.

Conclusion

The paper has traced the development of Zimbabwe’s manufacturing sector from the early colonial days through UDI and the first two decades of independence up to 2015. It has argued that, from very small beginnings in the 1930s, the sector developed rapidly during the Second World War and the Central African Federation and expanded even more significantly in the UDI period when the colonial government adopted import-substitution strategies as a counter to international sanctions. In the independence period, the sector experienced some growth in the 1980s, but began a downward slide in the 1990s, partly due to the negative impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and partly because of some unwise decisions taken by the government which involved large expenditures that had not been budgeted for.

Thereafter, the farm invasions and fast-track land reform programme of the early 2000s precipitated a downward economic spiral that not only lead to the shrinking of the country’s economy but also ushered in a period of massive levels of inflation that only ended when the government abandoned the local currency and adopted a multi-currency regime in 2009. Following a brief period of recovery which lasted until the controversial 2013 elections, the economy, once again, went into a tailspin as various challenges made company operations difficult. Among these were the decline in agricultural production, shortages and the high cost of power and water supplies, the near collapse of the country’s infrastructure, such as the road and railway system, unregulated competition from South African and Chinese imports, among others, ZIDERa and other sanctions by Western countries and a shrinking domestic market. Finally, it was argued that the country’s massive brain drain led to a crippling haemorrhage of its human resources capital which only compounded Zimbabwe’s problems.

Because of these developments, a once highly-industrialised economy, second only to South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa, had become a nation of vendors, with extremely high levels of unemployment as a result of a near-total collapse of the formal employment sector. This has condemned the majority of Zimbabwe’s people to eking out a living in the informal sector. Thus Zimbabwe had declined over the years from an industrial hub into a predominantly informal economy.
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Industrializing a Colonial Backwater: Northern Rhodesia during the Second World War to the 1950s

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If necessity is the mother of invention, war is certainly the father of industrial expansion (E.C.F. Bird, former Comptroller of Customs, Nigeria The Times, 7 January 1943)

I

From the very beginning of colonial rule Northern Rhodesia was considered a colonial backwater, deserving no development at all. In comparison with other British colonies in the region such as Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, Northern Rhodesia did not attract much capitalist investment in form of secondary industries when the search for the second Rand proved elusive. The country was designated as a supplier of cheap labour for her more economically advanced neighbours to the south. She, therefore, remained backward and dependent on the powerful south for much of her manufactured needs. This trend did not change much even during the Second World War when some of her neighbouring peers experienced massive industrial growth. In giving the manufacturing sector in the country little attention, scholars seem to be following in the footsteps of earlier colonial administrators who were mainly concerned with the promotion of agriculture and mining, considering secondary industries not to be vital to the country's development and prosperity. Half-hearted attempts were started during the war, however.

Several scholars have examined the history of manufacturing in Central Africa. Among these are E.S. Pangeti, I. Phimister, and A.S. Mlambo (2000). They note that the small beginnings of import substitution industrialization witnessed in Southern Rhodesia during the Depression were consolidated during and after the Second World War (2000: 3). Among factors responsible for this were the changing attitudes of the colonial state towards the manufacturing sector in the country as well as the general impact of the war on the country. In order to avoid supply bottlenecks associated with the Second World War, the state began to involve itself both directly and indirectly, in the manufacturing sector, both as regulator and entrepreneur. The massive expansion of the domestic market during the war was due to the large numbers of Europeans who moved to the country as part of the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS). Factories, to serve the expanding urban population, increased in number from 294 in 1939 to 473 in 1948, and over the same period their gross output grew from £5.4 million to £25.8 million (Phimister, 2000: 32). An earlier study on this subject was done by Leonard Tow (1960) who examined the problems and prospects of the manufacturing industry in colonial Zimbabwe.

To date insufficient attention has been paid to the thinking within imperial and colonial Government circles which underpinned the policies adopted in trying to industrialize Northern Rhodesia during and after the war period, and which led to the failure of policy makers to achieve their objectives. Even Charles Elliot’s edited collection (1971) does not address challenges faced by
 colonial Zambia, as the book focuses on the constraints to Zambia’s industrialization after the attainment of independence in 1964. Only one such study by Ackson Kanduza (1986), who examined the impact of the regional tariff policy on the development of colonial Zambia, has ever been done to account for the lack of investments in the country’s industrial sector during the colonial period. The paper fills an important void in the literature on the economic historiography of colonial Zambia.

II

By Secondary industry is meant the inclusion of all manufacturing and processing activity other than the “primary” activity of extractive industry: farming and mining. It means the production of a more highly proceeded article where production in a lower stage is already taking place: thus the manufacture of copper wire may be regarded as a “secondary” industry and the production of copper as a “primary” industry. According to W.J. Busschau (1945: 13) secondary industries, therefore, meant all manufacturing activity other than the production of raw materials. Busschau further noted that at the outbreak of the war, the economic activity of Northern Rhodesia was almost wholly concerned with primary industry mining and agriculture and in comparison, the value of the output of secondary industry was negligible (1945: 13). The only major industry in the country after the mines was Zambezi Sawmills which produced teak used in the manufacture of timber products such as railway sleepers, parquet tiles and furniture. The mining industry, as Elena Berger (1974: 9), argued did not spark the growth of many secondary industries, nor did it lead to improved prospects in the rural areas of the country.

The Second World War brought about a serious shortage of consumer goods in the colonies which needed to be redressed through the setting up of industries. Several reasons account for the shortage of consumer goods such as clothes, blankets, cutlery, pots and pans, food, and soap in Northern Rhodesia. One of these was that the country depended on imports for most of its needs. The major sources were the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, in wartime even the Imperial economy faced challenges which made exports to the colonies minimal. A nagging problem in the production of commodities during the war, according to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Northern Rhodesia, was that there was a shortage of labour as much of it in the producing countries had been diverted to war industries resulting in a drastic fall in production for the civilian market (NAZ SEC1/1362 Note for Executive Council c.1944). For as David Killingray and Richard Rathbone stated, the industrial world’s capacity was diverted towards “war production” which severely reduced the volume and often the quality of goods offloaded in Africa (1986: 8). This ensured that in the prosecution of the total war, as far as possible, goods regarded as not priorities were not manufactured, and that raw materials were used in the best interest of the imperial war economy. Northern Rhodesia was one of those colonies that came to suffer the brunt of reduced exports from the metropole and elsewhere in the Empire.

Apart from this, there was a worldwide shortage of raw materials needed for the production of goods in the metropole most of which had to be imported by shipping. The shortage of commodities such as butter and soap experienced in Northern Rhodesia was ascribed to the loss of Allied possessions in South East Asia in early 1942 from which Empire traditionally obtained fats and oils. Moreover as the Government observed, whatever raw materials managed to reach the shores of the United Kingdom were immediately ear-marked for direct war purposes or local consumption (NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council c.1944). What made matters worse was that the purchase of materials in non-sterling areas presented great difficulties since Imperial sterling balances had to be conserved. In 1941 the Colonial Secretary, Lord Moyne, sent a circular to all colonial Governors urging the accumulation of sterling balances for future use. The colonies, according to Ashley Jackson, were therefore asked to limit import demands in order to conserve the sterling area’s hard currency and ease Britain’s balance of payments (Jackson, 2006: 48). And as Michael Cowen and Nicholas Westcott (1986: 40) have demonstrated, it was the enforced change in the pattern of international trade in conjunction with the centralisation of sterling which determined change in market conditions for raw material production.
Furthermore, even if goods were produced in pre-war quantities in the UK, it was not possible to send them to their destination overseas with the usual regularity due to Axis submarine warfare. John Hargreaves (1996: 55) and Jackson (2006: 44) noted that dislocation of pre-war trade patterns, shipping shortages and maritime blockades weakened whole sectors of the commercial economy. One ship sunk by Axis could contain sufficient quantities of goods to satisfy Northern Rhodesia’s requirements over several months, and such losses had actually occurred more than once by mid-1943 (NAZ SEC1/1362 Note for Executive Council c.1944). An unanticipated shortage of shipping, which resulted in the concentration of convoys in the North Atlantic route following the fall of France in June 1940 took priority over dollar-saving. The proportion of British ships using this route to procure supplies from American sources rose from one-third to over a half during 1940 (Cowen and Westcott, 1986: 41). This state of affairs had a three-fold impact on Africa’s trade with the rest of Empire. Firstly, supplies of dollars for colonial imports were reduced; British exports to the colonies were also reduced because as many as possible were diverted to dollar markets, particularly in Latin America; and lastly reduced the markets and shipping available to colonial exports (Cowen and Westcott, 41). It was in this context that import licensing was introduced in all British African colonies.

As the Allied armies conquered other territories, these had to be supplied with goods of which they had been deprived for years owing to Axis invasion. These supplies were drawn from production which was already limited so that it was not possible to increase quotas for Northern Rhodesia or other British African colonies for a considerable period of time (NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council c.1944). Even when the war ended, Europe and the newly-liberated territories still had to be re-stocked with goods before others could be considered. As The Times reported on 14 April 1943:

> [t]here is little prospect of any expansion of supplies for export, and if … goods have to be sent to some market recently made accessible again to Lancashire firms, such as Madagascar it is virtually certain that some other market will have to suffer proportionately.

In pre-war days the wholesale business of Northern Rhodesia was almost entirely carried out by merchants in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa which held franchise over the distribution in the country. But both these countries had, during the course of the war, introduced export control measures aimed at protecting the local consumers, and Northern Rhodesia felt the effect of this policy due to limited imports which she could obtain from these traditional sources (1944: 4; Northern News, 24 October 1946). The introduction of programming for civilian requirements by Empire territories in wartime had necessitated arrangements for direct importation from the United Kingdom (UK) to Northern Rhodesia. In the case of official quota allocations, however, Northern Rhodesia was coupled with Southern Rhodesia in a joint allocation of commodities (NRG, 1944: 4). But as demonstrated below, some of the allotments through Southern Rhodesia did not reach Northern Rhodesia.

In Imperial circles, the view was stressed that in the case of a country in receipt of a reduced percentage of its own requirements of goods in short supply, it was only to be expected that there should be reluctance to re-export any part of those supplies to other countries to whom it re-exported in normal times. Having been so dependent upon Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in the past, Northern Rhodesia was for this reason to endure increased difficulties of supply (NRG, 1944: 11). For example, in 1944, Northern Rhodesia was allotted 1,983 cases of whisky on a 25 per cent basis of imports for the year 1940, but on investigation it was revealed that the indirect imports through Southern Rhodesia had not been fully taken into account and that the quota due to the country was actually 3,600 cases (NRG, 1944: 13). The allocations having been made, it was not possible to secure an adjustment, but by special endeavours on the part of the Whisky Shippers Association, Northern Rhodesia received 2,585 cases. The addition was partly secured from distillers who had hitherto not exported to the country (NRG, 1944: 13).
Challenges faced in the supply of commodities occasioned by the war thus provided an opportunity for Northern Rhodesia to become more economically independent of the mother country. It was under these circumstances that the industrialization of Northern Rhodesia was constantly discussed in colonial and Imperial Government circles between 1940 and 1945. In 1940 the impetus to do this came from the Colonial Office instructions for colonies to undertake local production of edible oils, fats and other commodities for which each colony had resources in order to reduce reliance on the British reserves, which were committed to the war and home consumption. Additionally, in February 1943 the Colonial Office issued the ‘Statement Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare’ which set the tone for the setting up of secondary industries in various colonies.

Some of the industries identified for possible establishment in the colony were for the manufacture of starch and oils. The local raw materials considered as possible sources for these industries in Northern Rhodesia were maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Maize was quickly dismissed because of the current inadequate supplies in the country/region due to drought. Cassava and sweet potatoes were disqualified because of the high cost involved in growing them, then estimated at one pound and six pounds six pence per tonne, respectively (NRG, 1946: 4). For as Ackson Kanduza states, the cost of producing sweet potatoes was half the cost in South Africa where oil extraction from the commodity had been fairly well established (1986: 187). The only proposal that offered bright prospects was the extraction of oil from eucalyptus *citriodora*. This oil had already been found suitable for frothing in the mines, and the Government acknowledged that this proposal showed a “reasonable margin of profit”. It was estimated that there would be an annual trade value of between £15,000 and £20,000. In January and February 1940, the Government coordinated investigations and experiments between the mines and a British settler aristocrat, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who had produced eucalyptus oil since 1928 (Kanduza, 188). However, the Government took a decision against any local processing because this entailed protection from competitors, which in turn meant financial assistance by the state, and the granting of special low rates by the Rhodesia Railways (Kanduza, 188).

Local merchants responded by renewing their pressure in demanding Government commitment to providing support for local industrialization. However, the Administration maintained that if any industries were allowed during the war, they had to make a direct contribution to the war effort, such as the Rhodesia Railways’ production of small parts for military tanks, pistols, and other equipment at Broken Hill, which began in 1941 but was discontinued immediately the war ended. Moreover, the Government argued that the war period was not particularly conducive to the setting up of projects in the country that could add to the escalating cost of living (Kanduza, 166). Government considered that the territory’s main concern ought to be rural development. In February 1943, new Chief Secretary, Beresford-Stooke thought the economic policy of the country should focus on reducing the gap between the social and economic development of Africans and Europeans. As a result, the problems of merchants became secondary, in policy, at least. This policy expanded in 1945 with the Government Joint Development Adviser G.F. Clay with his plan on agricultural development of the country. It is precisely for this reason that Southern Rhodesia attracted most investments of an industrial nature and manufacturing remained Northern Rhodesia’s economic Cinderella, despite the country’s vast potential wealth in timber, copper, lead, coal, limestone (Gann, 1964: 391).

Nonetheless as a result of the difficulties registered in the maize sector during the 1940s, and the lack of inducement for local secondary production, some settler farmers began to turn to dairy farming between 1939 and 1942. Unfortunately they found the lack of control and protection in this sector another hindrance to the diversification of their farming activities (Kanduza, 166). Protection, marketing, and pricing controls would have avoided the adverse impact of low rates on imported dairy products that came from Southern Rhodesia. For instance, it cost 42 pence per 100 pounds at class rate 6 to freight eggs and butter from Mazabuka to Ndola, a distance of 259 miles, while the same quantity was carried at a distribution rate of 44 pence from Bulawayo to Ndola, a
distance of 776 miles. The annual revenue from eggs alone for Mazabuka was estimated at £6,000 in 1942 and it was argued that a reduced competition from Southern Rhodesia might expand the sector. Mazabuka also dominated the settler and African cattle trade and had some of the highest acreage output for maize. Thus prospects existed at Mazabuka for an integrated primary and agro-based processing industry. However, the administration did not advocate a broad policy of agricultural protection because this would require further cooperation and support from the mining sector for a guaranteed market, which insisted on cheap sources of food, essentially in minimizing overall costs of production (Kanduza, 167). Moreover, expensive dairy products would have particularly affected white miners whom the administration was not prepared to provoke into a strike during the war (see, for example, Forster Commission Inquiry, 1940). A 70 percent decline in food production in southern Africa caused the spectre of the possible lay off of African miners and a cut in copper production. Local maize railway traffic and revenue declined between 1939 and 1945. In these potentially explosive circumstances, a broad protective tariff and the abolition of discriminatory rating rules were dead issues (Kanduza, 170). This, combined with the poor performance of capitalist agriculture during the war, strengthened the case against a broad effective policy of protection in the country.

III

In spite of persistent pressure on the state from local merchant and industrial capital between 1939 and 1947, a number of factors prevented the Northern Rhodesian Government from supporting the expansion of manufacturing in the same manner it had capitalist farming. Reasons such as the lack of markets and vast distances were prominent among these. Northern Rhodesians found themselves in the unenviable position of having to “service” vast areas with roads, railways and other amenities, their population remained much smaller than those of more developed countries overseas, where industrialists found all kinds of infrastructural facilities already in place for their use before they ever even built a factory (Gann, 1964: 391).

But all the same more could have been done; and Northern Rhodesian businessmen pointed out that a settler Government in Salisbury was making a much better job of things south of the Zambezi, that Northern Rhodesians development was held up by the high cost of services like water and roads, and by the Administration’s inept land policy (Gann, 391).

Perhaps the biggest hindrance to the industrialization of Northern Rhodesia was the unfavourable tariff policy between herself regional partners, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesians complained of the absence of special tariffs to protect local infant industries, and of existing transport policies which failed to use the railways as an instrument of economic expansion, but concentrated on making profits, whilst grossly favouring Bulawayo and Salisbury through its rate policies.

The customs and excise system was based on a number of principles. There was preferential treatment for goods from the Empire, including the imposition of additional or alternative specific duties where differences in ad valorem duties failed to check imports of foreign goods (Pim, 1938: 102). There was free entry under Customs Agreements, for all produce of Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, subject to payments by the Governments of the two countries in the case of manufactured goods (Pim, 1938: 102). These agreements were the most important feature of the Northern Rhodesian customs regime. In fact, Northern Rhodesia was bound to benefit from these agreements except that her industrial base was undeveloped. Had the Northern Rhodesian manufacturing base been as developed as in the other countries in the region, she would have been in a favourable position for the export of manufactured articles to Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Bechuanaland and the Northern Rhodesia-Congo Basin Area.1 As noted by the Advisory Committee

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1 For Customs purposes, Northern Rhodesia was divided into two areas: the Zambezi Basin Area, south of a line drawn from the south-east corner of the Katanga pedicle to Fife on the Tanganyika border, which contained all the important industries and accounts for the vast bulk of the trade of the
on Industrialization in its First Report, this was because Southern Rhodesian manufactured goods
paid a duty to enter South Africa, and similarly Southern Rhodesia protected its industries from the
Union manufactured articles by the imposition of a duty. On the other hand, Northern Rhodesia had
free access to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (NRG, 1946: 2).

These customs agreements, however, operated to the detriment of the commercial
community in Northern Rhodesia in that they made it difficult to develop secondary industries and
render it impossible for importers to compete with Southern Rhodesian and South African firms
(Pim, 1938: 107). From the purely fiscal point of view the agreements had two disadvantages. In the
first place large quantities of beer from the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and a
certain quantity of wine from the Union were imported annually at half the preferential rate of duty
(Pim Report, 1938: 107). As against this there was of course a benefit to the consumer. In the second
place, it so happened that whereas the percentage payments to the Northern Rhodesia Government
were calculated on the basis of the preferential rates of duty in force in that Territory, in the case of
sleeper timber, an important export commodity to the south, the NR Government had to pay duty at a
far higher rate than that laid down in the Union preferential tariff (Pim Report, 107). However, the
main disadvantages suffered by Northern Rhodesia importers appeared to arise from the system of
distribution rates on the Rhodesia Railways than any modification of the customs regime which
could be contemplated (Pim, 108).

But the establishment of a cigarette factory in Northern Rhodesia was discouraged because
of the existence of agreements with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, wherein Northern
Rhodesian leaf tobacco entered these markets under duty free quota in exchange for the entry into
Northern Rhodesia at reduced rates of customs duties of tobaccos and cigarettes manufactured in
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the establishment of a tobacco factory in Northern Rhodesia
offered little overall gain to the country’s economy (NRG, 1946: 14). Local products could not face
the stiff competition from imported internationally-established brands accompanied by the skill,
efficiency, power and resources of the United Tobacco Company of Southern Rhodesia. It was in this
context that a cigarette plant at Choma closed down before the war, and only one small factory
existed at Fort Jameson to cater for local demand in the district (NRG, 1946: 14-16).

One of the first assurances a prospective industrialist seeks is effective anti-dumping
legislation. In so far as Northern Rhodesia was concerned, no such mechanism existed to protect
anticipated industries. Busschau briefly mentioned this in his report just as the ACID did as well.
ACID strongly recommended that Government enact legislation to prevent dumping in Northern
Rhodesia. Dumping of goods was defined as the sale in the territory’s market at a price lower than
that existing in the country of origin, with the object of forcing the local producer out of business
(NRG, 1946: 2). This was the fear of those interested in starting a brewery at Ndola. Their
suggestion was whether Government could protect an infant local industry against a sharp drop in
the retail price of imported beers (NRG, 1947: 3). Government was of the opinion that the only
protection it could guarantee was legislation against dumping, that is, the sale of bottled beers in
Northern Rhodesia at a price lower that that existing in the country of origin plus the cost of freight
charges (1947: 3). While agreeing that freight charges on bottled beer and returned empties to
Southern Rhodesia greatly helped to increase the cost of this commodity in Northern Rhodesia, the
Government argued that the European population in the country was not large enough to support a
small brewery (1946: 6).

Another hindrance to the industrialization of Northern Rhodesia as noted by merchants was
that by law, industries could only be set up at Ndola. According to General Notice No. 397 of 1935,

 Territory, and the area north of this line, which was included in the conventional Congo Basin area,
but which was of negligible importance from the commercial point of view. In the area within the
Congo Basin no preference could be granted, and customs duty was charged at the Empire rate on all
goods whatever the country of origin.
the Government undertook to “develop Ndola as the commercial and distributive centre of the Copperbelt and to provide only retail trading facilities elsewhere to the extent required to meet the day to day needs of the inhabitants and to secure healthy competition” (NRG, 1946: 2). However, Ndola was obviously badly situated geographically as a distributive centre for the Copperbelt. Unlike the mining towns of the Copperbelt, Ndola was infested with mosquitoes, the water supply was bad and power supply limited (NRG, 1946: 3). Additionally, for manufacturers to reach the 10,000 non-African persons in the Copperbelt, considerable transport was required to be used, while long distances separated Ndola from the other Northern Rhodesian railway towns. Worse still were the great distances to be traversed to the relatively large South African markets and ports of export (Busschau, 22). Some secondary industries could be attracted to be set up around other towns and not just Ndola. This needed to be rescinded.

Northern Rhodesia’s small domestic market discouraged considerable capital investment required for modern factories for such commodities as food, drinks, barbed wire etc (NRG, 1948: 2). The general conclusion was that until the European population in the country had increased to over 35,000 and the standard of living of the African population raised above the existing levels, the internal market would remain too small to support manufacturing industries of a size to require financial assistance from Government (NRG, 1948: 7). During the war period, the country’s population was under 1,400,000 Africans and 16,000 Europeans (Busschau, 14). While Europeans had a high purchasing power, this was not the case for their African counterparts whose purchasing power was hampered by the low wages which they were paid. As a consequence, the total purchasing power was very low in comparison with other African colonies. It was for this reason that Busschau recommended that the development of secondary industries could have but limited expansion (Busschau, 14, 21). Andrew Roberts states that between 1946 and 1951 the European population had risen from 22,000 to 37,000, and reached 49,000 in 1953 (1976: 212). The ratio of Europeans to Africans in 1951 was about 1:40, much less than in Southern Rhodesia, where it was 1:13 but more than twice that in 1931 (Roberts, 212). The problem of a relatively small capacity of the Northern Rhodesian market and its very scattered nature was one of the major factors noted by G.F. Clay the Joint Adviser on Development to the Governments of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. To Clay, this was what militated against any large scale industrialization in the country (1945:25).

Clay’s suggested model was to regard the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa as one economic area and attempt to come to some arrangement whereby an assured market for some of Northern Rhodesia’s primary produce finding an outlet in this huge economic zone could be guaranteed (Clay, 1945: 25).

Although the ACID stated that the Northern Rhodesian Government was prepared to assist new industries in a manner similar to that offered by the Governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, in fact, the government did not have enough money to finance the new industries. There was also no financial institution set up in the country to help industrialists establish enterprises as was the case in the southern colonies. Even when it tried to do so, there were many strings still attached to such aid. First, that the industry would promote the development and welfare of the territory. Secondly, the applicant was required to explore other avenues for raising capital for a new industrial venture or extension of an existing industry before approaching the Government (NRG, 1947: 1). Much of the wealth in the country was subscribed by persons who lived outside the Territory while residents, on the whole, could not be regarded as a major source of capital (Busschau, 39). Although there had been considerable growth in individual incomes which could allow for the setting up of of small scale enterprises, many local “capitalists” were not willing to invest their savings locally. As Busschau (1944: 40) noted, the existence of a large measure of uncertainty is at present, and is likely to remain a factor retarding investment in secondary industries in Northern Rhodesia.

Merchant capital gained some influence in the legislative council following the election in 1941 of three traders through Roy Welensky’s Labour Party of Northern Rhodesia, which had been formed early in that year. The party was sympathetic to merchants’ demands for industrialization in
the country because this offered prospects of increasing employment for white workers and also increased political support. The electoral victory of merchants had been made possible because of the widespread dissatisfaction over import and price controls introduced in 1940. The merchants argued that these restrictions would have been less severe had rating and tariff policies allowed Northern Rhodesia to build up distributive trade and manufacturing industries (Kanduza, 186). However, the elected representatives of merchant capital could not effectively use their political influence because war conditions had increased cooperation between the Rhodesias. The Colonial Office was mistaken because the council worked towards reducing conflict over tariff and railway rates. This additionally eliminated prospects for inward-looking industrialisation in Northern Rhodesia. In the 1944 election three of the five representatives lost their seats (Kanduza, 186).

In response to imperial and local pressures for industrialization, the Government of Northern Rhodesia appointed a South African economist W.J. Busschau to undertake a feasibility study of the potential for local manufacturing. His terms of reference were to ascertain the necessity of local secondary industries, to advise on the nature of Government assistance to industry, and whether such assistance was desirable in the context of the broad economic development of Northern Rhodesia (NRG, 1945). The investigation entailed reconciling a strategy for an integrated regional development, and a gradualist approach to regional development in which less developed territorial economic sectors would be allowed to develop and increase their bargaining strength in the long term. Merchant and emergent local industrial capital in Northern Rhodesia, according to Kanduza (1986: 189), favoured a gradualist approach. Growth became blocked because the Government was not enthusiastic about state or tariff assistance in increasing commercialisation or stimulating local capital formation. Busschau’s South African background and his terms of reference which required that Northern Rhodesia’s development should be harmonised with an integrated southern Africa regional developmental plan, to Kanduza (1986: 189), assured the Government of Northern Rhodesia that it would get the kind of report it wanted to use against merchant capital. Busschau’s recommendations supported the strategy of Clay, for a regional approach in economic development, and thus strengthened the position of the Northern Rhodesian Government against protection. He criticized protection and the setting up of secondary industries in Northern Rhodesia because Northern Rhodesia stood to gain from the theory of comparative advantage by maximising copper production (Kanduza, 189).

Busschau’s argument was that “in general, tariffs should be regarded as an unsuitable instrument with which to encourage the development of secondary industries in Northern Rhodesia” but should “encourage the elimination of tariffs in British southern Africa. It (sic) should not acquiesce in arrangements unduly favouring the manufactures of the Union of South Africa against those of other countries”. The Northern Rhodesian administration and mining capital welcomed Busschau’s views because they reinforced their commitment to avoid anything that would escalate the cost of living and production. The position of the mining industry, which produced about 19 shillings in every pound sterling of the Northern Rhodesia Government’s revenue, carried more weight in formulating the colony’s industrial policy than the demands for protection from merchant capital (Kanduza, 1986:189). Moreover, the recommendations of the Busschau’s report and the views of the administration and the mining companies in Northern Rhodesia conformed to imperial economic policy on the need for colonies to consume goods produced in the metropole.

Roy Welensky, the vocal member representing the Broken Hill electoral area in the Legislative Council, harshly censured Busschau’s report for assuming that “non-economic” industries should not be encouraged, that Northern Rhodesian whites were temporary residents; and his criticism of the relatively high wages paid to Europeans (Gann, 391). Welensky also argued that Northern Rhodesia’s coal-mining potentialities were not developed because of Edmund Davis’ interests in Wankie (Gann, 391). Busschau, Welensky added, assumed the profit motive, and had few positive suggestions to make, except to set up the ACID. When the new body (ACID) was established, it came to be dominated by mining interests, which generally endorsed Busschau’s views. The Governor appointed the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development on 3 December
1945 whose terms of reference were as follows:

To examine the range of existing and potential industries in Northern Rhodesia and to advise Government as to those possibilities of industrial development which show the best promise of economic success and to recommend what steps Government should take to encourage the initiation or development of such industries and to report upon such matters as are referred to it by Government (NRG, 1946: 1; Busschau, 32).

The Committee argued that until the country’s white population had increased to over 35,000 and the standard of living for Africans considerably raised, the internal market would remain too small to support manufacturing industries of a size sufficiently large to warrant financial assistance from Government.

In the opinion of the ACID (NRG, 1948: 7), the only new industry deserving Government sponsorship was the cement industry near Lusaka to supply the country’s consumption of 20,000 tonnes annually. As Ackson Kanduza (1986: 191) pointed out, Southern Rhodesia had captured this market because Northern Rhodesia failed to impose a protective duty, and a special maximum rate of 28 shillings per load instead of 50 shillings per load of 15 tonnes per mile had been used by the Rhodesia Railways in order to counteract connection from the Congo. Further, cement, having a comparatively low value of approximately £5 per ton, in relation to its weight, made its export further afield out of the question (NRG, 1946:11). There was also the feared that with the post-war demand for building cement in southern Africa a serious shortage might develop in Northern Rhodesia.

A Consulting Geologist appointed to look into this project, W.G. Garlick, came to the conclusion that, for a combination of reasons, the limestone deposit at Chilanga lying between the railway and the Great North Road nine mile south of Lusaka, was the most promising of all the sites surveyed. That site was ideal because all necessary raw materials in the manufacture of cement except for coal and gypsum were available. The factory site was close to the railway, a plentiful supply of water was assured, and the electricity supply from the Lusaka Electricity Undertaking was nearby and could easily be expanded (NRG, 1947: 4). However, it was noted that owing to the limited size of the market for cement in Northern Rhodesia, the enterprise could be at a disadvantage in competition with producers in Southern Rhodesia who, operating on a large scale, could manufacture cement at a lower cost (NRG, 1947: 4). The application of Railway Tariff 12 to the carriage of cement throughout the railway system in Northern Rhodesia, when implemented, ensured to a factory at Chilanga, as against producers near Bulawayo, an advantage of approximately 25 shillings per tonne on deliveries to Lusaka and northwards (NRG, 1947: 4).

Thus a cement plant with an annual capacity of 50,000 long tons was purchased in November 1947 from Vickers Armstrong Ltd., England to assist Northern Rhodesia’s overworked construction industry. From other British manufacturers came a steam boiler and electrical generating plant. The project was sponsored by the Northern Rhodesian Government, contrary to its policy of a fee private enterprise economy. Baldwin (1966: 182) states that the factory was developed under Government initiative and with the aid of funds supplied by the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC). It was developed as a national enterprise, and not a private one because of the importance of cement in the country’s construction sector. The CDC provided £750,000 and the Government £250,000 (US Department of Commerce, 1956: 48) Production began towards the end of 1950. Subsequently, the cement works were sold to a private enterprise. Cement demand initially came from the Kariba dam project which contributed to the expansion of the firm. By 1954 the plant had produced 74,000 tonnes and this was expected to reach 180,000 by 1956 (US Department of Commerce, 48).

Once set up, the factory gave direct employment to 29 Europeans and 76 Africans. Benefits to the economy of Northern Rhodesia derived from the circulation within the territory of money which otherwise would be used to pay for imports of cement. The enlargement of electricity supply
at Lusaka to supply electrical power to the factory also led to a reduction in the cost of industrial power at that centre. Furthermore, it was envisaged by the Government (NRG, 1947: 5; 1948: 3) that the establishment of a cement factory at Chilanga would lead to the establishment of a factory manufacturing cement products, such as asbestos-cement roofing, and piping.

Some skilled European workers and entrepreneurs who had migrated into the country were responsible for the setting up of other small scale manufacturing businesses on the Copperbelt. Most of these were former employees of the mines. They set up firms which supplied services and goods to the mines (Baldwin, 1966:183). Once established, they began to branch out into operations beyond servicing the copper industry, thereby stimulating further growth in the economy.

Manufacturing, however, made little progress, and in addition to the Zambezi Sawmills in Livingstone, the country's largest single industrial enterprise, various firms began to manufacture articles like ferro-concrete pipes, bricks, and chemicals on a small scale. In addition consumer goods were manufactured such as soap, mineral water and sweets, as well as furniture and veneer, clothing and blankets (Gann, 1964: 391). Later on an iron foundry and a motor-body building workshop opened up, but enterprise remained small in scale, and confined to one or two localities like Ndola and Livingstone. Other industries were dealt with grain milling, meat processing, printing and chemical production (US Department of Commerce, 1956: 43).

This state of affairs was quite different from the Southern Rhodesian case where according to Phimister (2000: 32) during the first four years of the war, the annual rate of secondary industrial growth, including building and construction, and the supply of electricity and water was relatively modest, varied from 5.7 to 10.5 per cent. From the end of 1943, industrial expansion accelerated rapidly. Between 1944 and 1948 the average annual rate of growth was estimated at 24.4 per cent (Phimister, 33). This expansion was sustained by an influx of white immigrants which drove the settler population up from c. 80,000 in 1945 to c. 125,000 in 1950 (Phimister, 32).

Similarly, in the Union of South Africa, the requirements of the war not only provided large markets for the mining industry and for capitalist farmers but also allowed the Union to consolidate the industrial advances began in the 1930s. During the war, South Africa’s manufacturing output according to Hargreaves (1996: 56) increased in value by 116 per cent; the industrial labour force grew by 53 per cent, representing 125,000 new workers, of whom only 19,000 were white. Industrial growth was impressive. The Union’s industrial output doubled during the course of the war, with expansion in the mining, steel, textiles, chemical and armaments industries to the fore (Jackson, 2006: 252). As in Australian, in 1942 the manufacturing industry overtook mining and agriculture’s contribution to GNP, though gold production continued to drive the economy. In order to achieve this massive industrial and manufacturing leap forward, an Industrial Development Corporation was established, as was a Central Organisation for Technical Training. In 1941-42, the industrial workforce rose from 124,000 to an astonishing 413,000. The Black labour force grew by 74 per cent and white labour by 21 per cent (Jackson, 2006: 252). This led to a growth in the consumer market, and to the expansion of the cities at the heart of mining and industrial endeavor.

However, a few more industries were set up in the country during the period of the Federation of Nyasaland and Rhodesia (1953-63). During this era, Northern Rhodesia formed part of the Federation [made up of Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia]; there was complete free movement of all commodities between the three constituent members of the Federation. Moreover, the Federation constituted a customs union and several commonly-owned services among the three members in the fields of power and transport were set up. In real terms, the volume of manufactured output grew at an average rate of about 11 per cent in Northern Rhodesia (Faber, 1974: 299). The most rapid response to the new circumstances came from the clothing industry. The industry already existed in embryo in Livingstone, and thus a base existed for rapid expansion. The Zambezi Sawmills became the Federation’s greatest timber-processing company. In 1954 the company felled two million cubic feet of teak most of which was sold in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (US Department of Commerce, 45). In addition it also brought into production a
furniture making factory worth £250,000 (US Department of Commerce, 45).

The dominant position of Southern Rhodesia in Federal politics, according to Roberts (1976: 213) meant that it also gained the greatest economic benefits from Federation. Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia, was also the Federation’s capital, and it became the business headquarters of the Federation. This predominance was also expressed in Federal financial policy. For as Roberts noted, all income tax from the three territories went into a Federal pool, from which the Northern Rhodesian Government received less than one fifth, while almost two-thirds went to the Federal Government (1976: 213-4). This arrangement concentrated its expenditure in Southern Rhodesia, where it greatly assisted the expansion of secondary industries. For example, the number of industries established in Southern Rhodesia increased by more than 160 per cent between 1953 and 1956 due to state support (US Department of Commerce, 44).

Manufactured commodities produced in Northern Rhodesia, however, were usually characterised by the following features: high transportation costs in relation to the value of the product; the local availability of necessary raw materials; and an ability to produce the product efficiently on a small scale (Baldwin, 182). The cement factory, for instance, proved feasible because of the relatively high cost of transporting cement from Southern Rhodesia and because a small plant in the country was efficient. Similarly, the large presence of teak and other timbers in the western part of the country accompanied by transportation costs were actors behind the location of the saw mill and industries in the country. The same was the case for the meat, slaughtering, dairy, and grain-mill industries which were also dependent on the presence of raw materials. Furthermore, the absence of significant economies of scale characterised all manufacturing. The clothing, drink and tobacco, furniture, chemical, and engineering industries, for instance, owed their existence in the country largely to this consideration (Baldwin, 1966:182-183).

IV

What this paper has demonstrated is that contrary to Bird’s observation above, the state of war does not always lead to industrialization in the periphery. Unlike in other colonies where the Second World War stimulated the growth of secondary industries to solve war-induced commodity shortages, this did not take place in Northern Rhodesia to the extent experienced elsewhere for a variety of reasons. Among these were a limited market, lack of state support for private enterprises, unfair customs tariffs, and a hostile Federal Government. The war simply perpetuated Northern Rhodesia’s dependency of her more powerful neighbours for economic survival. This trend reveals that Northern Rhodesia lacked the prerequisites for wartime industrialisation which existed in other economically-advanced colonies. This proves that while ties may loosen between the periphery and the metropole during wartime, the sub-metropole usually takes advantage of the situation at the expense of the metropole.

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The State of Secondary Industry: Southern Rhodesia before and after UDI

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‘STOP THIS MADNESS. UDI has been condemned by the Institute of Directors, the Chambers of Commerce, industrialists, RTA and the Tobacco trade’

(Rhodesia Party Advertisement, May 1965)

The act of rebellion carried out on 11th November 1965 against the British Crown by Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers has been exhaustively examined. A voluminous literature has explored the causes, course and consequences of the unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] by the Rhodesian Front government led by Ian Smith. Less frequently accounted for is the growth of the Colony’s secondary industrial sector, for a time the most sophisticated in Africa north of the Limpopo. Almost entirely lacking, one important exception aside, is any analysis of the relationship, structural and political, between the two. Without an already existing secondary industrial base, UDI would have been impossible if not unthinkable. While some attention has been paid to the political attitudes of industrialists, no serious attempt has been made to identify the composition, capitalisation, ownership, or product range of the manufacturing sector in the first half of the 1960s. In placing the two side by side, this paper seeks to cast new light on the business and political dynamics shaping Central Africa during the era of decolonisation.

Based on the correspondence of organised commerce and industry, as well as on government memoranda, newspaper and periodical reports and commentaries from across the political spectrum housed in the National Archives of Zimbabwe and Herald House, both in Harare, and the Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, this paper is divided into two sections. The first part traces the development and changing structure of Southern Rhodesia’s secondary industrial sector between 1945 and 1965, paying particular attention to the market opportunities and protective tariff policies of the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as the growing importance of foreign investment. Section two analyses the fraught relationship between organised industry and commerce on the one hand, and the state on the other, in the period immediately before and after UDI. By disaggregating secondary industry, the significance of large, productive units, almost invariably foreign-owned, for key sectors is highlighted.

A short final section engages with David Rowe’s conclusion that the ‘solidarity of the business community with the Rhodesian Front government was not the spontaneous upwelling of patriotic support or racial solidarity for a beleaguered regime, but a political construction with substantial roots in the marketplace.’ In doing so, it joins a wider debate about the part taken by business during the post war era of retreat from empire. If this was an instance where the concerns of big corporations were ignored, it is also a case where their interests not only survived but flourished.

I

Southern Rhodesia was not completely devoid of secondary industries before the outbreak of the Second World War. Some expansion had taken place during the interwar years and the Great Depression in particular. Typical firms in the interwar period encompassed shoe-making, tailoring, cheap clothing manufacture, wagon building, meat tinning, confectionary and small engineering operations. From 1939
onwards, however, the manufacturing sector expanded rapidly under the twin stimulus of wartime demand and the restriction of imports. With the establishment of metal manufacturing industries, goods such as electric water heaters, ploughs, pumps, and radiators began to appear. Secondary industries increased both in number and value during the war. The number of factories grew from 299 in 1938 to 382 by 1945, by which time these industrial establishments had achieved a gross output of £14,062 million, causing the Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins, to observe that ‘industries were a little shy before the last war, but we have now reached the happy stage where industry is beginning to be carried forward by its own momentum, each new industry attracting subsidiary ones and so on’.

At this time, the state was the main investor in bodies such as the Electrical Supply Commission (1938), the Cold Storage Commission (1938), Cotton Research and Industry Board (1942), the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission (1942), and the Sugar Industry Board (1944). By contrast, private investment was small and largely locally sourced, only a few South African companies, mainly in the food sector, were setting up branches north of Limpopo. Ownership of manufacturing industries was reflected in the pattern of investment capital during the war years, that is, the limited flow of capital from Britain.

The immediate post war years witnessed a debate on whether secondary industries should be protected or not. The Commission of Inquiry into the Protection of Secondary Industry published its findings in 1946. A key recommendation was that secondary industry was not yet a priority compared to agriculture and mining. Nonetheless, the Commission conceded that some measure of protection, albeit temporary, was needed to help secondary industries. It noted that

the industrialist in Southern Rhodesia is at a disadvantage in comparison with his counterpart in other industrialised countries because of the lack of market and until such a time as improved markets are available to him, he might be expected to seek protection against external competition.

In light of this, the Commission suggested that ‘if assistance to be given to the manufacturer is to be of a limited duration, that limitation should take the shape of a protective Customs duty which should apply for a specific number of years.’ A Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) was subsequently established by the government in 1947. The Committee would receive and investigate applications for assistance to secondary industry; advise the Minister of Commerce and Industries on the extent to which such assistance should be granted; and keep under constant review trade relationships of the country with United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and other parts of the world.

By this time, an Industrial Development Commission established in 1944, was already making funds available to various industries. In 1948, the IDC was replaced by the Division of Trade and Industrial Development, a full blown ministerial portfolio succeeding the Department of Commerce and Industries, and intended to provide assistance to trade and industries. Other forms of assistance were also put in place by the government. Imports of raw materials required by industry were allowed to enter free of duty or at low rates; rebates of customs duties were granted on raw materials used for manufacturing purposes; and producer/capital goods could be imported free of duty from inside the British Empire, or at 5% duty if from other countries.

These protectionist measures marked a victory for local industrialists. In much the same period, the government increasingly came to believe that industrialisation was ‘synonymous with economic development’. These developments consequently marked the beginning of a closer association between the state and industrialists, as the state’s role shifted from direct participation to regulation. The intention was the creation of an environment in which private enterprise would thrive. Protection of secondary industries was now deemed to be of paramount importance for the development of the colony.

Once state support was secured, both foreign and local capital directed their energies towards the development of secondary industry. Between 1946 and 1953, Southern Rhodesia developed an increasingly diversified manufacturing sector. This included a cotton textile industry, iron and steel and metal industries, sugar refining, oil expressing, distilleries, breweries and soft drink manufacturers, food stuffs, cigarettes and manufactured tobacco, cement and cement products, hides, leather and footwear, wood and manufactures, paper and paper packing materials. The number of enterprises increased from 299 in 1938 to 524 in 1946, and further grew to 681 by 1951. In addition, the provision of rebates of duty on raw materials made available to some 40 different types of industries helped to increase the gross value of the
output of all factories and workshops from under £5 million in 1939 to over £20 million by 1947. Secondary industry was steadily becoming the most important sector of the Southern Rhodesian economy. Its net output for 1949 was just over £22 million, more than the gross output of either commercial agriculture at nearly £19 million, or mining at about £11 million.

Table 1: Manufacturing Industries, 1938 and 1949: Size of Firms by Gross Value Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross output</th>
<th>Number of firms</th>
<th>Total Value of Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under £5,000</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5,000 to £10,000</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 – 15,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 – 20,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 – 30,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 – 40,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 – 50,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 – 100,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 – 150,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,000 – 200,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000 – 250,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 and Over</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table indicates, in 1938 half of the firms had a gross output of less than £5,000, but by 1949 the proportion of such firms had dropped to only 17%. Whereas 16% of the total output in 1938 was contributed by firms with annual outputs of £250,000 and over, by 1949 the corresponding proportion was 45%. This increase in unit size was strongly associated with foreign, mostly British investment. The majority of firms with outputs of £250,000 and above were foreign owned. These same firms were responsible for 45 per cent of total industrial production.

A Customs Agreement negotiated in 1948 with South Africa was a major contributor to post war industrial expansion and the inflow of foreign capital. Keen to consolidate an export trade already worth £10 million per annum by 1948’, Pretoria was ‘prepared to foster industrial development north of the Limpopo.’ For Southern Rhodesia, the agreement offered protection to nascent local industries. The Agreement was intended to last for five years and during that period Southern Rhodesian products, ‘except for wines, potable spirits, cigarettes, manufactured tobacco, vegetable oils and unmanufactured tobacco in excess of a maximum quota’, were to enjoy duty-free entry into South Africa. In sum, the agreement created a guaranteed market for Southern Rhodesian industrial products particularly clothing, textiles and electrical goods. Exports of these products to South Africa more than doubled in the first year of the Agreement, and in 1950 they increased by a further 70% over the figures for 1949. Overall, Southern Rhodesian exports jumped from £1.2 million in 1948 to almost £7 million in 1953. Textile exports reached 1,000,000lb of yarn in 1950, valued at £210,000. By 1952, Southern Rhodesia’s cotton textile manufacturing industry already comprised three factories weaving piece goods, two factories weaving blankets, one factory weaving canvas, one factory weaving specialised goods, five factories engaged in knitting and three concerns involved in dyeing and another company engaged in cotton printing and dyeing.
Industrial momentum was further accelerated in 1953 by the establishment of the Central African Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For the new Federal government, industrial development was ‘essentially a field of endeavour for private enterprise’. The government aimed at providing ‘basic facilities on which private enterprise can establish industries rather than to participate directly in industrial enterprises’. Free enterprise was the basis of industrialisation in the Federation, much as in Southern Rhodesia. This came as no surprise, as Southern Rhodesia was the industrial hub of the Federation. For Salisbury, the Federation presented an opportunity to displace South Africa as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s main supplier of manufactured goods. Whereas prior to 1953, both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa could export duty free to the two northern territories, during Federation, only Southern Rhodesia could do so. The uniform tariff shared by the three territories upon the formation of the Federation made Southern Rhodesian products more attractive than South African ones, which were dutiable. The creation of the Federation hugely increased what became Southern Rhodesia’s domestic market, as evidenced by the fact that about four-fifths of manufactured products in the Federation came from Southern Rhodesia by 1956.

The Federal government also negotiated a new trade agreement with South Africa in 1955. This operated on the principle of reciprocity in terms of duties, permitting a number of products from either country to be traded free of duty. The Agreement provided for duty free entry into South Africa of some Federal Textile manufactures, if 75% of their total cost was made up of Federal labour and/or raw materials. If local costs were between 50% and 75%, then the duty equal to 25% of the Union’s most favoured nation rate was charged, and if the local costs were between 25% and 50%, a duty of 50% of the most favoured nation rate charged.

Other Southern Rhodesian products enjoying free entry to South Africa included tinned meats, tea in bulk, tinned or dehydrated vegetables, trailers, enamelware and hollow-ware, radios, certain oils, and canvas shoes. These terms also applied to South African products destined for Southern Rhodesia. The intention was that while a market was retained for the manufactured products of either country, local industries would receive some protection.

One of the most important benefits of Federation was a marked increase in the flow of foreign investment. The Federation of Rhodesian Industry reported that there was a growing overseas interest in the economic development of Central Africa. The Bank of England issued a report showing the extent of British investment in the Federation. According to the report, the nominal capital of all British investments amounted to £114.7 million by the end of 1953. By 1956, South African investment in the Federation amounted to £115 million. Of this amount, £28.6 million was invested in manufacturing enterprises, virtually all of which was placed in Southern Rhodesia. One of the biggest investors at this time was the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. In the same period, investment from the United States increased from £1.05 million in 1952 to £3.02 million in 1953, and was worth an estimated £5 million by 1954. Investments in statutory bodies increased from £2.3 million in 1952 to £5.7 million in 1953, and were worth an estimated £6 million by 1954. Overall, by 1957, the American stake in the Federation was valued at £45 million, of which about £25 million was privately invested, with the balance loaned to the government. American investment, however, was small in comparison to the British and South African presence.

With foreign capital flowing in, and basic infrastructure already in place, manufacturing industries expanded both in output and in numbers employed. Production was becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of big corporation. By 1957, they produced more than half of all industrial output. Indeed, less than 10 per cent of the total number of factories contributed nearly seventy per cent of all industrial production.
### Table 2: Manufacturing 1953-1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>Gross output (£ millions)</th>
<th>Net Output (£ millions)</th>
<th>Total number employed</th>
<th>Total Wages and Salaries Paid (£ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>61,871</td>
<td>26,084</td>
<td>70,148</td>
<td>13,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>77,070</td>
<td>31,362</td>
<td>69,879</td>
<td>15,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>87,063</td>
<td>35,462</td>
<td>75,341</td>
<td>17,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>104,945</td>
<td>41,885</td>
<td>83,982</td>
<td>21,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>109,194</td>
<td>44,661</td>
<td>83,119</td>
<td>23,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>120,067</td>
<td>48,830</td>
<td>85,315</td>
<td>24,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>129,059</td>
<td>50,892</td>
<td>81,819</td>
<td>25,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>141,661</td>
<td>55,997</td>
<td>83,681</td>
<td>28,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>148,704</td>
<td>59,630</td>
<td>83,289</td>
<td>31,051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Distribution of manufacturing establishments by size of gross output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross output</th>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under £5,000</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5,000 to £10,000</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 – 15,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 – 20,000</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>20,000 – 30,000</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>30,000 – 40,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 – 50,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 – 100,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 – 150,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,000 – 200,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000 – 250,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 and Over</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1956 onwards, however, a major slump in the price of copper, by far the Federation’s biggest earner of foreign exchange, adversely affected Central Africa’s economy. Much of the blow fell on secondary industry. ‘For the first time in more than a decade, the number of firms going out of business matched those being established.’ The state had earlier begun to scale back its involvement in secondary industry. In line with its policy of leaving industries to private enterprise, government relinquished control of its investments in secondary industries, as evidenced by the privatisation of the Sugar Industry Board (1954), Riscom (1956), and the Cotton Industries Board (1959). Establishment of these industries in the 1940s had been justified on the grounds that it was government policy to take over and establish industries which could not be profitably run by private capital, or where it was in the national interest. But now it was felt that the industries were sufficiently developed to be sold off, and by 1963 almost all state enterprises
had been privatised and taken over by foreign capital. The end of Federation in 1963 occurred at a time when the Southern Rhodesian economy in general and the manufacturing sector in particular were in a relatively strong position. About £1 billion had been invested in capital stock during the Federal era. This massive inflow of investment largely benefited Southern Rhodesia where secondary industry’s range of products had greatly expanded (see appendix one below). Uncertainty about the Federation’s future, however, raised doubt in the minds of many people, resulting in a fall in investment and an economic slowdown. This created excess industrial capacity in Southern Rhodesia, a feature which was to be of great significance after 1965.

Table 4. Manufacturing Industries: Proportion of gross output produced by small and large firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Units</td>
<td>% of total output</td>
<td>No. of Units</td>
<td>% of total output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small firms</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large firms</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In order to take into account changing industrial prices, ‘small firms’ have been defined as those with a gross output of £15,000 or less in 1938 and of £40,000 or less in 1953 and 1963. Similarly, ‘large firms’ have been defined as those with a gross output of £100,000 or more in 1938 and of £250,000 or more in 1953 and 1963.

Source: Census of Industrial Production

As noted above, the large productive units that came to dominate the Rhodesian economy from the mid and late 1950s onwards were either state-run enterprises, at least originally, or, more often, subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations. The trend towards an oligopolistic structure of production was matched by the growing importance of foreign and state capital in production and accumulation. As early as the late 1940s, the Development Coordination Commission had noted that the share of total investment financed by foreign capital had risen from less than 25% in 1946 to over 75% in 1948. But the best insight into the position occupied by foreign capital in Southern Rhodesia was provided by the results of a questionnaire sent to private companies operating in the Federation in 1962. According to the results for Southern Rhodesia, branches, subsidiaries and associates of foreign companies earned just under 67% of the total recorded net operating profits and were responsible for 72% of the total recorded capital formation.

The extent to which secondary industries had expanded and foreign capital had become entrenched in this sector by the early to mid-1960s is detailed in appendix two. Significantly, nearly all of the foreign companies established, registered and operating in Southern Rhodesia’s secondary industry sector during this period were subsidiaries of major companies in Britain and South Africa. Links between the two sometimes make distinguishing a company’s country of origin difficult. South African companies represented or operating in Southern Rhodesia were themselves often associates of, or subsidiaries of a parent or holding company in Britain. As Arrighi has described it, the general position on the eve of UDI was “the presence of “giant corporations” … in practically every sector of the Rhodesian manufacturing industry, with a relatively greater concentration of British capital in the first stages of production and South African capital in the other stages including distribution.”

II

Before and during most of the Federal era, organised industry and commerce were closely associated with Southern Rhodesia’s ruling political elite. The Rhodesian Federated Chambers of Commerce had forged close links with the dominant United Party lead by Godfrey Huggins over shared support for the mooted Central African Federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, while the [federation of]
Rhodesian Industries worked closely with officials in the Department of Trade and Industry. Addressing the FRI’s annual congress in 1957, the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, Sir Malcolm Barrow, complimented its leadership for their ‘vision and determination’. ‘Your organisation has been fortunate in always having in its van men who are acknowledged leaders in other fields as well and whose outlook has never been dimmed by narrow sectional interests’, he declared. ‘Industry will play a vital part in the development of the African and his standard of living and the ever-increasing part he will play in the economy of the Federation’. His remarks and those of other speakers to the effect that the ‘progress of our country and the welfare of all its peoples are geared to three vital and interdependent factors; stability of government; harmonious race relations; and a progressive industrial programme’ were repeatedly and warmly applauded.

This shared consensus between members of the Colony’s white establishment, from whose numbers came ‘not only the Government but the leaders of nearly all the State Boards and Commissions, the senior officers in farming, trade and industrial organizations, the prestigious positions in club and sporting life [and] the higher ranks in the Civil Service’, was unexpectedly overturned in December 1962 when the Rhodesian Front led by Winston Field and Ian Smith won a general election based on an extremely restricted franchise. Generally comprising but never entirely reducible to settler society’s less well-off members, the RF was initially treated with contempt by big business and its old guard leadership. A condescending editorial in the Rhodesian Recorder, organised commerce and industry’s trade journal, advised the new administration that ‘governments can only rule successfully if they enjoy the confidence of an overall majority of the people, all the people, not just those who have votes’. ‘Many people, both inside Rhodesia and out’, it concluded, ‘regard Mr. Field and his colleagues as sjambok-swinging racialists, no less. If this is untrue, then its falseness must be conclusively demonstrated at the earliest possible moment’.

But with the end of the Central African Federation a year later and settler politics becoming increasingly polarised, organised industry found itself on the outside looking in, as the RF’s manifest determination to entrench white rule made the prospect of a unilateral break from Britain ever more likely. At the highest levels, old ties frayed where they did not break completely. When the Minister of Trade, Industry and Development told businessmen in April 1964 that ‘we have in this country good Government, favourable to industrial growth because we seek to encourage a proper respect for law and order, we have low and reasonably constant levels of taxation and we support, in general, the philosophy of private enterprise’, the applause greeting his remarks was distinctly muted. However, this was about as far as most industrialists were prepared to go in a climate where opposition to the RF administration could be costly where it was not actually deemed treasonable. Only the blunt warning in October 1964 by Harold Wilson, Prime Minister and leader of Britain’s newly-elected Labour government that a unilateral declaration of Rhodesian independence would immediately be met with sanctions caused secondary industry’s leaders to break cover. An Association of Rhodesian Industries press statement, carried on the front page of the Rhodesia Herald, warned that UDI would have a ‘catastrophic effect’ on industry, resulting in widespread unemployment as a result of the loss of markets. Realising that this opinion was not shared by some of the organisation’s smaller members and taken aback by Ian Smith’s casual aside that Wilson had now given him as good a reason as any to seize independence, ARNI’s leadership lapsed into silence.

Obliged to work with what there was, ARNI’s executive invited Smith to open their eighth annual congress at the beginning of April 1965. His speech was characteristically uncompromising. ‘By insisting on the maintenance of civilised standards, by providing first class health and educational facilities, by assiduous attention to the country’s transport and communications needs and to its water and power requirements, Government has provided a sound foundation for investment’, he insisted. ‘Rhodesia has always been one of the most tranquil countries in Africa; in the turmoil of the past few years, this has become increasingly more obvious to potential investors from the Northern Hemisphere’. With no place to hide, ARNI’s president, D. J. Divett, nervously declined to make a stand. ‘You have said an awful lot which gives us food for thought in many directions’ he told the Prime Minister. ‘We were particularly pleased (and I say this as industrialist) to have heard your reference to Government’s approach to rural development, because without rural development we are not going to have spending power in the country to absorb and develop the very section of the interests of the country that we represent. Sir, as far as the political side is concerned, we, as you know, are a non-political organisation, so therefore I am not able to make any comment on what you have said at all’.

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Within weeks, though, the organisation was forced to show its colours. On 27th April 1965, towards the end of election campaign called to demonstrate settler support for independence, the Smith government issued a White Paper downplaying the economic consequences of a UDI. Entitled ‘Economic Aspects of a Declaration of Independence’, it claimed that counter-measures had been prepared in the unlikely event of Britain actually following up on its threat to sever ties and impose sanctions if Rhodesia declared itself independent. Reports which the government had received from various associations and statutory bodies nearly all assumed that the ‘most severe economic sanctions would be applied … with a degree of severity designed to collapse the economy of Rhodesia within a relatively short period’. But if the proposed sanctions were not implemented, then the dire consequences which they predicted would be ‘of little relevance, a point which has been accepted by the authors of the various reports’. ‘There can be no doubt whatsoever’, the White Paper concluded, ‘that in the long term Rhodesians have nothing to lose but all to gain by accepting their responsibilities and becoming completely independent as a sovereign State’. It was, fulfilled an editorial in the *Rhodesia Herald*, ‘an insult to the electorate’.

Spurred into action, the following day ARNI, ACCOR and the Rhodesian Institute of Directors all published the reports which they had submitted months previously to the government. They were joined by the Rhodesia Tobacco Association whose own negative report had infuriated Smith and his Ministers when it had first appeared in January, as well as by Wilson who reiterated his earlier warning about the disastrous economic consequences of UDI. With the exception of the National Commercial Distribution and Office Workers Association, a conservative white union, none of the reports agreed with the government’s assessment. Both ARNI and ACCOR expected that Rhodesia would be expelled from the Sterling Area; foreign investment would dry up as entry to the London money market was closed; overseas assets would be frozen; access to raw materials would be lost; and export markets would vanish. Inside the country, unemployment would rise and devaluation would follow. For ARNI’s executive, only one conclusion could be drawn: ‘the risks inherent in steps which would automatically lead to the loss of current trading opportunities cannot, on the known facts, be in the best interests of the people as a whole’. Of 294 members polled by the Institute of Directors, only 19 were not ‘unreservedly opposed to UDI’. Its economic and financial price would be ‘prohibitive’.

Neither the government nor the majority of the electorate were listening. The opposition Rhodesia Party, the latest and last political incarnation of the old establishment, whose electioneering campaign had emphasised big business’ condemnation of the ‘madness’ of UDI, lost every white parliamentary seat to the RF. Emboldened by its sweeping victory, Smith’s government proceeded to clear the decks for UDI. With African nationalist leaders already in detention, white opponents of unconstitutional action were either removed from office or cowed into submission. As the head of the Central Intelligence Organisation, Ken Flower, remembered it, ‘the government believed that the removal of a few anti-UDI officials would sound a warning note to others. They dismissed the prevailing anti-UDI attitude among businessmen and industrialists (the “business barons”, whom they considered pro-British and part of the old establishment) on the grounds that they would have to commit themselves to UDI eventually or lose any chance of economic survival’. Meeting with the deputy Prime Minister, Clifford Dupont, in October, Flower found him confident that ‘85-90% of the Europeans were behind Mr Smith, with the implied suggestion that they would support him in any steps he took to get independence. I told him of a definite uneasiness that had made itself apparent, particularly in business circles in the past week or so, which indicated that there would not be support for UDI in some circles. Mr Dupont said it was inevitable that in certain circles individuals would suffer’. The moment of madness was not long in coming. On 11th November 1965, Smith announced over the radio that Rhodesia had declared itself independent.

Shocked by the realisation of their worst fears, organised industry and commerce fumbled for an appropriate response. While ARNI’s president was quick publically to pledge that his association would provide all practical assistance necessary for its members, and others stressed the responsibility of industrialists to maintain production and employment at high levels. From Johannesburg, the *Rand Daily Mail* reported that Rhodesia’s ‘economic sector is in semi-chaos. It is a case of fuss but plenty of fears … there is confusion in all sections of the business field’. Manufacturing volume initially declined as companies wondered what attitude to adopt. ‘Cessation of business would leave them with heavy losses on assets and future incomes, while opposition to the regime had a cost in the form of penalties for transgression of more strictly enforced business practices. A way forward was needed. For the most part it was found in gradual compliance with the de facto authority. At the prompting of trade journals, merchants and financiers worked closely with government officials to set up an import control system.
Quite obviously, the accent in the immediate future is to make this country as self-sufficient in all fields as possible’, announced the first post-UDI issue of Development magazine. ‘Primary producers and secondary industry have an unique chance of ensuring that their products are such as to obtain ready acceptance in local markets not only for the immediate future but on a long term basis, once imported products are no longer available. Local production, in other words, can take over permanently the supply of certain commodities which have for long been the prerogative of external suppliers. The field is an extensive one.’

Just how extensive the scope for import-substitution industrialisation actually was became apparent in the course of 1966. Estimates made just six months previously that ‘no less than 45 per cent of total imports were of a type already produced in Rhodesia’ were soon found wanting. Having taken a deep breath and having assessed the direction in which the economy should go’, recalled the head of Dunlop Tyres local subsidiary, ‘by the end of 1966 Rhodesian businessmen were exhibiting a remarkable degree of optimism, ingenuity and determination that the economy must not be destroyed by the new conditions produced by world sanctions. The direction taken by secondary industry was largely determined by a combination of existing overcapacity and stringent exchange control regulations. A hangover from the end of the Central African Federation, ‘overcapacity had been the rule across industry prior to UDI, with capacity utilisation down to below 60% in 1962’. This was now taken up by companies extending product lines on the basis of existing plant and equipment. During the UDI period, ‘plant from the late fifties was often utilised … without replacement.’ This would accord with Riddell’s argument that the key period of import substitution industrialisation actually ‘occurred prior to UDI, with the major source of manufacturing growth … [subsequently] being domestic demand expansion.’ At the same time, exchange control regulations forbidding remittance to Britain, restricted other outflows of capital to ‘a remarkably low five per cent of gross operating profits.’ Blocked funds provided significant finance for the local expansion of subsidiary companies, even as ‘formal Head Office control passed in de facto terms to resident directors whose executive day-to-day powers increased.’ The combined effect, Bond concludes, was that the ‘industrial base of the economy closed ranks to support UDI. RF politicians and government bureaucrats intensified state intervention to sustain capital accumulation on a wider scale and to organise the disparate parts of an economy under siege. From 1965, the state focussed unprecedented resources on controlling external account balances, … ensuring labour market stability, … and subsidising all manner of white business ventures. This entailed waiving overseas firm’s production rights, licensing arrangements and trademarks as well as other constraints against technology transfer.’

The upshot over the next five years or so, as many commentators have noted, was a remarkable expansion in the number of factories and the range of their products. From 665 in 1965, factories increased to 1036 in 1970, their separately identifiable locally manufactured products rising from 602 in 1963 to 3837 by 1970. Stretching from zip fasteners to abattoir equipment, Rhodesian secondary industry revealed itself capable of producing ‘its own breakfast cereals, cube sugar, high quality furniture, lollipop sticks, canned asparagus, bird seed, fifteen varieties of shampoo, ten different hand cleaners, five lipsticks, seven varieties of swimming pool paints, and ten varieties of pet foods.’ More importantly, it also made a range of heavy steel items, one casting in 1973 weighing 21 metric tons, as overall steel production increased to 250 tons per annum. Large-scale contracts in connection with the construction of Cabora Basa Dam in neighbouring Mozambique and the Wankie coal-fired power station project all benefitted steel, cement and engineering companies capable of supplying transmission materials, structures and conductors.

Less obvious, though, was who precisely these industrialists were. The highly concentrated nature of the sector tended to be obscured by the fact that lots of small firms entered it after 1965. Their proliferation was misleading, however. After five years of UDI, the secondary industrial sector was only fractionally less concentrated than before. In the early 1970s, 14.2 per cent of factories accounted for 74.3 per cent of the sector’s total gross output, compared with 14.8 per cent responsible for 78.7 per cent in 1966. The picture sketched by Stoneman of an economy ‘in almost every sector [of which] … one or two multinational firms operated in a monopoly situation … with a number of small domestically-owned firms picking up what crumbs were to be had’, may be overdrawn, but the general point holds. For Rowe, ‘many of the new industries … were “backgarden variety”, creating shoddy consumer products that were no longer readily available because of sanctions.’ They stood in sharp contrast to the fastest growing sub-sectors such as chemicals and petroleum, construction and steel production, all of which were the almost exclusive preserve of foreign, mostly British and South African-owned companies, the latter often
themselves British subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{81}

These were the 300 or so companies whose directors had set their faces against UDI.\textsuperscript{82} Once dismissed by Smith as ‘people who have got their main interests in Britain: they represent British firms and they speak as Britishers as opposed to Rhodesians’\textsuperscript{83}, it was precisely this old and much reviled ‘elite within an oligarchy’ (Clements, \textit{Rhodesia}, 169) who for a time rescued the RF government from its own folly. A couple of high profile exceptions aside, notably Evan Campbell, chairman of the Standard Bank, and Bob Newson, head of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation, it was never a matter of the “old gang”, in league with the [mildly liberal and anti-government] Argus Press, trying to prepare the country for a sell-out.\textsuperscript{84} Instead, as the head of the CIO was quick to appreciate, ‘those who had not supported UDI or the RF, became committed to using every ounce of resourcefulness, courage and cunning they had in order to outwit Britain in the economic war.’\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Force majeure} may have given way to cosy accommodation\textsuperscript{86}, but why industrialists behaved as they did is only part of the story. A more rounded account needs to identify which firms did what. Here the evidence is compelling. It was very largely British companies, or more accurately, their Rhodesian and South African subsidiaries, whose manufacturing expertise and ever-expanding product range ensured the survival of the illegal regime in Salisbury despite economic sanctions imposed by successive British governments.\textsuperscript{87}

III

According to Giovanni Arrighi, UDI was directed ‘as much against large-scale capitalism as against Africans.’\textsuperscript{88} Other radical scholars sensed a more ambiguous relationship between settler interests and big business. Denying that there was a ‘fundamental contradiction between Britain and the settlers’, Andre Astrow insisted on the contrary that ‘British imperialism maintained its interests in the country through the settlers’. For all that there were ‘certain diverging interests’ between metropole and colony, UDI, he argued, ‘was aimed primarily against the resistance of the African people, a solution which was made possible by the acquiescence of British imperialism.’\textsuperscript{89} When assessing the balance of benefits accruing to settlers as opposed to foreign capital in the aftermath of UDI, Carolyn Baylies concluded that while some gains went to settler capital, ‘as a large number of [factory] units, often of small scale, opened to produce local substitutes for prior imports, … the role of foreign capital as regards new investment and expansion of existing facilities was also extensive. … if settler capital shared in the economic gain, foreign capital … made few losses.’\textsuperscript{90}

Arguably, though, neither assessment goes far enough. While Baylies came closest in recognising that ‘the participation of imperialism was essential to even the partial success of UDI which, if not allowing settlers to dictate the terms of their existence, did buy them an extended period of political power’\textsuperscript{91}, even she did not grasp the extent to which big business was complicit in the economic project as a whole, and the expansion of secondary industry in particular. Nor does David Rowe’s careful distinction between mining, manufacturing and commercial interests capture this dimension. He may also have overestimated the Smith government’s capacity to enforce compliance.\textsuperscript{92} There is little evidence for Astrow’s claim that ‘foreign firms – with the exception of South African ones – became “Rhodesianized”’.\textsuperscript{93} With the one notable exception of Turner and Newall, the asbestos conglomerate, whose Rhodesian subsidiary was taken over, they were not.

Writing in the early 1980s when the situation had barely changed, Christine Sylvester observed that it would be ‘hard to find a case comparable to Zimbabwe in which the role of foreign investment is so long-established, [and so] deeply integrated into the sectors producing the bulk of output.’\textsuperscript{94} It was this extraordinary degree of dominance by foreign interests that led Duncan Clarke to imply that for the most part it was business as usual after UDI. ‘Nominal severance of links took place in certain spheres. Alteration to executive control policies allowed T[rans][N][ational] C[orporations]s to divest responsibility whilst holding on to their “frozen assets”. Severed subsidiaries under instruction to locally re-invest profits …found their own way “unaided” by parent corporations.’\textsuperscript{95} It would seem that the policies followed and decisions taken by Southern Rhodesia’s secondary industrial sector were not so much ‘politically constructed’ by the RF regime, as Rowe would have it\textsuperscript{96}, as they were rooted in the material conditions of the late 1950s and early 1960s described in the first section of this study. When the government’s White Paper asserted in April 1965 that ‘there is no sentiment attached to money’\textsuperscript{97}, it hoped that countries would continue to trade with Southern Rhodesia regardless of whatever unilateral action it took. As understood by big business dominating secondary industry’s commanding heights, it was a sentiment that translated into
actions confounding sanctions and delaying decolonisation for more than a decade.


4 Ibid, 97-98.


7 *Rhodesian Recorder*, November 1950.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid, 56.

14 Ibid, 59.


19 NAZ S932/14, Industrial Development of Southern Rhodesia [Contained in National Industries]


21 *Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia*, 1952, 530.


24 *Ibid*.


27 NAZ F292/16/3, Industrial Policy, n.d.


29 *Ibid*.


35 *Rhodesia Herald*, 18 February 1959.


39 *Census of Industrial Production, 1938-1957*.


44 Property & Finance, October 1965, Special Supplement: Rhodesia Exports.


49 Rhodesian Recorder, December 1962.

50 NAZ, Proceedings of the Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Industries, Seventh Annual Congress, 16 April 1964, 3.

51 Rhodesia Herald, 28 October 1964.

52 Property & Finance, November 1964. See also, Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 26.


54 Rhodesia Herald, 27 April 1965.

55 Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia, 79-80. See also, Barber, Rhodesia, 271-272; and Young, Rhodesia and Independence, 196-198.

56 Sunday Mail, 2 May 1965.

57 Rhodesia Herald, 28 April 1965.


60 Rowe, Manipulating the Market, 107.

61 Kurebwa, Politics of Economic Sanctions, 142.


63 D. G. Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment (Gweru: 1980) 29.

64 Development, December 1965.

65 Ibid, September 1965.


67 Ibid, 123.

68 Stoneman, Zimbabwe’s Inheritance, 160.

69 Riddell, Manufacturing Africa, 341.
APPENDIX ONE: Range of local manufactures 1963

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**APPENDIX ONE: Range of local manufactures 1963**

**Textiles, clothing and footwear**

Canvas, canvas and hessian products, clothing, cotton wool, furs, footwear, grain bags, hats, printing, sanitary towels, twine and cordage, weaved and knitted products

**Chemicals**

Arsenic, chemicals, dips, disinfectants, insecticides, fertilisers, gases, pharmaceuticals, sulphuric acid and water softeners

Soap, polish, candles, perfumery, toilet preparations, soap powders and pastes

**Iron and Steel and Metals**

Agricultural implements and equipment, body building, bolts, nuts and washers, brick moulds, buckets, cable and wire, crown corks, cutlery, dies, electric heaters, electroplating, enamelware and hollowware, fencing material, nails, pipes, staircases, tanks, tins and drums, trunks and suitcases, wheelbarrows, windows and doors, venetian blinds

**Paper and printing**

Cardboard boxes, corrugated cardboard containers, multi-walled sacks, paper bags, paper and cardboard, printing and lithographing, stationery, toilet rolls, waterproof paper

**Furniture, brooms and brushes**

Brooms, brushware, handles, furniture, wooden, metal, upholstery and mattress

Bricks, tiles, cement and cement products, pre-cast concrete, pipes, glassed earthenware and asbestos

**Animal and vegetable products, food, drink and tobacco**

Animal foodstuffs, bacon and hams, biscuits, bone meal, meat meal and blood meal, bread cakes, beer, cigarettes and tobacco, confectionery, dehydrated foods, dairy products, edible oils and fats, canned fruits, ice cream, jams and marmalade, jelly, custard and pudding powders, macaroni, margarine, meats tinned, flour, sugar, syrup, salt, tea and coffee, vinegar, yeast, sauces and chutneys

**Timber**

ceiling boards, doors, joinery, mining timber, plywood and veneers, sleepers, wooden packing materials and parquet blocks

**APPENDIX TWO: Foreign Capital by Industry, 1963**

**The Cotton Textile Industry**

The development of this sector began with the Southern Rhodesian government’s establishment of the Cotton Research and Industry Board (CIRB) and subsequently set up cotton spinning mill and ginnery in Gatooma in 1942. The cotton yarn produced by the Board was sold to manufacturers in Southern Rhodesia and the surplus exported, mainly to South Africa. Exports from this sector reached 1,000,000lb of yarn in 1950 valued at £210,000, and in 1951 it was 1,022,000lb, valued at £170,000. Exports to South Africa were made possible by the provisions of the 1948 Customs Agreement discussed above. By 1952, the cotton textile manufacturing industry comprised three
factories weaving piece goods, two factories weaving blankets, one factory weaving canvas, one factory weaving specialised goods, five factories engaged in knitting and three concerns involved in dyeing and another company engaged in cotton printing and dyeing. Almost all of these companies were foreign owned or associated with foreign interests. For instances, David Whitehead was established at Hartley in 1951. This company was a subsidiary of David Whitehead and Sons Holdings of Lancashire, United Kingdom. Consolidated Textiles Limited, established in 1945, was a subsidiary of a South African firm linked to the Lancashire Cotton Corporation (Britain). Rhodesian Weaving Mills was established as a subsidiary of Union Textile Mills Limited of Cape Town, from where all the operations were directed. A new entrant in the canvas industry, Fothergill and Harvey (Rhodesia) Limited, was registered in June 1953. The company was born out of an association between Rhocord Products (Pvt) Limited and Fothergill and Harvey Limited of Manchester, Britain. In 1951 Rhodesian Clothing, was acquired by Thomson Savage and Company (Pvt) of Durban, South Africa. The structure of the cotton textile manufacturing demonstrates the increasingly significant role private enterprises were playing in the sector. Equally significant is the entry of foreign capital, especially through direct investment by firms such as David Whitehead, and Fothergill and Harvey. While numerically firms that were foreign-owned or foreign-funded seem few, it was their capacity and size that is worth noting. The largest part of production came from these firms.

**Iron and Steel and Metal industries**

This industry, developed from the state-owned RISCOM steelworks at Que Que, encompassed about 120 companies of one sort or another. By 1951 it had achieved an annual gross output of £5.923 million, making it the second largest industrial group in Southern Rhodesia. It comprised piping (foundries), coach body building, and the production of metal furniture, enamelware and hardware, cable and wire, light machinery and machine tools, and cutlery. Foreign-owned firms included Stewards and Lloyds, a subsidiary of the British Steel Corporation of London; and John Brown & Company Limited of London, which had additional interests in Rhodesian Alloys (Pvt) Limited. Rhodesian Cables and Aycliffe Cables were subsidiaries of British Insulated Callender’s Cables Limited of London; Metal Box Company of Rhodesia Limited which was a subsidiary of the Metal Box Company Overseas Limited; London, Steel & Barnett Rhodesia Limited which was an associate company of Steel & Barnett of Johannesburg; and Critall-Hope (Rhodesia) Limited, a subsidiary of Critall Manufacturing Co. Limited of England. Almost all the major companies operating in the iron, steel and metal sector were either a subsidiary of, or an associate of a British or South African Company.

**Food and Beverages Industries**

On the eve of the establishment of the Central African Federation in 1953, this sector included sugar refining, breweries, distillers, confectioners, and milling. According to Phimister ‘domestic capital located in the food processing … was swamped by a flood of foreign investment from 1947 onwards.’ In this sector, prominent firms included Rhodesia Sugar Refinery Limited. It had two factories - one in Bulawayo established in 1935, and one in Salisbury established in 1951. It was sole producer of sugar in the colony but at first also relied on South Africa, Mauritius and Mozambique for imports of raw sugar. Because of the continued undersupply of sugar, the Rhodesian Sugar Refinery and Chirundu Estates were both taken over by Tate & Lyle, London, in 1953. Other major companies were Liebig’s (Rhodesia) Limited, a subsidiary of Liebig’s Extract Of Meat Company, Limited, London. Also affiliated to Liebig’s was Sunrho Limited of Umtali. A leading milling firm was Rhodesian Milling and Manufacturing Company. From its inception, this company has always been foreign owned, initially by the British South Africa Company, and latterly by the Anglo American Corporation. Spa Foods and Rhodesian Breweries were both controlled by South African Breweries; and African Distillers and Schweppes (Central Africa) Limited, were subsidiaries of Schweppes (Overseas) Limited.
Chemical and Allied Industries

This sector produced chemicals as well as fertilizers, paints, perfumery, oils, and matches. Producing fertilisers were firms such as African Explosives and Chemical Industries (Rhodesia) Limited (AE&CI), Ibatros Fisons (Rhodesia) Limited, Windmill Fertilisers (Rhodesia) Limited, and Central African Fertilizers Limited. While the first two companies were established in Southern Rhodesia before World War 2, they were both subsidiaries of bigger companies outside Rhodesia. Fisons was owned by Fisons Limited of Suffolk, which also had another affiliate in the colony, namely Fisons Pest Control (Central Africa) Pvt Limited. AE&CI was part of African Explosives and Chemical Industries South Africa Limited, which was also an associate of Imperial Chemical Industries. In the category of preservatives and automotive chemicals, there were three major firms, namely Electro Chemical Laboratories (Pvt) Limited of Salisbury, Savotex Industries (Rhodesia), an offshoot of Savo Manufacturing (Pty) Limited of South Africa, and Aybeece Agencies (Pvt) of Bulawayo. All these were controlled locally but were foreign owned. Lever Brothers, which had started manufacturing in 1947 was a subsidiary of Unilever Limited of London.

Engineering

In 1951, Brush South Africa Limited, a Johannesburg subsidiary of the Brush Electrical Engineering Co. Limited, one of the largest British Engineering companies, opened a branch office in Salisbury. In September of 1951, Jeffrey-Galion (Pty) Limited, specialists in road machinery and industrial equipment, was officially opened in Salisbury. The company was an African company whose parent companies were in America, Canada and Britain. At around the same time, Acrow Engineers Limited entered Rhodesian secondary industry. It became known for offering engineering services to the building trades. Its head office was located in London, with associate companies in the United States, Canada, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Australia and South Africa. In Salisbury it was registered under the title of Acrow (Rhodesia) Limited. It provided products that included steel shuttering, flow centres, long forms, steel adjustable props, column clamps, beam clamps, builders and tripod trestles, steel and aluminium scaffold tube and fittings.
“We want to be like them!” Economic policy models as status signaling: Reflections on South Africa’s ‘developmental state’ debate

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The Asian ‘tigers’ had already attracted strong interest from South African policymakers in the early 1990s – though not as developmental states, but as icons of rapid economic growth based on manufactured exports. A decade later the attraction was undimmed, but had broadened to take in their developmental feats. More recently, China’s ‘miracle’ – along with Vietnam’s rapid economic growth and the recovery of Malaysia and Thailand after the 1997 crash – attracted admiration. The appeal, however, is somewhat schizoid, split between a fixation on economic growth (especially via competitive industrialization) and a more expansive concern with social well-being. Thus China earns tributes despite its widening income inequality, imploding hinterlands and exploitation of workers.

Marais (2011: 339)

Introduction

Can economic policy models or discourses be considered to be identity signifiers? By drawing on the developmental state debate in South Africa, this paper argues that economic development plans especially for ‘rising’ powers in the developing world constitute a basis from which state elites’ aspirational identities can be ‘read’ and can therefore be seen as useful forms of signaling that are often not treated as such in much of the development studies literature. Likewise, despite the growing interest in the significance of identity in International Relations, these interests are often not extended to issues in political economy or development. By trying to merge these fields/approaches it enables a connection between the domestic and the external face of state-societal interaction to reveal the way in which state elites seek to project an identity or aspiration both at home and abroad and what kinds of visionary promises as well as contradictions such a process of identity signaling entail. To do so, the paper is structured as follows. After some conceptual clarification, the developmental state debate in South Africa is contextualised. Doing so enables highlighting ambiguities and contradictions with a view to the next part of the paper, namely identity signaling and the significance of especially the East Asian cases as a particular type of status signaling.

Contextualising the developmental state debate in South Africa

One of the most notable features of the developmental state debate in South Africa, is the fact that it has not attracted a great deal of attention in the academic literature since the origins of the discourse lie in the political arena (Fine, 2011:113). Whilst some contend that the concept had been referred to in passing in some ANC policy documents before 2007 - Ready to Govern, (1992); State, property relations and social transformation, (1998); and in the Preface to ANC Strategy and Tactics document, (2000) – it is only in 2002 that the concept appears at the ANC’s 51st National Conference in Stellenbosch and finds more

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Our approach to economic transformation proceeds from the understanding that the changes we seek cannot emerge spontaneously from the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. The state must play a strategic role in shaping the contours of economic development.

The developmental state is one that is capable of leading in the definition of a common national agenda, mobilising all of society to take part in its implementation and directing society’s resources towards this common programme.

Since 2007, policy discourse has become awash with the concept. The ANC’s firm embrace of the developmental state in such explicit terms may seem to appear consistent with the expectation of the Zuma presidency being somewhat driven by more ‘left-wing’ sympathies as the basis for its differentiation from the Mbeki era. However, as Basset and Clarke (2008: 796) illustrate, this developmental model shares many fundamentals with the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) launched at the end of the Mbeki era, which also highlighted public spending on infrastructure, especially transport and communications, renewed emphasis on education, skills development and training as well as sectoral economic plans.

Another remarkable feature of the debate is the absence or explicit acknowledgement of the extent to which especially the most successful East Asian developmental states were very authoritarian systems. In fact, once one removes from consideration the very racialized basis of South Africa’s industrialisation – what some have described as a kind of ‘racial Fordism’ – the apartheid state resembled many of the features attributed to the authoritarian developmental state model: extensive and deep integration between state and business elites toward a common industrialization model; political repression and concomitant cheap-labour as the basis for rapid industrialisation both by the state and foreign direct investment and a strong Cold War national security discourse whereby state elites identified with a clear, anti-Communist agenda. Nevertheless, even if one removes these authoritarian features from the equation, it rapidly becomes very clear that one of the most fundamental tests of a developmental state, namely a meritocratically recruited, professional and politically insulated bureaucracy simply falls from view in the South African case. In fact, the ANC’s strategy of cadre deployment across the state bureaucracy heavily militates against the Weberian bureaucratic ideal.

Despite these deficiencies, proponents ardently envision the South African developmental state to be ‘democratic’, with limited reflection as to what a democratic developmental state (vis-à-vis its authoritarian version) would entail in practice. For example, a key work in this regard is an edited collection by Edijieji (2010) and published by the Human Sciences Research Council, which according to Maserumule (2012:195) shows that ‘despite the fact that its title follows the conceptual logic of the ANC, which underscores the democratic dimension of a developmental state…It is only the introductory chapter that does, logically presupposing that the different chapters in the book are concerned with a democratic developmental state. However, this is not the case. The discourse in other chapters of the book is thin on the democratic part of the developmental state’.

The implication is not that democratic developmental states are non-existent. However, if authoritarian developmental states such as South Korea, Taiwan or Singapore were established through exceptional circumstances, all the more so in the case of democratic developmental states. As Peter Evans and Patrick Heller (2013) re-conceptualise the 21st century developmental state:

Incentivizing and supporting investment in industrial activity is a complex task, but delivering quality education or health care requires even more state capacity. Industrial growth can be achieved by aligning with a fairly narrow group, deploying well-known policy instruments (e.g. subsidies, interest rates, state procurement) and can be measured against certain hard indicators (e.g. exports, manufacturing output). Delivery of high quality services requires interventions that are deeper and more socially and politically intrusive than industrial policy. Because capability-enhancement is about removing unfreedoms, it butts up directly against the forms of traditional authority and organised power of clans, castes, patriarchs and challenges the political hegemony of capitalist elites as well. A state that can deliver such services is one that must have both significant infrastructural power – the power to reach into society and deliver things – as well as significant authoritative power – the power to get individuals and groups to willingly obey commands.
Citing the work of Richard Sandbrook and others in *Social Democracy and the Global Periphery* it becomes clear that democratic developmental states are very much akin to ‘social democracies’ – using the term very loosely given the exceptional difficulties of establishing social democracies in the developing world – with three broad subtypes: radical social democracies such as Kerala since the 1960s; classic social democracies like Costa Rica (1950-1980) and Mauritius since 1970 and ‘Third Way’ examples like Chile after 1990 and Uruguay (1985-2004). Besides the fact that all of these cases are relatively small countries, the central and crucial defining factor shaping these states capacities has been the strength of all-encompassing multi-class alliances and the mobilising capacity of their civil societies. These assemblages of working class movements, peasants, the middle class, small farmers and trade unions have played key roles to ensure that capability-enhancing state interventions, especially regarding health and education are maintained.

Comparing the divergence in terms of state capacity in these spheres between South Africa and Brazil immediately illuminates the extent to which South Africa falls short of what is expected of a democratic developmental state. Brazil and South Africa are comparable on a number of dimensions: both democratised after authoritarian rule late in the twentieth century whilst facing amongst the highest levels of inequality in the world. Whilst Brazil had succeeded in reducing its position on the global GINI index through greater social protection programmes, most notably the *Bolsa Familia* conditional cash transfer programme, rising minimum wages and economic growth, South Africa’s levels of inequality increased despite an increased role for, and expenditure on, social grants. Moreover, whereas both countries increased spending on access to health care and education, in Brazil it delivered much better returns (Evans and Heller, 2013:17). Why did Brazil gain greater success with capability-enhancing interventions than South Africa? Despite similar levels of bureaucratic capacity, Evans and Heller (2013:18) contend that the answer lies in the relationship between ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’. Although both countries have vibrant civil societies with subordinate groups making claims on the state, the relation between civil society and political society in the two countries are very different. South Africa’s de facto one party dominant system in combination with the role of societal corporatism which emerged as a ‘crisis response’ to democratisation, meant that many of the broad-based civil society organisations that had played such a crucial role in the anti-apartheid movement, have become ‘estranged’ from political society. In recent years, gradually declining voter turn-outs and growing numbers of protests by the urban poor regarding ‘service delivery’ (water, sanitation, electricity, housing) seem symptomatic of the disillusionment of many towards the democratic process. Marais (2011:352) has captured these dynamics well:

As community protests underline, the consensual embrace sought by the state is often weak. It prefers a relationship that encloses it, corporate interests and the public in a predictable cycle of rituals and routines. The public’s role tends to be perfunctory and is ideally channelled through organisations and formations that are capable of supporting and advancing the state’s agenda without imposing additional fiscal and institutional burdens. Consultation occurs and a degree of inclusivity is attempted, but within regimented and hidebound processes.

In Brazil in contrast, the ‘co-evolution’ of party politics and civil society was key to a process through which civil society engaged the state through participatory institutions and the institutionalisation of a process to strengthen participation in local government. ‘The key agent of welfare expansion in the 2nd phase of Brazil’s social turn was a political party, the PT, but a political party that nonetheless had its origins in civil society and that despite its increasing professional and electorally-driven modus operandi still maintains key ties to civil society’. (Evans & Heller, 2013:19). Moreover, whilst Brazil capitalised on the Chinese-driven commodity boom during the first decade of the 2000s, South Africa achieved less success on that score, also in part because Brazil has a larger pool of both hard and soft commodities. Problematically however, in South Africa the state’s influence over business has been thwarted by the emergence of a powerful financial sector and a corporate sector that ‘is now so globalised, sophisticated and socially remote that the ‘embedded autonomy’ the state seeks seems unlikely’ (Marais, 2011:347). The relation between the state and capital today is decidedly different from what it was in the 1920s and 1930s when ‘neither the state nor capital could effectively dominate the other in South Africa. It also meant that neither peasants nor proletarians presented a serious threat to the state and capital, provided the latter two elements collaborated’ (Yudelman, 1983:7).

To understand the attraction to the developmental state - a form of state which, it must be emphasised is quite exceptional - lies in the fact that the vast majority of states in the developing world are neither neo-patrimonial regimes nor cohesive capitalist (i.e. developmental) states but what Kholi aptly describes as *fragmented multic阶级 states*.
Leaders of these states attempt to promote industry by supporting private enterprise, but given the political compulsions of maintaining legitimacy, the relationship of state and business tends to be cooperative at times but distant and even conflictual at other times. Similarly ambiguous is the relationship of the state with the working class. In the absence of well-developed parties, leaders may emphasize a pro-working class rhetoric to shore up political support, but, on balance, they feel obliged to maintain a functioning private economy, including a working class whose gains must not outstrip gains in productivity. The relations between the political elite and the vast numbers of the poor, both in the cities and in the countryside, tend to be unorganized, encouraging both rhetorical populism and, on occasion, sharp conservative reactions to such populism. Populist ideologies and nationalism generally play a significant role in fragmented multiclass states, helping leadership legitimacy but constraining economic policy choices.

To intermediate these contradictory demands, class compromise often emerges. However, it deviates from the northern European prototypes that consist of organized workers and capital with the state as mediator and enforcer. In this context, unionised workers accept private ownership as the means of production while capitalists agree to transfer some profits to wages, tax-supported services and social insurance, thus raising productivity. In the developing world, the context is much more complicated. In various respects the rules of the global economy are disadvantageous to the global South given that peripheral economies tend to be dependent on a few industrialised countries for markets, imports and investment.

The significance of the developmental state debate in South Africa needs to be understood against this context. Hence, not explicitly defining how the ANC understands the developmental state serves strategically useful purposes. As the deputy secretary of the South African Communist Party, Jeremy Cronin noted: ‘there is now a growing inter-ANC alliance consensus on the need for a strong, developmental state’, however its ‘present popularity may well be that it can serve as an ideological glue that hold the Alliance together’ (Fine, 2011:115). Mzukisi Qobo (2014:100) also contends

In South Africa it would appear that debates within the ruling party on the concept of a developmental state are less about the substantive meaning of this concept as rooted in the actual experiences of East Asian economies, but more about rhetoric and piecemeal policy measures. It is not substantive in the sense of it being a systematic framework for economic governance or a clearly defined policy approach that can lend itself to measureable implementation. This rhetoric is at two levels. First, it is meant to underline the importance of greater state involvement in the economy using both regulatory instruments and up-scaling the activities of development finance institutions and state-owned enterprises. Second, it is a concept that has political instrumentality, namely to solidify ideological consensus with the ruling alliance and to cement the imaginations and allegiance of the poor to the ruling party

(Patrick Bond talks of distraction).

Whilst various analysts therefore highlight the extent to which the developmental state debate provides a broader intellectual narrative around which the Zuma administration has sought to develop a common vision of national identity in which the developmental state promises something for everyone, its significance is not confined to the domestic political agenda alone. Rather, the developmental state debate needs to be read as a two level game, a dimension which is rarely acknowledged in discourses about development models. What is significant in this regard are state policy makers’ frequent references to specifically East Asian developmental models as a central feature of the developmental state discourse. Three Asian cases appear to feature prominently, namely South Korea (early 1990s), Malaysia (late 1990s) and more recently, China. Beyond East Asia, Brazil has also recently featured, especially amongst pro-labour circles in what has been described as possibilities for a ‘Lula moment’ in South Africa.

South Korea

Although ANC policy documents only cited the notion of a developmental state explicitly since the mid-2000s the genealogy of the idea can be traced to the first substantive economic policy document in 1990, the Discussion Document on Economic Policy (DDEP). In her analysis of the DDEP, Nattrass (1994:347) highlights the significance of developmental state thinking and especially that of the South Korean state in early ANC economic policy. Admonishing against reading future ANC policy as socialist, Nattrass noted, ‘...the proposed industrial policy, with its stress on strategic intervention and greater
control over investment flows, contained elements more compatible with state intervention in South Korea
than with old-style socialist economies’. However, whereas the Korean conglomerate structure allowed the
state to more easily control and direct the economy (given relatively few key agents), the ANC committed
itself to unbundling these and as such the DDEP ‘showed a greater commitment to competition and market
forces than that in South Korea’, most likely Nattrass (1994:348) surmises, due to pressure from the
emerging small black business and professional elites. More fundamentally, the DDEP sought to achieve
‘growth through redistribution in which redistribution acts as a spur to growth and in which the fruits of
growth are redistributed to satisfy basic needs’. This approach lay the basis for the policy’s political appeal
in uniting various constituencies within the ANC who placed differing emphasis on growth and
redistribution. These tensions also informed varying ‘economic visions’ with social democratic corporatist
institutional arrangements on the one hand and strong developmental state intervention on the other.
Prophetically, Nattrass (1994:349) noted: ‘[T]he tension inherent in these two rival strategies is indicative
of the likely strains which will occur between Cosatu and its alliance partner once the ANC becomes the
government’. By 1991, the ANC’s Draft Resolution on Economic Policy explicitly called for ‘a
developmental state to lead, coordinate, plan and dynamise a national economic strategy’, with the notion
of a developmental state gradually replacing the notion of growth through redistribution. By 1993, the most
comprehensive policy document to date, the Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic
Policy in South Africa (MERG), continued to echo the significance of strategic interventions along the lines
of the Asian developmental states.

In transforming South Africa into the South Korean model, the ANC faced the risk of being
hamstrung by Cosatu’s demands for consultation, thus lacking the kind of policy leeway characterizing the
Korean developmental state. The compromised end result was the Reconstruction and Development Plan
(RDP) whereby Cosatu agreed to support the ANC at the polls in exchange for it committing to the RDP as
a sort of ‘pact’. Without recounting a now familiar tale, by 1996 the RDP with its Korean developmental
state genealogy had been replaced by the much more market-friendly, Growth and Redistribution
Employment Programme (GEAR). Hindsight offers some irony in revisiting these debates: ANC economic
thinking in the 1990s came closest to the developmental state idea when it was least explicitly articulated
on and in party policy platforms.

Malaysia

By the mid- to late 1990s, no other country had become the focus of such sustained analysis for a
post-apartheid developmental model than Malaysia. Expected to emulate the Asian tigers within an African
context, Malaysia enjoyed considerable appeal amongst South African policy makers given its success in
generating impressive levels of growth whilst accomplishing redistribution against the complexities of
equally deep-seated levels of ethnic polarization. The significance of the Malaysian model rested not only
upon its resonance as an economic model but also for the extent to which it echoed broader societal
challenges such as affirmative action. At least three key themes - in rough order of significance to South
African policy debates - mark the comparative literature. First and foremost, the extent and danger of close
links between government and a state-sponsored capitalist class that constitute only ‘partial embeddedness’
and a considerable degree of rent-seeking behavior (Edigheji 2012). Freund (2007:671) asks

Can the new embedded elite and its partners shift the basis of growth away from the sale of natural
resources, even efficiently gathered and sold? South Africa remains a country powered by the
demand for its basket of resources. In the early twenty first century this remains an effective
strategy financially given the immense demands placed by the growth of the Chinese and Indian
economies especially. However, prosperity continues, as in the past, to depend on easy credit and
translates into balance of payments problems given the public tendency to buy foreign finished and
intermediate goods. Nor does it form the foundation of a more broad-based improvement in the
standard of living. Government proclamations indicate that there is a slow and difficult
understanding emerging of this reality. The thrust of the business world however, is to seek wealth
in familiar ways with the new elite in a weak position to promote fundamental institutional
changes.

Second, the Malaysian case has been particularly influential in relation to the affirmative action
debate (Emsley 1996) particularly access to higher education, employment and the promotion of a Black
capitalist class. Third, the Malaysian case often features in relation to the dynamics of one party dominant
systems (Southall 1997; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999). The attraction of the Malaysian model however is
mitigated by a number of conditions that are not always made explicit in some of these analyses. Firstly,
the success of Malaysia’s New Economic Programme (NEP) had as much to do with its substantive focus on poverty alleviation as it did on the promotion of a Malay middle class as complimentary processes. As it was stated in the *Mid-term Review 1973 of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975*

The first prong is to reduce and eventually *eradicate poverty*, by raising income levels and increase employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second prong aims at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually *eliminate the identification of race with economic function*.

Poverty alleviation seems to have become lost or at least overwhelmed by the focus on Black Economic Empowerment of a small elite in the South African translation of the NEP. World historical timing between the ANC’s sponsorship of a black middle class and a Malay middle class sponsored by UMNO also played a decisive role. In fact, whereas both Malay and Afrikaner nationalists pursued a programme of ethnic redistribution with growth with considerable success during the heyday of Fordism, the changing nature of the international political economy from the mid-1970s onward, meant that the South African state of the 1990s was much more limited in sponsoring an African middle class through the same means by which Malays and Afrikaners became part of the bourgeoisie (van der Westhuizen, 2002). Moreover, it is often forgotten that Malaysia enjoyed relative high levels of growth at the onset of the NEP - at nearly 7.8 percent annually in the 1970s – whereas South Africa was not as fortunate in the 1990s. Rather, South Africa ‘has become poorer in per capita terms since 1980, and it has lagged seriously behind most other semi-peripheral societies and NICs since the mid-1970s in aggregate economic growth’ (cited in Southall, 2007:21). Labour also plays a much more significant role in the South African political economy (Hart)...in Malaysia in contrast contrast, given its historically emasculated role since the Malay Emergency of 1948-1960 and the consequent crush of independent worker organisations and left-wing groups that the government feared may be a cover for communist activities, labour’s role was much more tightly circumscribed (van der Westhuizen, 2002:34). Finally in both South Africa and Malaysia the extent to which a meritocratic bureaucracy - the bedrock of the developmental state - could be forged were heavily compromised by the extent to which the bureaucracy had become an instrument of upward mobility especially amongst disadvantaged ethnic majorities amongst both Malay, Afrikaner and African nationalists. Nevertheless, by the 2000s attraction to the Malaysian model appeared to have dulled, possibly as criticism of Black Economic Empowerment and the small clique of Black capitalists benefitting from lucrative state contracts through family and political networks became more ubiquitous just as South Africa became known for increasing levels of inequality.

**The BRICS, notably Brazil/China**

By the first decade of 2000, the state-led development models amongst the BRICS had reignited interest in more interventionist models, most notably China and Brazil. Both domestic and global conditions account for the more neo-Keynesian shift in ANC economic policy. Whilst this shift - at the domestic level - is often attributed to the Zuma presidency owing to his apparent courting of labour and the left to oust Mbeki, the conditions which account for this shift were already well underway before the palace coup within the ANC. This evolution occurred in two phases: the first occurred in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s with the emergence of widespread social struggles which in combination with the divisions within the Tripartite Alliance triggered by the adoption of GEAR, ‘unsettled political elites and prompted them to expand the reach of social support grants’ (Habib, 2013:94). The second is that given the extent to which Cosatu and the SACP had increased leverage - given that they had given an institutional platform for Zuma’s ascendance to power, ‘the power differential in favour of business that prevailed under Mbeki’s reign eroded slightly in favour of a more equitable balance of power - both within the party and in the country as a whole’ (Habib, 2013:95).

At the global level, the effects of the Financial Crisis and the central role key emerging developing economies had come to play - as witnessed by their role in the now enlarged G20 rather than the G8 - as well as the evolution of developmental thinking that had especially with the MDG’s ensured greater receptivity towards notions of redistributive justice amongst both Bretonn Woods and UN-aligned organisations (van der Westhuizen, 2012), recreated conditions for the consideration of more statist development models. (The Economist issue). Amongst the large emerging economies that had withered the storm of 2008, two features became prominent: their continued use of state-owned corporations and the extent to which these economies expanded social welfare programmes (to complement the liberalisation processes of the 1990s).
Given Brazil’s success with the Bolsa Familia, its record economic growth until 2013 and the extent to which it shared many similar developmental challenges with South Africa - made the Brazilian model nearly as appealing in the mid-2000s - as Malaysia was in the 1990s. Enthralled by Brazil’s success in reducing poverty through state-led programmes, South African labour in particular clamoured that conditions were ripe for a “Lula Moment”. At the launch of the book ‘A Lula Moment for South Africa’ at the Chris Hani Institute, delegates noted that ‘there is much to admire in the achievements of the PT and of Lula of Brazil. By significantly raising the incomes of the poorest during a growth phase fuelled by the commodities boom and after that, Brazil created a virtuous cycle of income-led growth in which higher wages created a domestic market for locally produced consumer goods, fuelling further economic and jobs growth’ (Paton, Business Day 21 Feb 2014 Is SA ready for a labour-led ‘Lula’ moment?). Yet labour was not the only constituency interested in Brazil. In 2009, the pro-market think tank, the Centre for Development Enterprise (CDE) embarked upon a dedicated focus upon analysing ‘market based development solutions’ in Brazil, India and South Africa (www.democracy.cde.org.za).

The extent to which many of the world’s largest ‘emerging markets’ were relatively better insulated against the immediate effects of the financial contagion and their ability to weather the storm relatively better than their Northern counterparts, loomed large throughout the crisis. That the world turned to the BRIC countries - with their pronounced role for state-driven capitalism - to help underwrite the continued stability of the global financial system, also pointed towards the realignment of global power centres. Throughout all of this, China’s role has been central.

Although China has not explicitly sought to articulate a ‘Beijing Consensus’, the model of a strong and economically interventionist state has made an impact within ANC policy circles. Since 2009, the ANC has sent numerous delegations from its top-decision making structure, the National Executive Committee (NEC), to learn how the Chinese run their party and government, how they train their cadres and about China’s economic situation. “The ANC has relationships with all progressive parties around the world. We share experiences and views and perspectives on issues of international governance,” ANC spokesperson Keith Khoza said after one visit in 2011. NEC member and Gauteng ANC leader Paul Mashatile confirmed that NEC members travelled to China for ‘political lessons’, whilst another party official noted that the ANC ‘wants to know “how the party (CCP) manages itself” given the internal problems of discipline and governance in the ANC’. ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe also admonished Western investors to realise ‘South Africa does not need their money’ given that it can turn to India and China to fund economic development. ‘Sometimes when you deal with the IMF or the World Bank or anything, they feel that you must stop thinking because they have money and they will tell you what to do with the money […] As long as that is the case, you are going to see the fast growth of the ‘Look East’ policy’. More dangerous is that policy-peddling in terms of an undefined notion of a ‘developmental state’ may set the scene for the justification of a discourse citing democracy as an impediment to rapid development. An opinion poll conducted in 2012 asked respondents to rank countries they thought could be considered as South Africa’s ally or ‘close friends’. China scored the highest at 26 per cent, followed by the United States at 20 per cent. Asked which countries South Africa could learn the most from about alleviating poverty, China again emerged as first at 26 per cent, followed by Brazil and Botswana at 20 per cent.

It is in this context that the symbolic value of the invitation by Beijing into the club of BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China) during the summit in Sanya/China, in 2011 looms large. Pretoria’s

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2 “South African party delegation meets Chinese counterparts to boost ties”, Xinhua News Agency, 10 October 2011. See also “SAfrica: "Leaked" report gives details, insights on ANC’s "study trips" to China”, Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 29 November 2010
3 Rosswou, M., “ANC’s secret China trip,” City Press, 9 October (2011); The Chinese party, for its part, extended relations also to other South African parties and invited also a delegation of the opposition Democratic Alliance, which is the provincial governing party in South Africa’s Western Cape province, and the Inkatha Freedom Party. These study visits are part of China’s broader foreign policy, preparing contacts and agreements at a later stage (Shinn and Eisenman, China-Africa, p.82.).
4 Reuters, ANC says turning to China, India, 23 May (2012).
membership of the renamed BRICS and hosting the groupings 5th summit in Durban in 2013, signalled its commitment to working towards a more multipolar world order.

China is attracted to South Africa – as it is to other mineral-rich powers like Australia, Brazil, and Canada – but it also bears directly upon the role of the so-called ‘minerals-energy complex’ (MEC) that has been central to the history of South Africa’s economy and its role in southern Africa. For example, at the very ‘epicentre’ of the MEC, finance has emerged as ‘a separate but related’ set of economic activities closely associated with minerals and related sectors ‘but in which corporate restructuring and financial speculation have occurred at the expense of providing funds for investment for the expansion and restructuring of production itself’.[7]

The $5.5 billion purchase of a 20% stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank by China’s ICBC in 2008 was an attempt to service other Chinese interests and investment across Africa using a bank with an existing continental reach. Moreover, South Africa’s relatively advanced financial sector exposes Chinese firms to a tightly regulated environment - an experience that is worth undergoing in some sort of ‘test case’ when aspiring for more lucrative markets in the Western world. Yet the ICBC investment – probably the most significant foreign direct investment by size – is symptomatic of the proliferation of the large variety of ‘producer service firms’ that emerged in the late 1990s. These ‘service the centralisation requirements of globalised manufacturing and industrial companies (including mining). Most notable amongst these are accounting, law, advertising, corporate travel, security, public relations, management consulting, IT, real estate, storage, data processing and insurance companies’.[8] Increasingly, South Africa’s role is shaped by its position in the global economy to perform what Carmody[9] describes as fulfilling both global and regional interests by promoting economic liberalisation for regional market access by its own corporate elites as well as for other major countries and transnational capital. This is more colloquially known as the so-called ‘gateway to Africa’ argument.

However, South Africa also faces the complexities that arise from being a part of what Garrett[10] describes as the global ‘missing middle’: the many upper-middle income economies of Latin America and Central Europe that are neither low-wage economies in which labour executes routine tasks at the lowest possible cost nor knowledge-based economies based on cutting edge technological innovation. In short, because of South Africa’s global and regional role, the vast inequalities generated by the country’s deep integration with the global economy are mirrored by the enormous skills gaps between on the one hand the small but affluent indigenous capitalist class, the increasingly multi-racial middle class, and the organised working class; and on the other hand an enormous subordinate class, reliant on precarious employment and the informal sector. This configuration of class dynamics means that a relatively powerful (but declining) labour movement prohibits a low-wage, mass-manufacturing process based on ‘flexible’ labour, whilst massive and fundamental skill deficiencies in key sectors also forestall adoption of a relatively productive but high wage, value added trajectory.

Desperate to overcome being stuck between this Scylla and Charybdis, Pretoria pursues two strategies. Firstly, it uses sub-Saharan Africa as the base for its manufacturing and service related exports and secondly, it adopts a programme of heavily state financed infrastructural development programmes to position South Africa as the pivotal centre of African transport, logistics, telecommunications facilities and related services. Paradoxically, China’s role in Africa both complements and complicates these strategies. For example, President Zuma’s announcement of a R1-trillion infrastructure-driven model in his 2012 State of the Nation address, was cited as drawing on the Chinese model of state capitalism[11]. As Enoch Godownana, head of the ANC’s economic transformation committee noted at the time, ‘The Chinese model

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[8] Ibid.


[11] Mail & Guardian, State of the Nation: Zuma adopts Chinese model, 3 February 2012: Yet as Cisse & Grimm (2012) have noted, there is nothing particularly Chinese about this ‘model’. South African contexts are very different and, say, Germany or France could also have been cited. What is intriguing however, is the fact that budget plan was ‘packaged’ as being consistent with the Chinese growth model.
of building infrastructure and growing jobs will be a key focus of the ANC’s economic policy. With the emergence of new growth economies and the impact of these on trade flows, many African states have seen a commodity price boom that resulted in GDP growth figures long unseen in Africa. Yet, current growth paths have led to a diversification of economic activity. To the contrary: new partners with a demand for resources have dulled the urge to diversify. This ‘cashing in’ by elites is at the very core of the ‘resource curse’. This may also in part explain ANC state and business elites’ with close connections to the resource and finance industries, being reluctant to forego lucrative opportunities for their companies to act as intermediaries to Chinese exploration of African wealth.

Since the early 1990s, East Asian models have played a central role in South African development debates. South Korea featured heavily during debates at the onset to democratization; during the late 1990s Malaysia was widely studied both for its significance as a model of combining high growth with the sponsorship of an ethnic capitalist class, and in the 2000s China and Brazil featured prominently. Whilst the analysis of similarities and differences between cases constitutes the core feature of comparative political economy, another dimension – namely debates about identity and more specifically status signalling, are usually not as obvious. The following brief section tries to link issues of central concern in constructivist International Relations, namely identity and status, to the more policy-directed debate about developmental models in comparative political economy.

**Developmental models as status signalling**

Discourses about development models rarely acknowledge the extent to which these debates constitute a basis from which state elites’ aspirational identities can be ‘read’. South African state elites’ frequent references to developmental states especially in Asia serves not only to engage in instrumental policy-making reflections, but project the idea of an imagined economy that both ties multiple and often conflicting domestic constituencies together into a shared national vision, whilst at the same time signalling an identity to the world at large. Imagined economies refer to one’s encounter with the economy through stories, images, and accounts through which projections about our relationship with the economy is projected. The concept also points to how different imaginaries circulate and offer competing visions (Clarke, 2014). Engaging in this ‘two-level’ game entails finding out precisely how a state’s identity affects the construction of its interests vis-a-vis another state demands that the social context in which that state’s collection of identities is being discursively constructed be investigated as deeply and broadly as possible. This means exploring not only how that state’s identities are produced in interactions with other states, but also how its identities are being produced in interaction with its own society and the many identities and discourses that constitute that society (Hopf, 2002:294).

State elites’ frequent interaction with and reference to Asian developmental states involve a process of status signalling: ‘we want to be like them’. When an observable action is used to make information available to those who do not have it, in order to shape a desired image, signalling occurs. The international relations literature on signalling tends to be dominated by realist considerations focussing on two types of questions:

- how can security-seeking states signal their benign intentions in an anarchic international system?
- And how can states conduct coercive diplomacy and reach bargains that avoid the costs of war, while accurately signalling their resolve, credibility and intent (Pu & Schweller, 2014:144).

In contrast, the literature on status signalling ‘is a theoretically underdeveloped and unconventional type of signalling in international relations’ (Pu & Schweller, 2014:144). Generally, signals are more likely to be broadcast credibly and reliably when they are costly to the signaler to the extent that a different kind

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12 Mail and Guardian, 3 February 2012.
of actor would be unwilling or unable to make them (i.e. space programs, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers). Second, regardless of whether it is intended or not, status signals are received by multiple audiences both domestic and international. Hence for ‘national leaders status signalling is tantamount to playing a ‘tricky ‘two level’ game between international and domestic audiences’. Rapid development in rising powers are likely to trigger rising domestic expectations and cause status signalling at the international level to be connected to a domestic political struggle for legitimacy (Pu & Schweller, 2014:145).

Social identity theory posits that people compare their groups qualities and achievements to those of a reference group that is either similar or higher in status. States also make favourable references to a ‘reference state’ or group of states - that are similar in culture, region, history or size – to enhance members’ self-esteem. However, if the other group is superior in terms of significant indicators and the lower status group can occupy or consider a higher position, the group may pursue an identity management strategy. The lower status group can pursue one or more strategies: initiate the higher status group (social mobility); defeat the other group (social competition) or ‘find new value dimensions in which it is superior (social creativity)’ (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014: 38). Pursuing social mobility involves ‘emulating the values and behaviour of an elite group to be admitted to the club. For this strategy to be feasible, elite group boundaries must be open to new members’ (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014:38). Not to be confused with a contest over material possession, social competition is not about gaining greater resources, but rather to better or surpass the other on indicators of comparison. Finally, social creativity refers to attempts by lower status states to develop or identify a new criterion for evaluation on which the group ranks highly. This strategy does not aim to challenge the status hierarchy but simply to achieve pre-eminence on its own criteria and may involve the advocacy of new norms, regimes, institutions or development models in order to make the state or group distinctive from the established powers (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014:41).

South Africa’s long-standing attraction to East Asia as a development model can be read in terms of Tajfel’s social identity theory in at least two of the three responses (considering the unlikelihood of social competition as a status goal). State elites in South Africa clearly seek to emulate the values and behaviour of an elite group of states – namely East Asian developmental states – regardless of whether economic policy and institutional capacity actually justifies such self-description. As Ben Fine (2001: 120) has noted, the East Asian states had no notion that they were developmental states until they were told so by western social scientists. Moreover, discursively in South Africa, the assumption is that the criteria of what constitutes a developmental state is somewhat flexible and open – hence the injunctions of a democratic developmental state or ‘the issue that should inform the discourse should not be about replicating the East Asian model…the focus should be on learning from it and considering lessons learned within South Africa’s own contextual uniqueness’ (Maserumule, 2012:197). In terms of a social creativity approach, the very idea of the developmental state suggests emulating a model that does not arise from the Atlantic economies, even though the ANC’s commitment to more statist models have waxed and waned over the past twenty years. Currently, the obvious tie-in between ‘reference states’ (i.e China, Brazil) and the pursuit of new value dimensions revolves around South Africa’s ascension to membership of the BRICS its various initiatives, and the status to be derived from membership of the club despite Pretoria being the junior partner in quantitative terms. Yet unlike any of the other BRICS, South Africa’s membership rests on its supposed role of representing the African continent (while Brazil shares the complexities of being regionally dominant, it does not need to justify its role in BRICS on the basis of regional representation). However, South Africa’s position in the BRICS and the significance of the developmental state as a status signal is not without contradictions. For in as much as the consolidation of South Africa’s leadership on the continent and championing the ‘African Agenda’ constitutes the foundation of Pretoria’s foreign policy, African states rarely feature in state elites’ references to African developmental states. This cannot be attributed to the lack of cases with significant potential for policy learning. Thandika Mkandawire (2001:304) has illustrated that during the period 1967-1980 ten African countries enjoyed a growth rate of 6 percent, comparable to many Asian cases. These included not only resource rich countries like Gabon, Botswana, Congo and Nigeria, but also Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Moreover, it might be plausible to conceptualise at least two ‘waves’ of developmental states in Africa in the post-Cold War period. The first would be ‘established’ cases such as Mauritius (Meisenhelder 1997; Sandbrook 2005; Sandbrook et al. 2007) and Botswana (Taylor 2003; Hillbom 2012) and ‘emerging’ developmental states such as Uganda (Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005), Ghana (Ayee, 2013) and Ethiopia (Lefort, 2012; Gagliardone, 2014).

Conclusion

By drawing on the developmental state debate in South Africa, this paper argues that economic development plans especially for ‘rising’ powers in the developing world constitute a basis from which
state elites’ aspirational identities can be ‘read’ and can therefore be seen as useful forms of signalling that are often not treated as such in much of the development studies literature. Likewise, despite the growing interest in the significance of identity in International Relations, these interests are often not extended to issues in political economy or development. By trying to merge these fields/approaches it enables a connection between the domestic and the external face of state-societal interaction to reveal the way in which state elites seek to project an identity or aspiration both at home and abroad and what kinds of visionary promises as well as contradictions such a process of identity signalling entails.

To do so, the paper highlights the extent to which especially Asian developmental states have frequently appeared in policy documents or are routinely referred to by state elites. South Korea already featured in early 1990 documents; the Malaysian case has been a model especially in relation to affirmative action and the promotion of a Black capitalist class in the form of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and then later, so-called ‘broad-based’ BEE throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and within the first decade of 2000, China and to some extent Brazil, appeared as models to be emulated, consistent with South Africa’s inception within the BRICS. In practice however, South Africa shares very few features with the classic authoritarian developmental states that initially arose in Northeast Asia. Neither does South Africa comply with the challenging demands for a democratic developmental state as posed by Evans and Heller (2015). Rather, the developmental state debate should be read as a two level game: at the international or external level as a form of status signalling, consistent with South Africa’s projection of itself as a rising power and at the domestic or internal level as a strategically vague vision to help generate a national identity around a kind of imagined economy.

Bibliography


Part 4

Africa-Japan Relations:
New TICAD toward Post 2015
Dreaming Afrasia: An Essay on Afro-Asian Relations in Space-Time Perspectives

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Introduction

In the seminal work that discussed a possibility of non-Western international relations theory, the two leading scholars of the discipline, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, expressed an emphatically cautious view against the advocacy of an exclusively Asian perspective of international relations.

…. we are not, repeat not, concerned with identifying or advocating an Asian school of international relations. This would link us to constructs (and debates surrounding them) such as Asian values, Asian democracy, Asian way etc. We want to stay clear of such reifications, which, while they may have their usefulness in building non-Western IRT, are also hugely problematic because of the extent of generalizations they involve, and the suspicions they evoke as an elite-driven and politically motivated exercise’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010: 229. Italics in original).

The purpose of this essay is to consider the relevance of setting uniquely Afro-Asian spatial and historical perspectives (the term Afrasia is used hereafter in this paper) to contemporary international relations and development. Given a possible danger of elitism and political manoeuvring involved in an exclusively Asian grouping mentioned above, the proposition of considering international relations in the framework of Afrasia may sound equally problematic. Otherwise, the proposed framework may be too general, broad and abstract to create a substantial threat to healthy intellectual debate.

However, the political space of Afrasia is alive since the time of Bandung Conference. The original Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference) held in April 1955 was attended by the delegates of 23 Asian and 6 African states, representing more than a half of the global population at the time. Although the second reunion was not convened for a long time, the original conference affirmed the principle of equal sovereignty of diverse nations in Afrasia and their reciprocal cooperation, opposed all forms of colonial intervention and then gave birth to the Non-Aligned Movement. In the 21st century, the spirit of Bandung that has receded into history textbooks is being reactivated. The 2nd Bandung of 106 states was held in 2005, and the 3rd, the 60th Anniversary Conference Summit of 109 states, took place in April 2015. Now the group of Bandung is deemed to be the largest regional organization, even though it remains an ad-hoc grouping with no permanent secretariat at the time of 2015.¹

This essay does not claim that a self-contained space of Afrasia as a political and economic entity already exists, but suggests that this broad stretch of land and sea areas is a potential region that may be created through active dialogue among those who live there. Afrasia is a project in the making rather than an accomplished fact. Therefore, the aim of this essay is merely to incubate a ‘pre-theory’ of international relations across Afrasia and indicate new research areas based on some key historical literature. In the following sections, the paper rewind the time from the future to the past, by discussing the future projection of Afrasian demography first, then examining pan-nationalist ideals propounded by some of the eminent intellectuals in Afrasia in the 20th century, and finally, describing pre-colonial political orders in the vast region that cast long shadow into the present time.

¹ In 2014, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was launched by 50 mainly Eurasian nations. Several major economic powers like the United States, Canada and Japan did not participate as founding members.
1. The Foreseeable Future

According to a projection released by the UN Population Division, 4.71 billion people will live in Asia, 4.18 billion in Africa, and about 1.96 billion in the rest of the world in 2100 (Figure 1).\(^2\) This means that more than 80 percent of the world population will be either Asians or Africans in the early 22nd century. Given the democratic principle of equal representation, organising a visionary dialogue between Asia and Africa where an absolute majority people will reside will be critically important to decide the future shape of the world. There is no wonder that the presence of Asia in the world will remain significant in terms of population, as well as economic power, in the foreseeable future. As the population of Asians has already reached 4.17 billion in 2010, the major contributing factor of the global population increase in the coming century is the continuous demographic expansion in Asia, where the population is projected to quadruple from the baseline of 1.03 billion in 2010. The African continent, the birthplace of the humankind, is expected to regain its demographic presence on par with its vastness of the landmass.

However, this picture of ‘80 percent majority’ of Asians and Africans requires some caution. First, it must be remembered that the Malthusian assumption (Malthus 1985), in which the unchecked population increase would eventually lead to a human-environmental catastrophe, has been often narrated with mythophobia related to perceptions such as ‘yellow-peril’ and ‘black-peril’. In reality, the simple Malthusian scenario conceived in the late 18th century has proved to be wrong; the population did not continue growing exponentially in any society, and the agricultural production has grown steadily to accommodate the aggregate needs of the global population to date. There is much evidence to show that women’s education and their involvement in ‘gainful’ employment outside home tend to lower the total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children a woman in a society is expected to have in her lifetime (Sen 1999: Chapter 9). Raising costs of child-bearing concomitant with urbanization as well as the spread of contraception also contribute to the decline of TFR. In short, a Malthusian catastrophe is avoidable through the empowerment of women.

Technically speaking, future population is determined solely by the levels of birth rate and death rate. The present pattern of demographic change has a momentum (or inertia), as the TFR of women and the death rate of alive persons does not radically change in the short term. Therefore, it is known that the population projections at least for the next couple of decades are quite accurate, even though a projected state one century later is more or less a guesswork (Livi-Bacci 2012: 216). The UN population projection is based on an assumption that the trend of declining TFR continues; the TFR of African women has already started to decline in the 1980s (Figure 2). As long as the TFR remains as high as four and five, the absolute size of the population on the African continent will continue to expand. However, in future Africa as well as in the rest of the world in the recent past, the TFR is expected to drop gradually and settle down to around two, the replacement level. The UN projection shows that the ‘80 percent majority’ situation in the early 22nd century will be a sort of stationary state, rather than one stage in an unending crisis of population explosion.

Second, population growth should not be considered to be an independent variable, as human demography is affected by various factors including policy choices and unfolding events that could not be foreseen. While China introduced the rigid one-child policy in 1979, Indira Gandhi’s coercive birth control policy faced enormous protest in India in the late 1970s and brought to a standstill, and the resultant contrasting population policies of China and India have greatly affected the paths of population transition in the two countries (Livi-Bacci 2012: Chapter 5). Such a divergence was totally unpredictable at the time of the post-colonial founding of their nations in the late 1940s. Looking at Africa, in hindsight, the high mobility of people conditioned by low population density was a major factor of the quick spread of HIV/AIDS, but the epidemic was largely unnoticed in the 1980s (Iliffe 2006).

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\(^2\) United Nations (2012). The figures cited here are based on the medium variant. Africa includes Northern Africa, while Asia is composed of Eastern, South-Central, Central, Southern, South-Eastern and Western Asia based on the UN definition of regional boundaries. The estimation and projection are updated every few years, so readers are advised to consult the latest figures. A few years after 2050, one will be able to see a projection up to 2150 at the UN Population Division website (if the network called ‘internet’ is still in use).
Third, the future state of population is changeable in accordance with the choice of policies, which affect not only the absolute number of population of a given society, but also the quality of life of increasing or decreasing population as well as their relations with natural environment. Therefore, it must be emphasized that the real problem lies in the population structure rather than in its absolute size. The rapid decline of population growth rate combined with relative longevity enjoyed by Asians means that the Asian region will soon face a drastic aging of the population, which is expected to entail acute shortage of working-age population and the defection of formal pension systems. In contrast, on the African continent, the young generation will augment its presence into the 22nd century. The UN projection shows that the world population will grow from 6.92 billion in 2010 to 10.85 billion in 2100, and this increment is largely attributable to the increase in Africa, which will put an enormous strain on the food security, or food sovereignty, of the African continent. Given the prospective population expansion in Africa and global environmental constraints, a soft landing should be managed to ensure decent life for all, especially the coming generations, who live on the continent.

Although it is not propitious that the policy-makers in African countries have not been very much enthusiastic about the agricultural reform after independence compared to their Southeast Asian counterparts (Henley 2015), radical agricultural modernization may not work in large part of Africa where communal landholding functions as a last resort of social security. Capital-intensive development of the agrarian sector in Africa would deprive rural people of their more or less equal access to land and bring devastating social consequences. Without taking a labour-absorbing peasant path, the ongoing new ‘enclosure’ robbing the rural mass in the ‘South’ of land and job would be tantamount to the genocide of half of humanity (Amin 2011: 124). It must also be noted that the enhancement of agricultural production, by itself, cannot be a solution to food shortage. Even when the total food supply surpassed the aggregated demands of society, a lack of effective mechanism of market control and food distribution occasionally led to serious famine crises in both South Asia and Africa, as demonstrated by Amartya Sen’s study on famine crises in Bengal, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and the Sahel (Sen 1981).

2. Pan-Nationalist Aspirations in Afrasia

Despite these cautions and unpredictability, it is almost certain that people who reside in Afrasia will form an overwhelming majority of the global population in the early 22nd century. The quality of direct communication between Africans and Asians will therefore greatly influence the future shape of the world, but the opportunities of dialogue and mutual learning between these two regions are still very scanty and intermittent at best. Here, the historic symbolism of Bandung stood out as the first occasion of framing a broad regional grouping of Afrasia based on a binding spirit of anti-colonialism and self-reliance. Despite the shared distance from the socialist block at the time, the organizers of the conference, especially Indonesia, were at pains to incorporate Maoist China into the Bandung framework. In this section, let us make a cursory overview of the pan-nationalist ethos propounded by some of the great intellectuals in 20th century Afrasia, which is expected to highlight keynote aspirations of the spirit of Bandung.

It is possible to identify three common threads in their writings and speeches. First, the eminent nationalists in Afrasia protested against military might and greed associated with the colonial aggression of the West. Their strong anti-Western attitudes may appear too bitter and confrontational today, but that was the reality in the 20th century especially for the awakened intellectuals in colonies. Second, the quintessence of their voice was to combine nationalism and humanism with the expectation that an assertion of particular values would ultimately enrich the universal human values or that their own values possessed core universal meanings. Third, they advocated unifying values of Asia or Africa surpassing parochial national interests, and in this sense, they were not so much nationalists as pan-nationalists. Although reactive nationalism begins with self-assertion of one’s own values against the hegemonic powers, the articulation of nationalism often reached beyond a mere expression of narrow territorial identification.3 3

3 According to H.W. Arndt, the notion of ‘economic development’ had its origins exclusively in the West. ‘Reactive nationalism’ fermented by the Western intrusion played a major role as the catalyst of modernization in Japan, China, India and other non-Western nations (Arndt 1987).
Having witnessed the horrendous violence of the World War I, Rabindranath Tagore stated that ‘the spirit of conflict and conquest is at the origin and in the centre of Western nationalism’ (Tagore 1917: 33) and warned against the assimilation of such spirits on the part of Japan and India. In one of his lectures delivered in China in 1924, Tagore referred to an anecdote of British airmen of a crash-landed bombing place being rescued by local people in a Mahsud village in Afghanistan, which had been attacked by the very British aircraft. Then, comparing the bomber to an expensive ‘toy’ given to a child, he made the following point.

Man’s ideal has for its field of activity the whole human nature from its depth to its height. The light of this ideal is gentle because diffused, its life is subdued because all-embracing. It is serene because it is great; it is meek because it is comprehensive. But our passion is narrow; its limited field gives in an intensity of impulse. Such an aggressive force of greed has of late possessed the western mind. This has happened within a very short period, and has created a sudden deluge of things smothering all time and space over the earth (Tagore 2002: 133).

Then Tagore cautioned the Chinese audience, ‘I am sure you know that this soulless progeny of greed has already opened its elastic jaws wide over the fair limb of your country, wider perhaps than in any other part of the world’ (ibid. 138). The spirituality of Asian civilizations was accentuated by the Japanese pan-Asianist, Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzo), a sworn friend of Tagore and a curator of the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, the United States. He commenced the first chapter of The Ideals of the East with a resounding statement.

Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilisations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life (Okakura 1903: 1).

Here, China and India are regarded as the core civilizations of Asia, though Okakura’s contempt for ‘maritime peoples’ sounds somewhat strange because his own Japanese people as well as Southeast Asian and other coastal peoples in Asia are also exemplary ‘maritime’ peoples with dynamic polytheistic cultures akin to the ancient Greek culture. Still, in the early 20th century, the idea of pan-Asianism was shared among a number of East Asian key intellectuals including Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1924, the same year as Tagore visited China, Sun Yat-sen delivered a passionate lecture on pan-Asianism in Kobe, Japan.

Now, what is the problem that underlies Pan-Asianism, the Principle of Greater Asia, which we are discussing here to-day? Briefly, it is a cultural problem, a problem of comparison and conflict between the Oriental and Occidental culture and civilization. Oriental civilization is the rule of Right; Occidental civilization is the rule of Might. The rule of Right respects benevolence and virtue, while the rule of Might only respects force and utilitarianism. The rule of Right always influences people with justice and reason, while the rule of Might always oppresses people with brute force and military measures (Sun 1924).

At the end of his speech, Sun defied the Japanese audience to choose between ‘the hawk of the Western civilization’ and ‘the tower of strength of the Orient’, a question that could be potentially posed to any ‘successful’ nation in Asia. Japan eventually plunged into the destructive war with its neighbours, Korea, China, the Pacific and the Western Allies, as the chimeral imperial power in the Far Eastern front of the World War II.

Given the history of trans-Atlantic slave trade as well as the depth and length of the Western colonial domination in Africa, the discourse of pan-Africanism was more abundant and articulate than that of pan-Asianism, making meticulous citations almost redundant. The Pan-African Conference was held in London in 1990, then the First Pan-African Congress was organized by W.E.B. Du Bois in Paris in 1919, followed by a series of Congresses that took place in various parts of Western Europe and North America.
in the 1920s. A galaxy of major advocates of pan-Africanism includes Marcus Garvey, C.L.R. James and George Padmore. Though often misunderstood as a banal humanist due to out-of-context translation of a part of his poem from French to English, the Martinican poet, Aimé Césaire, eloquently denounced the evil of colonialism and Euro-centrism in 1955, the very year of Bandung.

I note (…) that colonial enterprise is to the modern world what Roman imperialism was to the ancient world: the prelude to Disaster and the forerunner of Catastrophe. Come, now! The Indians massacred, the Moslem world drained of itself, the Chinese world defiled and perverted for a good century; the Negro world disqualified; mighty voices stilled forever; homes scattered to the wind; all this wreckage, all this waste, humanity reduced to a monologue, and you think all that does not have its price? The truth is that this policy cannot but bring about the ruin of Europe itself, and that Europe, if it is not careful, will perish from the void it has created around itself (Césaire 1972: 75. Italics in original).

While the Bandung Conference was attended by only 6 African states, 34 states became independent from 1956 to 1965 and 11 more from 1966 to 1975. The gravity of pan-Africanism shifted from the African diaspora world to the continent, and the Caribbean pan-Africanist thinkers like George Padmore and W.A. Lewis crossed the Atlantic and served as the advisors of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Compared to East Asia where the Cold War confrontation was so manifest in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, there was room for Africa to manoeuvre for better positions through the Non-Alignment Movement. President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, attempted to construct an ‘imagined community’ of village-based Ujamaa (family-like solidarity), partly inspired by the philosophy of self-reliance in Maoist China.  

‘UJAMAA’, then, or ‘familyhood’, describes our Socialism. It is opposed to Capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the Exploitation of Man by Man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire Socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of Inevitable Conflict between Man and Man. We, in Africa, have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past – in the traditional society which produced us (Nyerere 1962).

The pan-African thought nurtured by Africans both in the diaspora world and on the continent was synthesized by Steve Biko who advocated Black Consciousness in apartheid South Africa. Inspired by the writings of Frantz Fanon, Sékou Touré, Kenneth Kaunda, Robert Sobukwe and other pan-Africanist thinkers as well as the Hegelian master-servant dialectic, Biko lucidly argued that African humanity would make an immense contribution to the world. He was tortured and killed at the age of thirty.

We reject the power-based society of the Westerner that seems to be ever concerned with perfecting their technological know-how while losing out on their spiritual dimension. We believe that in the long run the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of human relationship. The great power of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face (Biko 1978: 46-7).

Based on a dichotomy between the West and ‘us’, those pan-nationalist figures of Afrasia exalted a culture and collective dignity of their own, denouncing the connivance of nationalism and militarism, and dreamt a contribution of the particular to the universal, or bring an alternative humanistic frame of the universal. In the latter half of the 20th century, pan-nationalist aspirations became more pressing as the liberation wars in Algeria and Vietnam were getting fierce and conclusive.

However, in spite of the concurrence and strong resonance of voices, there was not much literature in which the aspirations of pan-nationalism in Asia and Africa were expressed as the single agency, except for a handful of political tracts written under the influence of Marxism. The role of Islam, which was born in the 7th century after Judaism and Christianity in the knot of Afrasia and then permeated much of the southern part of Asia as well as the northern part of Africa, has not been discussed explicitly in the framework of Afrasian politics either.  

Although it is undeniable that the spirit of Bandung embraced

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4 Though widely respected by Tanzanians as Mwalimu (teacher), Nyerere failed to capture the Tanzanian peasantry and rally them in the national socialist cause of Ujamaa (Hyden 1980).

5 The role of secular pan-Arabism is also beyond the reach of the present discussion. As for an attempt to revitalize the
both pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism, the group of Bandung was no more than a coalition of newly independent nation-states. The political leaders of post-independent Afrasia were therefore expected to fulfil the roles of benign ‘teachers’ to guide their peoples within the cages of new sovereign nations (Chakrabarty 2010a).

3. Beyond the Reversal of Centre-Periphery Relations

It is Arnold Toynbee who coined the term, Afrasia, which signified nomadic grasslands that used to stretch ‘from Arabian across North Africa’, where the Sumerian and Egyptian Civilizations were born as responses to gradual desiccation (Toynbee 1987: 57-8, 68-74). For Toynbee, Afrasia was the space that connected Africa and Asia, today’s Middle East that served as a cradle of civilization, in which geographic cores of Africa and Asia were excluded as its hinterlands. More recently, Jared Diamond (1997) argued that the vast west-east stretch of the temperate zone in the Eurasian continent gave rise to the economic development of Western Europe at the western end of the axis, while the diversity of ecological zones hampered the development of Africa due to the lack of economy of scale. However, Diamond paid very little attention to the emergence of economic centres at the eastern end of the Eurasian axis; China lost its ‘technological lead’ after all. In his thesis, the historical experience of Eastern Asia in parallel with Western Europe was sidelined, and the major part of Africa was characterized principally by its inaccessibility. The powerful nomadic civilization in Central Asia that connected the both ends of Eurasia also vanished from the scene.

In terms of geographic space, the recent key literature in economic history puts a fresh focus on the holistic connectivity of Eurasian, rather than Afrasian, paths of economic development. The position of Asia, especially China, in the single world system was elucidated by Andre Gunder Frank in ReOrient (1998) and by Kenneth Pomeranz in The Great Divergence (2000). In terms of material wealth, according to these works, the Asian economy had at least kept on par with its European counterpart until the 18th century (or the 19th century depending on authors and their definitions), and the European economy started to emerge, or diverge, only since then. The rise of Europe was made possible not by the capitalist properties rooted in European history, parallels with which had been also developed in Asian history in terms of norms, institutions, technology and economic structure, but only through Europe’s monopolistic control of the silver flow from Latin America, as well as the benefit Europe received from the coercive trans-Atlantic slave trade. According to Frank, the entire world order had been Sinocentric from 1400 to 1800 with the great exporter, China, functioning as the final ‘sink’ of the world’s silver, while Pomeranz stressed that parts of Western Europe and Eastern Asia revealed ‘surprising resemblances’ before the great divergence, and urged economic historians to engage in ‘reciprocal comparisons’.

From this long-term viewpoint, the gravity of economic development is now decisively shifting to the East, pushing China and other Asian nations back to their original predominant positions in the world economy. Giovanni Arrighi argued that China and East Asian nations had followed a Smithean ‘natural’ path of economic development based on inclusive market expansion, while North Atlantic nations had taken an ‘unnatural’ path of development driven by foreign trade and buttressed by military power. In today’s East Asia, the Smithian path manifests its original strength (Arrighi 2007). In parallel, the North Atlantic capital-intensive path of ‘industrial revolution’ is contrasted with the East Asian labour-intensive path of ‘industrious revolution’, and the implications of this dual-path model to other regions, especially Africa where land was abundant while labour and capital were scarce, is vigorously discussed (Sugihara 2003; Austin and Sugihara eds. 2013).

With the reemergence of Asia, Sinocentric international relations are being restored, and China is expected to play a major role as a ‘responsible great power’, responsible not only for the entire world


6 There have been Asian and African attempts of claiming the ownership of the motherland of monotheistic religions. Sun Yat-sen’s statement that ‘even the ancient civilizations of the West, of Greece and Rome, had their origins on Asiatic soil (Sun 1924)’ is correct as long as the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea belongs to West Asia. On the other hand, Cheik Anta Diop (1974) emphasized the African origin of the Egyptian civilization.
including the West but also for the rest of Afrasia, including sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, not as a void of history but as distinctive sub-regions with their own economy and institutions. As the North Atlantic powers gradually retreat from Asia, the question of the Western domination that great pan-nationalists confronted is dissipating, and the peoples of Afrasia are now obliged to address a possible bifurcation of development and underdevelopment within their own region. The exercise of mainstreaming the experience of the ‘periphery’ of Afrasia will contribute to recasting the meaning of freedom.

In land-abundant and labour-scarce societies, in abstract terms, political systems tend to be centrifugal and farming methods tend to be extensive. In such conditions, unlike land-scarce and labour-abundant societies, it is meaningless to mobilize labour for collective development because surplus labour does not exist in permanent forms. African pre-colonial societies were characterized by high mobility of people in unoccupied, boundless land; in case of conflict and natural calamities, groups of disgruntled people were pushed out of established polities into sparsely-populated frontiers as ‘institutional vacuum’ and formed new settlements, which eventually grew into new chiefdoms and kingdoms, and the dynamic process of fission and fusion was repeated. The ubiquity of this ‘frontier tradition’ is supposed to have formed a pan-African political culture (Kopytoff ed. 1987). In Southeast Asia, the power of kings and lords was also limited, because in this part of the world ‘where land was abundant, buildings impermanent, and property insecure, it was in followers that power and wealth were primarily expressed’ (Reid 1988: 120).

However, no condition is permanent. For example, in the process of land dispossession and apartheid social engineering in the 20th century, people in South Africa started to face acute land shortage and structural unemployment across cities and the countryside. ‘Southern Africans began to suffer the land-scarce family poverty long predominant in more densely peopled continents’ (Iliffe 1987: 260). A rapid demographic change in decades is certainly expected to change the patterns of factor endowments and affect the modality of political, economic and social institutions. Sooner or later, the population growth and land grabbing on the African landmass will oblige people on this continent to face developmental challenges similar to those in labour-abundant India and China. If African countries invest sufficiently in health and education, the principal components of human development, however, labour supply will improve in quantity and quality, thereby paving the way for labour-intensive industrialization in Africa (Austin 2013).

Although a rapid population increase in relatively labour-scarce economy can be a blessing in disguise, it must also be remembered that institutions have a force of inertia. Institutional norms and practices in a given nation may change in a relatively short time, but once established, they tend to stay constant, resist change and determine long-term paths of development of economy and society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Therefore, ‘Africa had land-rich cultural traditions even where land was scarce’ (Iliffe 2007: 4). However, there can be a reverse situation: a centrifugal statecraft developed in a land-scarce situation is superimposed on a centrifugal land-abundant society. The following is the famous characterization of Southeast Asian plural society by J.S. Furnivall.

In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples – European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit (Furnivall 1948: 304).

In this citation, Furnivall honestly noted that he was a ‘visitor’; local people may have interacted with each other in ways unnoticed by outsiders. Still, at least, they did not want to work together for the colonial rule at the time. The founder of social anthropology, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, characterized the ‘composite society’ in colonial Africa, most typically in South Africa, in almost the same way as Furnivall’s (Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 202). Then, what would happen if the European segment lost power in colonial plural society? The Fabian socialist colonial officer, Furnivall, argued that Southeast Asian nations should grapple with the challenge of ‘reintegration’ in order to get prepared to future independence. It is in this context that the ‘imagined communities’ as specific cultural artefacts were constructed with zeal in colonial and post-colonial Afrasia (Anderson 1983).
The lack of people’s unity in the colonial states imposed from above was related to the nature of political organizations in a large part of pre-colonial society in Afrasia. Based on his exit-voice model, A.O. Hirschman elucidated the internal logic of constant fission and fusion in land-abundant and labour-scarce societies as in the case of African frontier societies discussed by Kopytoff. In such conditions, the principle of ‘voting with one’s feet’ prevails like in the idealized market economy, where a customer is totally free to switch from one trader to another. However, the mobile societies of the Nuer, Central African peoples, the Khoisan and the Mbuti pygmy in sparsely-populated Africa, as well as of the Nambikwara of Central Brazil, succumbed to ‘the perhaps less efficient but more powerful societies – exitless and endowed with a centralized political organization – that arose elsewhere’ (Hirschman 1978: 96).7

Historical high mobility of people is observed not only among continental Africans but also maritime and mountain peoples in East and Southeast Asia. It is well known that the widespread tributary networks centring China greatly contributed to the rise of the East Asian economy before and after the Western colonization. While Chinese expatriate merchants and their communities scattered across East and Southeast Asia, their regional movement was largely autonomous, being motivated by trading opportunities rather than unilaterally dictated by the will of the successive central governments of China (Hamashita 2008). Regarding the mountain peoples, stateless forms of self-government were deliberately chosen by the locals in a vast highland zone of Southeast Asia called Zomia, and it is argued that this ‘anarchical’ governance was not a residual trait of primitive societies but the manifestations of the agency of people who tried to escape from the authority of the lowlands (Scott 2009). The propensity toward power dispersal in land-abundant society in Afrasia seems to affect the organizational ways of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU), which have gradually formed consensus-based political communities without creating pariah members.

Ester Boserup, the development economist famous for her theory of population and agricultural development pointed out that women in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia participated fully in shifting agriculture as well as trade activities in cities (Boserup 1970). Extensive agriculture, which was a reasonable method of farming in land-abundant society but is considered a bottleneck of development and productivity rise in agriculture, seems to have functioned as institutions conducive to relative freedom of one half of population: women. Along this line, Amartya Sen demonstrated that a great number of women were ‘missing’ in the world. As women tend to outlive men biologically, the female-male ratio (FMR) should be more than one. In reality, however, the FMR is less than one in many countries in South, East and West Asia as well as North Africa, in contrast with those in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia where women enjoy relative longevity, not least due to their engagement in economic activities outside home. If the FRM in sub-Saharan Africa is considered a benchmark, we can calculate the ‘deficit’ of women in other regions, which amount to 100 million in total (Sen 1990).8 They are missing mainly due to the structural neglect of women, selective abortion and even female infanticide.

A reversal of global history heralded by the resurgence of Asia may lead to a bifurcation of Asia and Africa. While the rise of European capitalism was financed by uncompensated extraction of silver and exploitation of African slaves in the Americas, the economic expansion of China, Japan, the Asian NIEs as well as India is currently financed by the industrial inputs including crude oil and other natural resources from Africa. Whether the present patterns of trade boils down to an intra-Afrasian return of macroparasite (McNeill 1976) or the realization of a new equitable global economic order largely depends on the stability of the world price of primary commodities. In the 1970s, there was a limited scheme to stabilize export earnings of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries operated by the European Commission, but the voice calling for a global mechanism has lost its momentum due to the breakup of the ‘South’. If the growth of global economy slows down, export-oriented African economies may suffer a devastating blow, while industrialized countries are forced to adjust their already diversified economies. The principle of equal sovereignty, reciprocity and mutual benefit confirmed repeatedly in Bandung will have to go through a serious trial if a global economic crisis should occur.

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7 The fact that property inheritance is less significant in land-abundant societies highlights a conceptual problem in applying the Weberian notion of patrimonialism to the analysis of undemocratic states in contemporary Africa. Alternative explanations are required.

8 If we recalculate the missing women based on the UN 20** population estimation, the number approached nearly ** million in 20**. The FMR of sub-Saharan Africa was ***, while those of China, India, and Southeast Asia were **, **, and ** respectively. <to be calculated based on the 2015 revision>
Conclusion

Clifford Geertz described the nature of Bali’s political institution like this: ‘The political development of precolonial Indonesia does not consist of a relentless unfoldment of a monolithic “Oriental despotism”, but of an expanding cloud of localized, fragile, loosely interrelated petty principalities’ (Geertz 1980: 4). The democracy of ‘voting with one’s feet’ in smaller communities in Africa and Southeast Asia may function as an antidote to the traditional authorities of big nations in Afrasia. However, at the same time, it must be remembered that the great pan-nationalists in East and South Asia, Africa and the African diaspora world opposed the ‘rule of Might’ and military nationalism, advocated wider regional, multilateral frameworks that would accommodate aspirations of both big and small nations, and envisioned the contribution of the particular to the universal. If we return to the supreme writings and eloquent speeches produced by pan-Asianists and pan-Africanists in the 20th-century, an Afrasian unity in diversity seems to be promising without being preoccupied with ‘an elite-driven and politically motivated exercise’ too much.

In the first section of this paper, we envisaged a future world in which Asians and Africans would form an 80 percent majority. While the population theories of Malthus (1985) and Boserup (1965) are often contrasted as the extremes of pessimism and optimism, these two perspectives seem to complement each other in that the former makes much of the long-term constraints of resource scarcity, while the latter sheds light upon the possibility of short-term innovative responses to population crises, the accumulated effects of which eventually make difference. Capacity development, the enhancement of problem-solving abilities of communities, is the sine qua non to address the structural problems such as youth unemployment, aging, deteriorating environment and other pressing issues concomitant with the global population transition. The ideal of Sarvodaya propounded by Mohandas Gandhi (1954) and the concept of intermediate technology presented by E.F. Schumacher (1973) should be revisited, and methods of successful small experiments should be adapted to other conditions and scaled up. University institutions in Afrasia are expected to play significant roles as the sites of innovation, reproduction and diffusion of knowledge to cope with the historic transition.

This paper has not discussed much about challenges faced by the world outside Afrasia. The joint point of Afrasia, the Middle-East, anguishes in the vortex of wars ignited by the onslaught of military nationalism of the West, which the great pan-nationalists of Afrasia should have unanimously condemned. Restoration of peace in the knot of Afrasia is the precondition for eternal peace of the whole human race. The binding frame of Afrasia was justified by the common history of decolonization in the 20th century; the pan-nationalist aspirations of Asians and Africans were always expressed in relation to the West, with underlying affections of love and hate, in the hope of embracing a provincialized Europe (Chakrabarty 2010b). In today’s Afrasia, the major challenge is to find workable ways to realize coexistence of diverse, big and small nations within the broad region by taking local dynamics and people’s everyday encounters fully into account.

Finally, where is the natural place for the Americas outside the historical-political nexus of Euro-Afrasia? In the societal dimension, the Americas are characterized by creolization between indigenous peoples and the diasporas of the African, Asian as well as European origins. In this particular aspect, the Americas may stay one step ahead of Afrasia in terms of diversity of population, as well as their capabilities to accommodate conflicting needs and aspirations of their own people, provisioning an image of a united world in the future.

References


Figure 1: Projection of Population Growth by Region

Source: UN <to be updated based on the 2015 Revision>

Figure 3: Evolution of the total fertility rate by world region: 1950-2050 Source: UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision; the data after 2010, with dotted lines, are medium variant projections

Figure 2: Projection of Fertility Change by Region

Source: UN <to be updated>
Japan and Africa, East Asia and Africa

Katsumi Hirano

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Two types of developing economies

In broad categorization, two types of economies with different development paths can be observed in developing area (Figure 1). One group is non-East Asian countries mainly composed of natural resources exporters, which GDPs have been fluctuating along with natural resources prices (Figure 2). Another group is found exclusively in the East Asian region that is composed of manufacturing exporters emerging from the 1970s (Figure 3). Both groups now respectively occupy around 20 percent of the world total production.

Economic development of the East Asian countries is termed ‘export-oriented industrialization’. Each economy in that region was not developed separately but done in comprising regional value chains, and increased export one after another which shape is called ‘flying geese formation’ (Figure 4). Export-oriented industrialization was incarnated in China after the 1980s. China used to be one of the biggest exporters of natural resources in Asia, but now the biggest importer in the world. Not only Chinese but also other East Asian manufacturers must find any resources supplier outside Asia, because China and other Asian resources-endowed countries incremented their domestic demand of resources for their own manufacturing sectors. In the result, both developing’s groups are strongly combined each other through enhancing trade. In these circumstances, China inaugurated a new set of Africa policies at the turn of the century with its priority on resource procurement.

At the end of resource boom around 2013, China’s Africa policy has changed. Its main target seemingly shifted from resource procurement to infrastructure building and manufacturing transfer. In this regard, the comparison with Japan’s ‘economic cooperation policy’ during the 1960s and 1980s will provide noticeable implications. Japan implemented that policy toward the Southeast Asian countries and accelerated manufacturing transfer through active foreign direct investment (FDI) especially after 1985 Plaza Agreement that appreciated Japanese yen very much. That sort of FDI movement was followed by Newly Industrialized Economies (NIES), namely, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. That development paved the way to the establishment of the integrated regional economy with expanding value-chains in Asia.

Japan and Africa

Africa used to be a rather big counterpart for Japan’s trade (Figure 5), but its shares in Japanese export and import were gradually decreasing to less than 2 percent of its total trade. The main items of Japanese trade with Africa are platinum import, automobile export, and fuel import (Figure 6). Platinum, being indispensable input for automobile manufacturing as catalyst to purify exhausting

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gas, had been the mainstay of Japan’s import from Africa. On export side, vehicles have been the biggest components by far, which occupy more than 40 percent of the total Japanese export to Africa. That is to say, the trade between Japan and Africa has been sustained by the automobile industry. Therefore Japan’s trade inevitably concentrates in South Africa, which country has 90 percent of global platinum reserve and the biggest market of vehicles in the continent.

After Fukushima disaster, namely, serious accident in Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant hit by Tsunami during 2011 Great Earthquake, Japan faces with a new requirement in energy security. In order to activate all capacities of thermal power production, Japan increased fuel import especially natural gas from all over the world including Africa. Japan depended around 7 percent of natural gas supply on Africa in 2014, mainly from Nigeria.

Platinum mines in South Africa and natural gas fields in Nigeria are not stable production sites by respective reasons. Japan will have to consider how to commit those in the near future.

Japan now faces with particular challenges, that is, to handle with nuclear disastrous accident and rebuild energy system, to find a way for peaceful coexistence with expanding audacious China, and to adapt to demographic onus economically and socially. Japan enjoyed considerable demographic bonus in the 1960s, which accelerated economic growth in those years. However, huge demographic bonus should be followed by huge onus that has brought rapid decreasing labor force component and also total population from the 1990s. China and South Korea that enjoyed bigger demographic bonus than Japan seem to have entered onus phase from the 2010s at faster speed than in Japan (Figure 7). If same phenomena happen in China and South Korea as in Japan, the East Asia region as a whole will lose growth potential in a considerable extent.

East Asia and Africa in Food Security

Figure 8 shows cereal import of East Asia and Africa. Japan has historically been the biggest cereal importer in the world with only temporal exception of the Soviet Union. However, the sum-up import volume of sub-Saharan African countries surpassed Japan’s one in 2002. Cereal import of total Africa including North African countries also surpassed the East Asian total in the same year. While East Asian import volume seems rather stable, African import is steadily increasing at the almost same pace of its urbanization. It is because Africa’s agriculture cannot feed urban population fully.

East Asia is the region of the heaviest population density in the world (Table 1). Paddy rice with flood-irrigation system, commonly observed in East Asia, brought about good capacity to afford huge population. But, despite of self-sufficiency of rice, the East Asian region does not have enough land to yield feeder cereal for their meat consumption that is growing along with income increase. East Asia’s dependency of cereal can be said inevitable due to its heavy population density or severe land limitation.

The case in Africa is quite different. Almost all of the sub-Saharan African countries have been pushed into food cereal dependency in spite of that more than half of their labor force still engaged in the agriculture sector, of which majority part is still food production for domestic use. The urbanization rate of sub-Saharan Africa is now around 40 percent, and food cereal dependency rate is estimated about 20 percent. That is to say, African agriculture with 60 percent labor force can feed only 80 percent of the total population. Considering that 1 percent labor force is enough to grow good volume of staple cereals to sustain total nation in developed countries, the productivity of food cereal in sub-Saharan Africa is incredibly low. As Table 1 indicates, sub-Saharan Africa is the only one region in the world that cannot yield enough food despite of endowment of adequate land.
The global cereal market is based on supplies mainly from North and South America, Europe, and Australia; that supplied volume is imported mainly by East Asia and Africa. The biggest threat for food security of East Asia is continuous increase of cereal import in Africa. In order to alleviate this threat, it will be required for the East Asian countries to assist Africa to approach food self-sufficiency.

**Agriculture and industrialization**

Less development of agriculture and low productivity of food production is the rudiment of poverty, but also functions to prevent industrialization. Low productivity generally brings high price of product and food production as well (Table 2), and then high price of food brings relatively high wage. Therefore, generally speaking, the wage levels of the manufacturing sectors in sub-Saharan African countries are higher than in Asian counterparts (Table 3).

Japan initiated agricultural modernization from the 1880s. Asian countries experienced Green Revolution from the 1960s and China developed hybrid rice technology from the 1970s. All these efforts approximately tripled food productivity in the result of creating comparative advantage in labor and prepared industrialization.

It is widely said, and also Chinese people may think that economic circumstances in Africa are not suitable for manufacturing in various aspects, namely, power supply shortage, insufficient infrastructure, poor governance, and others. Above all, high production cost including labor should be the most crucial barrier.

**Future of the relation between East Asia and Africa**

China has the biggest reserve of various natural resources in Asia, but now Japan, and South Korea too, cannot rely any natural resource on China. On the contrary, they must procure natural resources competing with China. China is now the biggest importer of almost all varieties of resources in the world, and the biggest trade partner for Africa whose export is sustained mostly by natural resources. Africa’s trade will be dominated by China in the foreseeable future, not again by Europe. Europe-dominate regime in Africa was over.

However, China’s interest in Africa seems to shift from resource procurement to infrastructure building and manufacturing transfer. President Xi Jinping repeated that Chinese manufacturers would soon lose competitiveness due to its rapid wage increase. If China holds a sort of idea like Japan in the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa may be put as one of the targets for production transfer of Chinese domestic manufacturing. Infrastructure building is indispensable for that purpose. But, as mentioned before, one of the most important prerequisites for African countries to invite such Chinese investment will be agricultural development, especially food production, in order to get comparative advantage in labor. If sub-Saharan Africa cannot realize food production increase, the era of global development after World War II might come to the end at the last frontier in Asia, namely, CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) without visiting the Africa continent.

Manufacturing transfer and agricultural development; both challenges are most crucial for development and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only China but also East Asians have a good reason to support these challenges in Africa. If so, will Japan assist Chinese efforts in Africa? Can we expect any collective form of partnership between East Asia and Africa comes in? East Asians’ own task in my thought is to cope with combative nationalism in order to fulfill true interest of East Asians and Africans.
Figure 1. GDPs’ shares of two groups of developing economies in the world total production

Source: UN, Taiwan National Statistics.

Figure 2. Non-East Asian developing economies’ shares in the world total production and the movement of deflated (base year 2000) oil prices

Source: UN Statistics, UNCTADstat.
Figure 3. Shares in the world manufacturing production: OECD countries, East Asian developing economies and non-East Asian developing economies

Source: UN Statistics.

Figure 4. Shares in the world total export: Japan, NIES, ASEAN and China

Source: UN Statistics, Taiwan National Statistics.
Figure 5. Africa’s shares in the export and import of Japan

Source: Japan Tariff Association.

Figure 6. Main items of the trade between Japan and Africa

Figure 7. Demographic bonus and onus: Japan, China and South Korea


Figure 8. Cereal import of Asia and Africa

Source: FAOSTAT.
Table 1. Shares of population and arable land of various regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population share</th>
<th>Arable land share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>&gt; 8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>&gt; 15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
<td>3.3% ≃ 2.8%</td>
<td>≃ 2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5.0% ≪ 15.0%</td>
<td>≪ 15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>5.7% ≪ 8.2%</td>
<td>≪ 8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Europe</td>
<td>4.3% ≪ 14.1%</td>
<td>≪ 14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Europe</td>
<td>2.8% ≫ 2.5%</td>
<td>≫ 2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>0.5% ≪ 3.5%</td>
<td>≪ 3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>3.0% ≫ 3.1%</td>
<td>≫ 3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>≪ 13.1%</td>
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Source: FAOSTAT.

Table 2. Price indices of cereal and meat of various regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Price index of cereals]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Price index of meats]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>7.32</td>
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Source: ILO Statistics.
Table 3. Average wages of the manufacturing sectors in various countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average wages</th>
<th>Per capital GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12,680</td>
<td>5,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4,832</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,012</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,853</td>
<td>3,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,233</td>
<td>3,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>1,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12,044</td>
<td>16,966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNIDO Statistics.
The Discourse of Japanese Development Assistance and the Scaling-up of Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) in Ghana

Kweku Ampiah
University of Leeds

Introduction

This research concerns Japan’s role in the development initiatives of Ghana. Specifically, it examines JICA’s contribution to the Community-based Health Planning Services (CHPS) project in the Upper West region of Ghana. CHPS is conceived as ‘the mobilization of community leadership, decision-making systems and resources in a defined catchment area (termed a ‘zone’) to provide services according to the principles of primary health care (Awonoor-Williams et. al., 2013) through Community Health Officers (CHO) as frontline health workers. Essentially, the project is about strengthening the administrative capacity for health delivery in the Upper West region.

More broadly, the CHPS is part of the Ghanaian government’s national programme ‘to bridge the gap’ in access to decent healthcare in Ghana. As such, although the project is community-based and oriented in its operations, it is in fact an initiative under the authorial control of the State, and in principle orchestrated by the Ghana Health Services (GHS). It is identified by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) as a key component of the national drive to deliver health services to the poor. As would be discussed in the wider context of administrative control (Michel Foucault, 1973) the initiative encompasses a dual body of inspectors: the policy-makers with authority over the practice of medicine and its socio-economic utility, and an external body that disburses economic assistance towards the project, JICA.

The study is not about diagnostically assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the project, nor is it about finding out whether as a form of primary health care the CHPS is effective or not. Rather it attempts to map out Japan’s role in it, and to evaluate the particular forms of contribution JICA made to the project’s planning and implementation, and how this might have impacted on the administration of health delivery in Ghana. Essentially, the study underscores the role of the State in development; crucially it shows Japan’s historical emphasis on the State’s role in economic development, and consequently implicitly challenges the determined policy attitude of the neo-liberals to deny the State its role in international development.

Two interrelated insights might be gleaned from the emphasis on developing the capacity of the state towards health delivery:

1. Growth promotion in Ghana can only be sustained if the leading implementers of development (which, in a developing country, is the State and its institutions) have the requisite administrative and technical (institutional) qualities to do so.

2. Japanese aid policy-makers are attentive to the development policies pursued by the traditional partners of the African countries (including institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank), and where appropriate they would interrogate them.

The research for the project involved a visit to the project-site in the Upper West Region in Ghana in 2009, and interviews with the country’s health officials and policy-makers. Extensive consultations with JICA officials, both in Ghana and Tokyo, have also contributed to the research. Suffice to say, I have followed the project since its inception in 2006.
The inception of the Community-based Health Planning Services

Decades of failed health policies, techniques and infrastructure of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) necessitated the implementation of the CHPS, which was initiated in 1994 by reorienting and relocating primary health care from sub-district health centres to community locations. Effectively, CHPS was designed to counteract poor attendance at the Outpatient Department (OPD), high maternal mortality, child mortality and morbidity. The project was also conceived in response to the awareness that ‘there was no community participation in health decision making’. Consequently CHPS is seen as providing the ‘vehicle to deliver … community level service by engaging communities to take decisions concerning their own health, and recognize that the primary producers of health are the individuals within the household—especially mothers’.

The initiative revolves around a Community Health Officer (CHO) who serves designated areas (CHPS Zones) in very deprived rural areas. The CHO is a full-time professional nurse employed by the GHS, retrained and relocated from a national health institution to a particular district as resident paramedic. As a community-based frontline health worker, the CHO undergoes a pre-service training of two years, including a structured 14 module, two-week in-service training, which includes family planning (FP), antenatal care (ANC), postnatal care (PNC), infant care, and nutrition training. The CHOs are trained in groups of 20-30 mostly by means of group discussions, demonstrations and field visits (Stephen Ntsua et al., 2012). Also armed with community organisational skills especially in their dealings with Community Health Volunteers (CHV), the CHOs go about their duties often on motorbikes, which they are supplied with and trained to operate to:

1. Visit households;
2. Organise community health services, and
3. Conduct Community Health Clinics

The CHO is in the main entrusted with the responsibility to deliver preventive care, including reproductive health service, but also trained to deliver curative care in some cases.

Following training the CHO is technically qualified to provide both health post-based and doorstep services as follows:

1. Integrated management of childhood illness (treatment of malaria and febrile acute respiratory infection with antibiotics), management of diarrheal disease, and referral of complicated cases
2. Outreach organizational support for comprehensive childhood immunization
3. Antenatal care, including provision of iron folate
4. Support for uncomplicated deliveries and referral for emergencies
5. First aid for minor injuries and skin condition
6. Health promotion and education, including supervisory support for Community Health Volunteers (CHV)
7. Family planning counselling and services (oral contraception, condom distribution, and injectable contraception), and referral for long-acting methods
8. Management of contraceptive side effects and referral, as needed

But the success of the service is also dependent on the volunteers (CHV) who are trained for five days with emphasis on practical activities complemented with lectures, group work, and demonstrations (Stephen Ntsua et al., 2012: 5), which prepare them for responsibilities including, conducting disease surveillance and identifying cases, as well as providing condoms and family planning information. The
The key component of CHPS is health delivery at the community level through partnership between health administrators and the community, including households and community leaders and social groups. Its overall goal is to improve the health status of those living in Ghana "by facilitating actions and empowerment at household and community levels. The initiative is projected to achieve the following crucial objectives”

1. Improve access to service
2. Improve efficiency and responsiveness to client needs
3. Develop effective inter-sectoral collaboration

In terms of stages of development the planning process first identifies areas in districts with poor healthcare accessibility; the space for a nurse is identified along with a designated area for the construction of a Community Health Compound (CHC), which is referred to as a CHPS’ zone. The District Health Management Team (DHMT) then formally announces the project to the traditional leaders of the community and the community at large at a public reception.

The CHPS initiative involves six implementation activities referred to as the six CHPS milestones, which are Planning, Community Entry, Community Health Compound Construction, Community Health Officer, Essential Equipment and Volunteers, suggesting some order in terms of ‘stages of development’ (Binka et. al., 2009). However it was found that in some case ‘completing Community Health Compounds construction/innovation [was] more widespread than community entry’, although ‘financial resources required for construction are far greater than resources required for community diplomacy’ (Nyonator et. al., 2005: 31). Community entry (Nyonator, et.al., 2005: 27) as a diplomatic initiative is about creating the proper environment to enable the community to become receptive to the new (and potentially intruding) phenomenon in their lives, which involves negotiation with community leaders and members, culminating in social events designed to further bond the relevant stakeholders together in initiative.

The implementing agencies of the CHPS project are: The Ministry of Health (MOH), which notionally serves as the overarching body in charge of the initiative; the Ghana Health Service (GHS), and Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Department (PPMED). More directly involved in the project are the Regional Health Management Teams (RHMTs), and the District Health Management Teams (DHMTs), who are in charge of each pilot district. The operational mandate of the latter essentially concerns making CHPS functional, in additional to scaling up its implementation.

Overall, the indicators show that CHPS has made a huge contribution in improving health care delivery in Ghana, reducing under-five mortality from 108 per 1000 live births to 80 from 1998 to 2008, along with a reduction in maternal mortality (Stephen Ntsua et. al., 2012: 7-8), as well as a decline in total fertility rate from 4.6 children per woman to 4.0. However, the system is flawed at several levels, perforated with weaknesses within the system in part because of lack of resources and weak administrative capacity. For example, from the national to the sub-district levels, ‘no administrator work[ed] full-time on CHPS, which creates the impression of a lack of commitment and support’ for the project (Ntsua, 2012: 12), despite policy-makers’ claims that ‘there is political will from all angles to sustain the CHPS concept (Republic of Ghana, 2010, Annex, 7: 45), and the self-serving pronouncement that ‘African countries are looking up to the Ghana strategy for possible replication’ (Republic of Ghana, 20107: 46). And while CHPS revolve essentially around home visits by CHO, with the expectation that the latter would ‘conduct at least 10 home visits each day for preventive health education’, they instead conduced, on average, one home visit per week’ (Ntsua, 2012: 5), which means ‘they are shifting attention to static service provision’ and therefore undermining the essence of the project. This has had the effect of fragmenting the work of the CHVs because they seem to have lost contact with the CHO (Ntsua, 2012: 8). These problems may be partly to do with lack of funds and other relevant planning resources, as a result of which the Government of Ghana made appeals to the international partners to contribute to the initiative.
Japan and the CHPS project in the Upper West Region of Ghana

As the figures below graphically demonstrate health indicators for the Upper West Region lagged far behind those of the other regions of Ghana and therefore needed desperate intervention. Based on a request from the Government of Ghana the Government of Japan agreed to support ‘The Project for the Scaling-up of CHPS Implementation in the Upper West Region’, targeting one of the most deprived regions in Ghana. Negotiations between the two governments were concluded in December 2005 following an on-site preparatory study by a Japanese team in November 2004, and an assessment in May 2005 of the grant aid, technical support and Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers’ (JOCV) involvement. The project was launched in March 2006 under the cooperation of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Ghana Health Service (GHS), and the Ministry of Health (MoH), Ghana, and completed in February 2010, with a project cost of approximately at Y500 mn (approximately US$4,043,549).

The responsibilities of key stakeholders in the project were noted as follows:

1. As Coordinator of the project the GHS would monitor and evaluate the project implementation together with JICA.

2. The Director of the project was the Director General of the GHS who was technically in charge of the overall administration and implementation of the project.

3. The regional Director of GHS in the Upper West Region served as the Project Manager and therefore was in charge of the managerial and technical matters relating to the project, which included ‘providing supervisory and facilitative support to district and sub-district teams on project planning and implementation’ (Republic of Ghana, 20107: 5).

4. JICA’s role as aid disburser automatically made its Chief Representative in Ghana chief advisor to the project;

5. The JICA Chief Representative’s primary role was to ‘make necessary recommendations and advice to the project director and manager on any matters pertaining to the implementation to the project.’

The terms of agreement between the primary stakeholders also clearly stated that the JICA team was not the implementer of the project, which in principle meant that authorial control of the project was with the GHS and its agencies in the UWR. The caveat however was that ‘all decision relating to the project activities were made by the JICA team’ (Republic of Ghana, 20107: 7), which in theory compromised the local ownership content of the project.
Rationale for JICA’s support in UWR

CHPS Activities in the Upper West Region

The main activities of the project were noted as follows:\(^1\)

1. Standardising training in health administration management;

2. Training CHO\(s\) and Community Health Nurses (CHNs);

3. Conducting situation analyses on CHPS activities and developing a supervision system

4. Conducting situation analyses and developing a guideline on referral system;

5. Conducting situation analyses on community participation and developing training materials; and

6. Disseminating good practices to other districts through training and sharing the guidelines

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\(^{1}\) JICA (Ghana Office) Internal Ex-post evaluation for Technical Cooperation Project: Scaling up of Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) Implementation in the Upper West Region, March, 2014
The primary objective of the project was to increase access to quality care through improved coverage of functional CHPS\(^2\) by strengthening ‘the institutional capacity of the GHS towards the implementation of CHPS in the Upper West region’. This was to be achieved through:

1. Capacity building for the Regional Health Management Teams (RHMTs), District Health Management Teams (DHMTs), and Sub-District Health Teams (SDHTs)
2. Capacity building for the Community Health Officers (CHO)
3. Establishing, implementing, and strengthening the **Facilitative Supervisory Visit** (FSV) (to ensure the above objectives)
4. Strengthening Community participation
5. Strengthening the referral system in CHPS in relation to the hospitals
6. Dissemination for potential replication

The FSV is explained as ‘a major component of continuous quality improvement (QI) in health services’, which ‘helps supervisors at all levels in an institution [to] focus on the needs of the staff they oversee, and to assist supervisors to consider their supervisees as their customers. The ‘approach emphasizes mentoring, joint problem solving, and two-way communication between a supervisor and those being supervised.’\(^3\)

For our purposes, it amounts to a cascading process of capacity building starting with the RHMTs who then transfer the acquired tools of engagement to the DHMTs through an elaborative system of supervision. The process continues with the next team below the bureaucratic structure, the SDHTs, right down to the CHO. This process in capacity building is indicative of the fact that these institutions ‘bear the responsibility to ensure that the primary health care service functions’ effectively (Aikins et al., 2013: 4). Nevertheless, it was also understood that the success of the project would depend on the extent of community participation (Nyonator, et. al., 2005; Aikins et. al., 2013; JICA, Final Report, 2010).

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\(^2\) According to JICA, making CHPS functional involved the actual assignment of a CHO to the community, and the implementation of home-visits by the CHO. See JICA (Ghana Office), Scaling up of Community Based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) Implementation in the Upper West Region, Internal Ex-post Evaluation for Technical Project, March 2014, http://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2012_0604668_4.pdf

Table 1

### Project Purpose and Overall Goal Achieved

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of functional CHPS Zones</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target achievement Rate (%)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

### Indicators and Achievement of Output 1 (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1 By 2015, Target number of trainee completed CHO fresher training is achieved</td>
<td>240 CHNs</td>
<td>214 CHN and 104 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 By 2015, Target number of trainee completed CHO refresher on CHOs at CHPS for ANC, emergency deliveries, and PNC training is achieved</td>
<td>270 CHOs</td>
<td>206 CHOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FSV Implementation rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target FSV</td>
<td>At the time of Terminal Evaluation (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHMT to DHMT</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHMT to SDHT</td>
<td>10.9% (2008) 56.7% (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDHT to CHO</td>
<td>7.5% (2008) 23.7% (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHO to Community Health Volunteer (CHV)</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4

**Indicators and Achievement of Output 2 (2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-2-1 Target number of trainee completed FSV training is achieved.</td>
<td>270 CHOs 195 SDHTs 110 DHMTs 27 RHMT</td>
<td>135 CHOs 252 SDHTs 61 DHMTs (FSV) 24 DHMTs (Database) 27 RHMT (FSV) 4 RHMT (Database)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2-2 Implementation rate of monitoring using the revised tools and methods of FSV is more than target rate.</td>
<td>RHMT over DHMTs 100% DHMTs over SDHTs 80% SDHTs over CHOs 50%</td>
<td>Data Collecting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The indicators above from Project Output 1 through to Indicators and Achievement of Output 2 (2) show the advancements made in the area of health provision in the Upper West Region through the CHPS initiative, especially in regards to the attempts to streamline the bureaucracy surrounding healthcare in the region. As shown in Table 1, the 24 CHO compounds in 2006 increased, based on ex-post evaluation, to 166, which was 84% of the 197 target for 2015. And as indicated in Table 2 by the latter year 214 CHNs had completed the fresher training to become CHO, out of the target 240. In addition 206 CHPS’ CHOs, out of the target 270 completed the required training for antenatal, emergency deliveries, and prenatal care. Most importantly for our purposes, there was much improvement in terms of updating and improving the administrative capabilities of the relevant personnel of the target institutions through the FSV initiative, with 252 SDHTs and 27 RHMT trainees completing the initiative by 2015. The Implementation rate for monitoring using the revised tools and methods of the FSV was equally successful with the RHMT and the DHMTs achieving more than the target, while the SDHTs and the CHOs also achieved 80% and 50% respectively by 2015. The project outcome on the whole shows that the initiative seemed to have focused on capacity building, to augment the administrative capabilities of the relevant institutions in an attempt to advance the community-based health initiative in the Upper West Region with the objective of narrowing the gap in health service provision between the region and the rest of the country, and ultimately to bring better health chances to the communities in the area.

Theoretical discussion

The above discussion is analysed within the framework of Michel Foucault’s (1980) conception of ‘disease as a political and economic problem’, which society ‘must seek to resolve as a matter of overall policy’. The problem of the sickness of the poor is framed in relation to the imperatives of labour and the needs of production (Foucault, 1980).

Michel Foucault’s works inform us about the organisation and application of knowledge to maximise power; in his analysis he articulates the operations of the institutional structures that enable the effective abilities of the state. In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault explores the historical development of the institution of medicine by critically assessing the contexts—social and institutional—that defined the role of the clinic in modern Europe. He points out, in his conception of noso-politics, that concurrent to the process of institution building was the ‘organisation of a politics of health’, which was about ‘the consideration of disease as a political and economic problem’ for society as a matter of government policy. Thus medicine as a general technique of health, even more than as service to the sick or an art of cures, increasingly assumed an important place in the administrative system and machinery of state power (Foucault, 1980). This suggests that the configuration of the technology of power behind the construction of the institution of health and medicine was fuelled as much by a scientific need to heal the sick in part because of the upsurge of interest in favour of ‘distributing the living in the domain of value and utility’ (Foucault, 1990). The indigent were cured for productive purposes, and in tandem the ‘sick poor’ were bundled up to the clinics to be relieved of their illnesses as part of the de-composition of the traditional notion of poverty (Bynum et. al., 2006).

Thus medicine as a general technique of health, even more than as a service to the sick or an art of cures, assumes an increasingly important place in the administrative system and the machinery of power (Foucault, 1980: 177). In that respect, as our study should also reveal, ‘medical space …coincides with social space [and] traverses it and wholly penetrates it’ (Foucault, 1973: 31) for our purpose through the work of the CHO and the volunteers in particular who are trained to alert members of the community of the intrinsic values of medical knowledge. In other words ‘the best way of avoiding the propagation of disease is to spread medical knowledge’ by means of a generalized medical consciousness, diffused in space and time, open and mobile, linked to each individual existence, as well as to the collective life of the [community]’ (Foucault, 1973: 31) through, for our purposes, the work of the CHO and the CHV in particular. In other words, functional and effective health service demands medical practitioners whose responsibilities would include the task of “… teaching individuals the basic rules of hygiene which they must respect for the sake of their own health and that of others’ (Foucault, 1980: 176). In essence ‘the imperative of health [was] at once [conceived as] the duty of each person and the objective of all’ (Foucault, 1980: 170).
Within that configuration the first task of medical practitioners, as Foucault suggests, is political (Foucault, 1973: 33), in so far as the struggle against disease must indeed begin with a war against bad government (Foucault, 1973: 33), suggesting ‘a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirements of political ideology and those of medical technology’. (Foucault, 1973: 38). The policing of the medical health of the collective as a component of noso-politics was legitimised (Foucault, 1980: 171) on the basis of ideology-- as ‘a theory of the social composition of interests’ enshrined in ‘a doctrine of contracts and the regulated formation of the social body’ (Foucault, 1990: 140). Suffice to say, the ultimate objectives of the medical practitioners on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other, are not in conflict since their respective objectives revolved around the identification of the problem of the sickness among the poor in its economic specificity (Foucault, 1980: 171), and therefore were equally concerned with securing the economic interests of the collective, which has its basis in the imperatives of labour to the needs of production (Foucault, 1980: 169). Essentially, the economic management of the population, including its biological traits, was at the core of this medicalization of society as part of the ‘explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for the subjugation of bodies and the control of population’ (Foucault, 1990:140). As we have attempted to demonstrate above CHPS functions within this same historical understanding of the importance of medical health, and brings into perspective the political and economic imperatives under which healthcare operates.

Suffice to say given the utilitarian agenda of the uses of medical health the problem of children in the context of medicine was no longer merely about ‘…their number at birth and the relation of births to mortalities’ but as much about ‘survival to adulthood, the physical and economic conditions of this survival, the necessary and sufficient amount of investment for the period of child development to become useful’. Consequently, ‘it [was] no longer just a matter of producing an optimum number of children, but one of the correct management of this age of life’. (Foucault, 1980: 172) It was in that sense a matter of expediting health. In essence, ‘the health and physical well-being of populations [came] to figure as a political objective which the police of the social body must ensure along with those of economic regulation and the needs of order’ (Foucault, 1980: 171). This engendered what Foucault referred to as ‘a medical police’, ‘ordained’ as it were, to impose its constraints and dispense its services, ensuring not only the subjection of the ‘body’ but the constant increase of its utility.(Foucault, 1980: 172). In essence, the body- of individuals and of populations- was being assessed in terms of its economic functions (172) and, ultimately, its amenability to profitable investment’

This symbiotic relationship between medicine and politics (nosopo-politics) in the eighteenth century, relevant indeed to the CHPS initiative in the Upper West Region, reveal two main characteristics:

1. The privilege of the child and the medicalization of the family. Within that construct was the organization of the family, which prioritised “the health of the child [making it] one of the family’s most demanding objectives”(Foucault, 1980: 173); and

2. The privilege of hygiene and the function of medicine as an instance of social control (enabling the state to assume authoritarian interventions and control in matters of medical health (Foucault, 1980: 175)

In his seminal work The Policing of Families, Jacque Donzelot (1979: 188) provides detailed insights into how the privacy of the family was intervened upon as a result of the development and expansion of the medical system, making it possible for the State to intervene in the familial haven by means of its ingenious application of power. Donzelot draws an intricate picture of how medicine was used as a general technique of health in 18th century France to co-opt the unsuspecting family into ‘the administrative system and machinery of power’, while at the same time confirming the ‘sacred’ position of the doctor in ‘the different instances of social power’ (Donzelot, 1979: 176). In effect the State’s self-imposed responsibility in improving the social body, and maintain it in a permanent state of health provided the doctor with, as Foucault put it, a ‘surplus of power’, in the same way the CHO assumes tremendous authority in the communities s/he operates in.

More specifically Donzelot (1979: 18) examines the evolving dynamics of the medicalization of the family and shows how the organic links between doctor and family were to have profound influence on the latter, leading to its reorganization in at least two directions:
1. The closing up of the family against the negative influences of the older educative milieu, against the methods and prejudices of domestic servants (and the extended family).

2. The making of a privileged alliance between the doctor and the mother, favouring the advancement of women by virtue of the recognition of their educative usefulness in the realm of medical health.

No doubt the configuration of CHPS also involves the supreme role of the mother starting of course with matters relating to contraception, child birth, and child care, all of which are dependent on the well-being of the mother in the first place. Moreover through the initiatives of the project (with its objective of instituting the norms and practices of modern medicine) it is assumed that ultimately the communities undergoing the CHPS would be able to interrogate the traditional healing practices and reject their negative influences accordingly. In other words in the case of the families in the Upper West Region the CHO would be their first reference point for medical advise, instead of the ‘old wife’s tales’ of grandparents or the sorcery of traditional healers. The initiative ‘to raise the level of health of the social body as a whole’ effectively amounts to helping and if necessary constraining the families to ensure their own good health (Foucault, 1980: 170). But by supplanting the ‘old wife’s tales and practices of the ‘quack’ healers with the services of the CHPS and its trained CHOs who are also supported by the knowledge and capabilities of the various health agencies (the power apparatus) such as the RHMTs and DHMTs the State is furnished with tremendous privileges over the management of the health of the population through the initiatives of noso-politics.

In that regard my research is concerned with ‘the health and physical well-being of populations …as a political objective which the police of the social body must ensure…’ through the effective institutionalization of medical health care. How this can be achieved in the context of post-colonial economic development is the focus of this research, based on the understanding that there is ‘a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirements of political ideology and those of medical technique’ (Foucault. 1973). In essence the study attempts to assess how CHPS feeds into the wider objectives of Ghana’s economic development.

Also relevant to the analysis is how the issue of ‘development ownership’ plays out between the stakeholders of the project: the Government of Ghana, the donor (Japan), and the communities directly impacted upon by the CHPS ‘intervention’. In other words, the study also interrogates the implied community ownership of the CHPS and suggests that in fact the ownership of the project lies with State, not least because it is orchestrated and managed by the Ghana Ministry of Health and its relevant agencies in the Upper West Region, and that while the communities involved in the project were not passive participants in the initiative, not least because the project’s success depended on the active participation of the communities, the State’s hegemonic and privileged role within the equation is unquestionable. In addition the FVS initiative as designed further augments the powers of the State in relation to the communities in the region.

**Conclusion**

The CHPS project amounts to creating a durable primary healthcare system to provide better life chances to communities in one of the most deprived areas in Ghana, the Upper West Region. The point to stress here is that the sustainability and success of the project, functional CHPS, is more dependent on the capacity of health officials, including the Community Health Officers (CHO), and less on economic aid. The Facilitative Supervisory Visit (FSV) is designed to strengthen the capabilities of the health management teams in the region, and effectively further strengthen the power apparatuses of the State. Ultimately this furnishes the State with tremendous privileges, according to Foucault’s conception of noso-politics, over ‘the state of health of a population as a general objective of policy’. And the State’s concern with the health of the population is partly dictated by its concerns about the health of the national economy. In essence, ‘…a complete utilitarian decomposition of poverty is marked out and the specific problem of the sickness of the poor begins to figure in the relationship of the imperatives of labour to the needs of production’ (Foucault, 1980: 169). Basically, the ‘poor sick’ had to be fashioned for the labour market and toward productive production.
The research reveals that authorial ownership and control of the project was with the Ghana Ministry of Health and its ancillary agencies, not least because where necessary they systematically contested decisions made by the JICA team in regards to the project. They also, as stated by the agreement between the Government of Ghana and the Government of Japan, orchestrated and managed the project. Secondly, the analysis reveals a contestation within the discourse of international development, between the perennial neo-liberal attempt to dis-enfranchise the State from its responsibilities in development, and Japan’s historical belief in the State’s role in the processes of development. Where the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s and after, through the Structural Adjustment Policies and its market liberalising principles, aimed to constrain the State there seems to be an attempt, through the initiative of the Japanese economic assistance towards the CHPS project to bring the State back in, reminiscent of the Washington-Tokyo controversy in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Taniguchi and Babb, 2009) over development models.

References


14
TICAD and Lusophone Africa in the new Millennium

Pedro Amakasu Raposo de Mederios Carvalho
University Lusíada of Porto

1. Introduction

In 1993, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) restored the spirit of Bandung and approached development assistance based on shared principles, ideas and interests. It also proposed collective efforts to eradicate extreme poverty, hunger, disease and other emergent threats in Africa even before the approval of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agenda. Theoretically, TICAD gives a voice to all-African countries regardless of their geographical size, fragility or income; in practice the situation is different. While Angola and Mozambique became a model of the TICAD three-pillar framework in 2003, Cape Verde (CPV), Sao Tome and Principe (STP) and Guinea-Bissau (GBS) did not receive the same attention as fellow Lusophone African countries until mid-2000s.

Assuming that TICAD has affected positively Japan’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP) one asks why it was only after TICAD-IV (2008) that PALOP gained in importance in Japan? Two hypotheses explain this late interaction between TICAD and PALOP: Relations were affected either by misunderstandings about TICAD’s principles in terms of ownership and partnership between TICAD and PALOP or by policy interests on the Japanese side and the poor governance record, small geographical size and lack of natural resources on PALOP’s side. Taking the first hypothesis, although African leaders and civil society have criticized TICAD policymakers for not protecting Africa’s best interests, neither CPV, STP nor GBS have levelled such criticisms.

The second hypothesis makes more sense in terms of Japan’s interests vs. the irrelevance of PALOP. Regardless of Japan’s reasons for wielding TICAD it does not explain our initial question of why so late? By leveraging the vast assistance package of TICAD-V in 2013 (comprising up to US$32 billion) to support the PALOP on MDGs, Japan not only strengthened TICAD diplomacy and its own status as a development practitioner; it also boosted private sector interests in Japan. This hypothesis enables us to understand TICAD’s policy implications in terms of whether the TICAD Partnership serves both sides equally, thus reflecting MDG-8, depends for example if all stakeholders, including civil society, take part in the process.

Against some literature claiming TICAD mainly favours Japan’s national interests in terms of obtaining political and diplomatic support, improving its international image and its own economic self-interests, the author argues that TICAD advances both Japan and PALOP’s diplomatic and non-traditional security interests, development outcomes and economic prospects as a whole. It follows that for CPV, STP and GBS, TICAD has been a platform where they can be heard, obtain political and diplomatic leverage and seek financial help to compensate for the disadvantages of their small size, low per capita incomes and limited resources.

Despite their common colonial past, PALOP countries have significant differences, illustrating the development challenges each African country faces in delivering MDGs. Because there is not much literature available on Japan and Lusophone Africa as a whole this study is relevant. Previous studies have centred on Japan’s economic relations with former Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia (Carvalho 2002); on Japan’s aid relations with Lusophone Africa from the recipient aid perspective (Seabra 2011); and on the analysis of changes in Japan’s ODA in the
context of TICAD focusing on post-conflict effectiveness in Angola and Mozambique (Raposo 2014). Further, there is little research on how TICAD has affected the development of relations between Japan and Lusophone Africa focusing on MDGs. Despite the overall economic growth and accelerated progress in PALOP, with the exception of CPV all are considered off-track on most MDGs targets. This is the case for most African countries, as TICAD was neither conceived as a pledge conference nor results-driven process in terms of a Japanese programme for Africa even though it is becoming one.

Given this, after the introduction the paper traces the historical background of PALOP behind the MDGs. Section three examines TICAD as a driver of Japan’s foreign aid policy to Lusophone Africa and evaluates progress on MDGs. Section four assesses TICAD’s input in terms of Japan’s development assistance and economic links with PALOP and concludes in view of the paper’s key findings.

2. The historical evolution of PALOP: Implications for MDGs

This section answers the question of why most PALOP countries will not achieve the MDGs. However, this is best understood when placed in the political, economic and social context of their post-colonial path.

Taking advantage of the same language and identity, in 1996 the former Portuguese African colonies together with Brazil and Portugal established the Community of Portuguese Language countries (CPLP) to promote common national interests within international institutions, namely the United Nations.

During the Cold War, a post-colonial thread among PALOP countries was their socialist ideological commitment with the Soviet Bloc. The anti-colonial wars in Angola (1961), Guinea-Bissau (1963) and Mozambique (1964) ended with the Carnation Revolution military coup of April 25, 1974, and independence for all PALOP members. However, prolonged civil wars, lasting for 27 years (1975-2002) in Angola and 16 years (1976-1992) in Mozambique under Marxist ideology, impacted negatively on human security as people were exposed to mounting threats including forced displacement, landmines, infectious diseases, extreme poverty and the destruction of basic infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau, CPV and STP although socialist in ‘identity’ supported the Non-Aligned Movement. They were rewarded with Western foreign aid, mostly from Scandinavian countries (Chabal et al. 2002).

3. TICAD as the driver of Japan’s foreign aid policy toward PALOP

This section briefly analyses Japan’s ‘hidden’ policy agenda towards Lusophone Africa through TICAD. Based on our argument that TICAD advances both Japanese and PALOP’s reciprocal interests, the question is how has the TICAD framework translated into implementing policy objectives in PALOP for fully or partially delivering on MDGs at a country level and continuing beyond 2015.

**TICAD and human security as a guiding principle to achieving MDGs**

The importance of human security to TICAD policy in terms of programmes and statements of intent had been accepted from 2003. Human security was made a pillar at TICAD-IV in 2008, and since then achieving MDGs has rested on this concept.

Currently, human security is one of the overarching principles of the Yokohama Declaration 2013, enacted at TICAD-V, in tandem with the 2063 Africa Agenda to realizing the post-MDGs development agenda. Among OECD donors Japan has been at the forefront of the post-2015 agenda debate either through TICAD or in the 20-nation ‘Post-MDGs Contact Group’ established
in 2011. With the emergence of conceptual alternatives, such as the ‘well-being approach’ as an attempt to measure people needs, acts and thoughts in any post-2015 agreement (Melamed 2012), at the first TICAD-V ministerial meeting on the post-2015 agenda, Japan insisted that human security should be a guiding principle. The ambiguity and subjectivity of the approach, but also the possibility of it being disruptive in terms of gender and politics as it attempts to measure ‘who has what’, ‘who can do what’ and ‘who feels what’ (Sumner and Tiwari 2009), explains Japan’s insistence on human security. But there is always an underlying national interest as the concept also serves Japan’s own development agenda.

Results in Angola and Mozambique

MDG-1 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger)

The progress of this goal is based on a country’s advances in halving poverty and hunger by 2015. According to the recommendations of the MDG Africa Steering Group (2008), agriculture with particular focus on smallholder farmers is central to reducing poverty, hunger and malnutrition (MDG-1). TICAD policy efforts in both countries have focused on food security either through the “Coalition for African Rice Development” (CARD), in Mozambique (not Angola because of war destruction) and through JICA’s agriculture-related projects in Angola to revitalise rice production extending beyond 2016 (MOFA 2012). The result has been increased rice production in both countries and higher returns due to chemical fertilizer use (Kajisa 2014).

Although, as conflict-affected countries they have similar assistance needs, the two states have a 10-year development gap. This gap explains why Japan-Mozambique ODA relations within TICAD are more dynamic. To date Japan has still not formulated a Country Assistance Programme for any of the PALOP countries though a Country Evaluation was done on Mozambique in 2009 (Raposo 2014a).

Recently, Japan issued a project development programme (the so-called ODA Rolling Plan) for Angola in 2012 and Mozambique in 2013. Although the agriculture sector represents more than 70% of all jobs in both countries, in 2013 the government of Angola invested 1% of its budget, covering just a quarter of needs. It is worth remembering that an important component of NEPAD rural poverty is the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). And, at Maputo’s meeting in 2003, African governments committed to spending at least 10% of their budgets on agriculture within five years (DFI/Oxfam 2015). It is left to international donors like China, Brazil, Japan and others to rehabilitate agriculture production in Angola (Muzima and Mazivila 2014).

MDG-2 (Achieve universal primary education) and MDG-3 (Promote gender equality and empower woman)

The MDG African Steering Group report (MDG-ASG 2008) on post-MDGs recommends implementing holistic education strategies through gender equality at all levels of education and improving the quality of education, for example through vocational and technical training.

Mozambique primary school net enrolment ratio increased from 44% in 1997 to 77% 2008; however it has stagnated since. The problem is a lack of teachers compared to the number of primary schools built. This has led the government of Mozambique to include professional and vocational training in education (AfDB 2011). JICA through to 2016 not only constructs secondary schools in Nampula Province but also includes central policy formation drawn up by Japanese experts to improve the quality of education and build teacher capacity (MOFA 2013). Both countries participate in the Maths and Science Teaching Reinforcement Programme (SMASSE) launched at TICAD-IV. Angola also has technical cooperation agreements with JICA to receive third-country training in maths, science and technology through a centre based in Nairobi, Kenya. In line with the draft SDGs’ broader agenda for education (DFI/Oxfam 2015), new JICA areas have centred on education within the Abe Initiative launched at TICAD-V (2013).
Yamada (2013) notes some weaknesses in broadening the scope from an exclusive focus on universal basic schooling towards an education-related, post-MDGs agenda. Nevertheless, Japan’s assistance harmonizes with the Common African Position’s (CAP) holistic perspective as required by the TICAD-V thematic session towards the Post-2015 development agenda in recognition of the complex nexus between peace, security and development.

**MDG-4 (Reduce child mortality), MDG-5 (Improve maternal health) and MDG-6 (Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases)**

Africa as a whole is off track to meeting MDGs 4 to 6. Though Angola and Mozambique are on track to cutting infant mortality (by two-thirds by 2015), they are not on the maternal mortality ratio (MMR). While Mozambique under-five mortality rates decreased from 245 per thousand live births in 1997 to 62 in 2013, Angola’s child mortality was 102 per thousand live births. But Angola’s low HIV rate (2.4% in 2014) contrasts with the high rate (10.8%) in Mozambique. However, both countries will fail to meet MDG 6 due to high mortality rates from malaria (estimated at 35% in children under five in Angola and 56% in Mozambique). A leading cause of disease and death, it is one of the biggest hindrances in Mozambican economic development affecting people’s health (AfDB 2011; JICA 2011).

To improve this goal TICAD is applying Japan’s strategy on global health diplomacy for universal health coverage (UHC) with a contribution of US$800 million to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; however when compared to France’s US$1.4 billion Japan’s donation reveals a lack of awareness of development issues around MDGs 4-5 in Japanese society, the media, government and parliamentarians (Grellier et al. 2007). Ultimately, HIV/AIDS is still a political issue. Nevertheless, Japan’s financial efforts are essential for the achievement of MDGs in Africa, a priority of TICAD-V together with Africa Union’s Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal, Newborn, and Child Mortality in Africa (CARMMA). Launched in Maputo in 2006, presently includes 40 AU members, including Angola.

Regarding the health sector, Japan’s assistance policy to Angola and Mozambique adopts a human security centred on human resource development and capacity-building approach, one of the priority areas of TICAD-V.

Based on Angola’s “National Four-year Plan for Health, 2009-2012”, JICA has concentrated on capacity building programmes for the health sector in Josina Machel Hospital (JMH), Luanda, under Triangular Cooperation (TrC) (MOFA 2012). The Brazil-Angola-Japan TrC resulted in the reduction of mortality rates at JMH of more than 1% per year from 2007 to 2009 (JICA 2013). Prior to this project, the Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme (JBPP) was small and for specific needs, but it made it possible to analyze future cooperation activity in larger scale in Angola’s health sector, such as the “Project of Health Sector Resource Development in Angola” – ProFORSA.

As for Mozambique, Japan ODA, acknowledging the holistic nature of health issues and the importance of cross-sector cooperation, works with Mozambique’s Strategic Plan for the Health Sector (JICA 2013b). JICA has provided assistance in educating medical technicians nationwide; improving and expanding the Institute of Health Science of Quelimane for the prevention of HIV and malaria among pregnant woman in five provinces through Long Lasting Insecticidal Mosquito Nets (LLINs), and finally, transferring medical equipment maintenance and management technology (MOFA 2013). Regarding malaria control in the five provinces, results show that the number pregnant women and children under five infected with malaria decreased by 19.2% per year between 2008 and 2010. Expectations should not be high. The UN General Assembly in RES/68/308 in 2014 recognizes the effectiveness of LLINs, but it urges the international community to expand distribution, accelerate research through existing partnerships and develop vaccines and new medicines to prevent and treat malaria to attain MDGs 4-6.

**MDG-7 (Ensure environmental sustainability)**

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Over the years TICAD IV-V, through the Hatoyama Initiative and earlier initiatives (‘Cool Earth 50’, Clean Development Mechanism), has been assisting developing countries (to the tune of US$11 billion for three years up to 2012) combat the negative impacts of climate change aimed at translating the MDG-7 into integrated programmes on the ground. However, the difficulty in complying with targets that cover forest preservation, climate change, desertification, loss of biodiversity, floods and natural disasters is complex as African countries does not have the technological, human and financial resources, made them concentrate efforts instead on access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation to reduce poverty (MDG-1). This is the case in Angola compared to Mozambique.

While Japan’s ODA to Mozambique specifically targets the four main priorities of the Government National Action Plan for Adaptation on Climate Change (early warning systems, strengthening farmers’ resistance to climate change, impact of climate change along the coast, water resource management and forest preservation) (AfDB 2011a), Luanda lacks a plan on climate change. Therefore, Japan’s assistance to Angola is combating drought, improving water supply systems and sanitation.

**MDG-8 (Develop a global partnership for development)**

The question here is whether TICAD partnerships share the same vision as its partners and benefits everyone involved? Although MDG-8 does not present the complexity (of MDG-7) in terms of ‘sustainability-compliant spending targets’ (DFI/Oxfam 2015), TICAD stakeholders also need to fulfil SDG 17, which calls on all partners (countries or not) to strengthen implementation measures and revitalize global partnerships for sustainable development. In Angola, JICA provides rehabilitation and development assistance for all kinds of infrastructure such as roads, transport corridors, seaports, railways and rural and urban electrification, etc., as outlined under the Angolan government's long-term strategy ‘Vision 2025’. The effort to build a nationwide and integrated transport network for the future to and from landlocked countries has been ongoing without criticism.

The same cannot be said about the emblematic JBPP in Mozambique, ProSavana, a triangular public-private-partnership (PPP) project initiated by JICA in 2009. Based on human security, ProSavana aims to improve the livelihoods of communities through sustainable and new agriculture development models, to promote poverty reduction for smallholders in the Nacala Corridor region and to seek market-orientated agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge. ProSavana has been aided by Brazilian development ties with PALOP, to whom it allocates 74% of all assistance (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). Given Angolan agricultural potential and with the ongoing Brazil-Japan-Angola TrC in Luanda, the probability of extending the ProSavana model to Angola increases. Despite the advantages of ProSavana, opposition from small farmers’ civil society organizations has been fierce since TICAD-V with JICA being accused of not protecting the interests of small-farmers (Raposo 2014a).

**Results in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome**

In November 2012 Algeria, on behalf of the Group of 77 and China submitted a draft proposal (A/C.2/67/L.2) to the UN General Assembly and alerted to the particular vulnerabilities of SIDS and their inability to attain MDGs. However, their specific challenges were mentioned neither in the final Yokohama Declaration 2013 nor in the Yokohama Action Plan 2013-2017. This was corrected throughout the 17 SDGs and respective targets in the final outcome document for the UN Summit, which will adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

Japan’s partnership with SIDS Lusophone countries has improved. Possible reasons are TICAD’s input on MDGs, which coincided with several events in the countries under review, and Japan associated observer status at CPLP in 2014 with Portugal’s support, thus increasing Japan’s ‘moral’ and development responsibilities towards PALOP. Other mutual interests that explain the strengthening of partnerships with PALOP are examined below.
Cape Verde (CPV)

The achievements of CPV on MDGs, its graduation from the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to MIC in 2008 and its unexploited Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) with vast fishery resources explain Japan’s renewed interest. Despite Japan’s diplomatic recognition of CPV in 1975 the absence of an embassy created a diplomatic vacuum.

TICAD has elevated the partnership between both countries to a higher level of cooperation. The fishery agreement signed with Japan in exchange for ODA and technical cooperation illustrates the benefits to both sides. Considering that CPV does not own fishing fleets to exploit its EEZ, its fishing policy is to provide access to foreign fleet operators. The fishery agreement with Japan is highly beneficial to CPV as in 2009 fishery products represented 66% of total exports, including to Japan (OD 2010). Fish is also the main source of food protein and employs more than 10,000 people, 5% of the total workforce, thus contributing to reducing poverty and hunger (MDG 1).

In 2011, following TICAD-IV, CPV asked Japan to integrate the country’s Budget Support Group aimed at facilitating its transition from LDC to MIC, together with the necessary aid from Japan to accomplish the social objectives (Seabra 2011) of the MDGs. In 2012 JICA approved an ODA loan of US$74.8 million to stabilize and improve electricity supplies to six Cape Verde islands. As the country suffers from severe environmental degradation, the project aims at mitigating climate change.

The UN-MDG monitor recognizes CPV as “a fast achiever”, having already reached MDGs 2 to 5 and is attaining the remaining goals with the possible exception of the environmental sustainability indicators (AfDB 2012). To help CPV reach MDG-7, at a TICAD-V Summit Meeting Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe promised Cape Verde’s Prime Minister assistance in fisheries, renewable energy and water supply as the arable land and poor soil fertility of the archipelago limits development. Furthermore, in late 2013 JICA signed a second ODA loan with CPV worth US$150 million, corresponding to two of the three main themes of TICAD-V: a ‘robust and sustainable economy’ and an ‘inclusive and resilient society’. The project has a crosscutting approach to meeting MDG 1, 3, 6 and 7. Increasing access to clean water also contributes to reducing poverty (MDG-1) and improving living conditions. A stable supply of clean water also increases hygiene and reduces women’s workload within a gender perspective. Finally, the project facilitates the country’s climate change adaptation (MDG-7) by preserving and replacing underground water resources through seawater desalination (JICA 2013a).

Guinea-Bissau

In 2010, more than 70% of the population survived on less than US$2 a day, and 30% on less than US$1. By 2013 more than 40% of the population was living in extreme poverty. The GDP at purchasing power parity per capita declined from US$1,270 prior to the civil war in 1998/1999 to US$560 in 2000. With the country in a state of total fragility MDGs are unachievable by 2015.

In contrast to previous TICADs, Guinea-Bissau was not invited to TICAD-V in 2013 (Matsutani 2013). The cause was the 2012 military coup, which like those in 1998 and 2003 forced Japan to suspend ODA (MOFA 2010). Japan economic cooperation with Guinea-Bissau was resumed in 2007 and Premier Nchama was invited to TICAD-IV. Guinea-Bissau’s progress on democratization led Japanese ambassador Yukio Takasu, Chairperson of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to put the fragile state in the PBC agenda after a mission in 2008 (GASC/2008/208). Under a request of Yukio Takasu, (MOFA 2008) Japan enacted an ODA Rolling Plan with poverty reduction and peacebuilding - two of the three main pillars of TICAD-IV - as major priorities of ODA along with agriculture, education, health and infrastructure (MOFA 2010). In addition, and as a demonstration of ownership, Guinea-Bissau, asked to join the g7+ under the New Deal for Fragile States approved at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 in Busan, Korea. This advocated using the objectives of
peacebuilding in terms of institutional and political resilience as the basis for making progress on MDGs. These objectives were recently reinforced through the Government PRSP ‘2011-2015 DENARP II’, extended until 2018, aimed at ‘reducing poverty through state building, the acceleration of growth and achievement of MDGs’ (AfDB 2015).

Sao Tome and Principe (STP)

Sao Tome shares with CPV the vulnerabilities of other Small Island Development States (SIDS) such as climate change and erosion problems. With Timor-Leste it shares the recent discovery of oil; with Guinea-Bissau the extreme poverty and state fragility driven mainly by economic vulnerability, insularity and the incapacity of its institutions, and also the fact that diplomatic issues are conducted through Japan’s Gabon embassy, hindering the development of a global partnership (MDG-8). Without an ODA Rolling Plan, development cooperation between STP and Japan has been conducted through TICAD and recently CPLP summits became useful platforms for direct dialogue in reciprocal terms with Japan.

Since TICAD-IV Japan has been assisting STP on MDG-1 with food aid for children who attend school hungry (MOFA 2009a), on MDG-2 through the Education and on MDG-7 through the project “Support Integrated and Comprehensive Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation in Africa” (MOFA 2009a).

Our initial question of why only after TICAD-IV results from a corruption scandal in 2004 involving the former PM Guilherme da Costa and fraud in STP’s government aid fund (GGA) over the sale of US$1.3 million of rice donated by Japan (RTP 2004). For humanitarian reasons Japan resumed food aid worth US$1.6 million in 2007 to reduce poverty (Macauhub 2007). Two months before TICAD-IV, STP signed a fishing agreement allowing Japan to fish in its waters in exchange for technical cooperation and the construction of fishing facilities (Macauhub 2008). It is worth remembering that fishing is the major activity in STP’s coastal communities and represents 3% of GDP, thus providing income for communities and protein for poor households (AfDB 2012).

Japan’s assistance is highly important as fishing is included in the Second Pillar of STP National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2012-2016) aimed at promoting sustainable and integrated economic growth to attain MDGs. Following a Japan-STP Ministerial Meeting at TICAD-V, STP was granted an additional 1,890 tons of rice to be resold to domestic wholesalers. As Japan is the major international supplier of rice it is clear that STP uses rice as a strategic lever to achieve food security, is neither enough to cover the basic needs of more than half the population living below the poverty line nor to provide basic social services to attain MDGs. With limited food production and unexploited oil stocks, STP’s economy is thus largely dependent on ODA.

4. TICAD: Aid and Economic Links with PALOP

This section assesses what kind of policy processes, here input/output-oriented, did the Japanese government use to help PALOP as TICAD policy-makers realised that if African countries were to deliver on MDGs, trade and investment were as vital as aid. A major input of TICAD in eradicating poverty is ODA. Table 1 shows that from 2000 to 2013 the highest volumes of Japanese aid went to Mozambique (US$1.1 billion), followed by Angola (US$531 million), CPV (US$314 million), Guinea-Bissau (US$52 million) and STP (US$33 million). This illustrates the priority Japan accords each PALOP country in terms of its policy agenda. While Angola and Mozambique have Japanese embassies and JICA offices, Japan failed to open embassies in the remaining PALOP, accentuating their low priority level in its agenda. Also, Japan’s ODA values confirm that Mozambique is among Japan’s top partners in Africa; Angola also is as since 2000 Japan has been the second highest OECD donor five times. The same happened with STP from 2010 to 2013.
Table 1. Japan’s Total Bilateral ODA to the PALOP, 2000-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Sao Tome and Principe</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>20.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>116.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>279.2</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ODA</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (a) ODA - Official Development Assistance. (b) (..) not available or non-existent
(c) Currency unit: USD million. Source: Japan's ODA White Paper (several years), Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan;

Aid priority sectors

Overall, from 2000 to 2013 Japanese aid aligned with PALOP development needs and with Japan’s interests alongside TICAD with human security as a basic policy. A common pattern in Japan’s allocation to PALOP is implementation through grassroots human security projects (GRHSP) and support for NGOs. This elevates the bottom approach of JICA to the top by combining the empowerment approach with ownership by locals. A second pattern is that while the “longer” aid relationship translates into a higher number of projects (150 projects in Mozambique and 92 in Angola), mostly allocated to GRHSP, health, water supply and sanitation, education, agriculture, economic infrastructure, and others, the “shorter” aid relationship with CPV (45 projects), Guinea-Bissau (33 projects) and STP (21 projects) concentrates mostly on fishing, GRHSP, education and vocational training, water supply and sanitation, economic infrastructures, and energy among other sectors (See: Graph 1 to 5).

Economic Diplomacy

As part of the TICAD-V concept of “Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa” Japan’s aid policy to PALOP, while contributing to sustainable development, aims to strengthen programmes for securing resources through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Japan’s new strategy integrates business delegations to PALOP from trade, natural resources and construction companies, promotes joint economic forums to encourage mutual investment opportunities and recently appointed ambassadors from the private sector to be effectively present. In September 2013, Takashi Kitahara from Mitsui & Co. was appointed ambassador to Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and Shuichiro Nishioka from Mitsubishi Corp. ambassador to Malawi (Kyodo 2013).

Angola
From 2009 to 2011, Angola’s government agreed three financial loans worth US$1.2 billion with Japan Bank International Cooperation (JBIC) to rehabilitate textile industries in Luanda, Benguela and Kwanza Norte (2010), build a mini-hydro in Bié Province (2011) and for a credit extension for textile plants (2013) above cited (Raposo 2014). Although final peace expanded trade relations between both countries, with the exception of 2013 when Japan was Angola’s ninth largest trading partner, between 2010 and 2014 in contrast to China, Japan did not rank among Angola’s ten largest trading partners.

**Mozambique**

At TICAD-V (2013) Japan and Mozambique signed an agreement (the first in Sub-Saharan Africa) on reciprocal liberalization, promotion and investment protection. In January 2014, PM Abe visited Mozambique and established a “Development Initiative based on natural gas and coal” with Maputo with an assistance package of US$670 million to further develop the Nacala corridor. Additionally, six memoranda of understanding in energy and finance were also signed to increase economic partnerships between the two countries. Japanese companies’ investment efforts in Mozambique, namely Mitsubishi Corp. at Mozal Aluminium plant (2001), Nippon Steel, Sumitomo Metal, and Mitsui & Co. (2015), combine resource development with sustainable growth to increase agricultural productivity sustained by solar-powered irrigation facilities. As a result of these investments, in 2013 Japan was Mozambique’s eighth world trading partner (total share of 2.3%) and seventh in 2014 (3.2% share) (E.C. Stats 2015).

**Cape Verde**

TICAD-IV and Cape Verde’s ownership earned it graduation from LDC status and Japan’s attention. While maintaining the basic philosophy of providing ODA for achieving food security (MDG-1), Tokyo has increased sustainable development assistance to the archipelago with concessional loans decided at TICAD-V to build desalination plants for water supply between 2014 and 2020 (MOFA 2013a). And, CPV Premier José Neves and his delegation met Japanese business leaders to attract investment in tourism and infrastructure. Trade relations with Japan are unbalanced as CPV relies heavily on imports. In 2013, Japan exported US$2.2 million, mostly in automobiles, but did not import any goods (MOF 2015). Sc  **Guinea-Bissau**

On July 2015, Takashi Kitahara, Japanese ambassador to Bissau had bilateral consultations with authorities to analyse future projects and to assess Bissau’s progress in line with the “Bissau Strategic and Operation Plan 2012-2025”. Ultimately, Japanese assistance depends on Guinea-Bissau ownership for the social, economic and institutional reforms the country needs, said Kitahara (Rith 2015). Given this, and similarly to STP, Guinea-Bissau has a systematic trade deficit, including with Japan, whose imports in 2013, were just US$5.6 thousand, while exports to Bissau amounted to US$123,012 thousand (MOF 2015). Regarding ODA, Japan ranked first among OECD/DAC donors to Guinea-Bissau in 2010 and third in 2008/09 and from 2011 to 2013.

**Sao Tome**

STP’s recent achievements on MDGs explain the re-launch of Japanese ODA to the archipelago around TICAD-IV as part of a programme of bilateral cooperation. Looking at the volume of Japanese ODA, one can argue that STP is not a priority in Lusophone Africa. STP runs systemic trade deficits with the world due its dependency on food, fuel and capital equipment imports (MOF 2015). In 2010, Japan exported US$1.4 million to STP and imported US$13,526 of cacao. In 2013, Japan did not import any goods from STP. Regarding ODA Japan ranked as the
OECD’s third highest donor in 2008 after France and Portugal and the second highest from 2010 to 2013 after Portugal.

Conclusion

Based on the evidence of the five PALOP good governance and development strategy trajectories in reaching/failing to reach MDGs, our second hypothesis, regardless of Japan’s ‘hidden’ interests, confirms the argument that in the new millennium TICAD has advanced both Japan and PALOP’s interests as a whole in terms of benefits to each side from the partnership – although Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and in particular Sao Tome fare worse than Angola and Mozambique even post-2008. This brings us to our question of why so late? Severe political instability and corruption scandals undermined confidence between TICAD and PALOP. Still, the role of human security in TICAD is evident in the cases assessed with the largest number of projects allocated to GRHSP followed by countries’ development needs. Ultimately, PALOP’s success/failure on MDGs is proportional firstly to the extent of their self-help efforts; secondly to the correct implementation of projects/programmes based on sound policy choices with partners and thirdly to the financial incentives (private-public investments, trade and ODA) from all stakeholders involved. If these three criteria are not fulfilled MDGs/SDGs will almost certainly not be attained. The feasibility of the new SDG agenda until 2030 relies on true political commitment and financial accountability to achieve the 17 goals, which is somewhat unrealistic. In sum, the analysis of Japan’s aid policy to Lusophone Africa under TICAD offers three main findings and lessons. First, although the TICAD framework suits the needs of PALOP, TICAD–VI (2018) in Kenya needs to strengthen civil society ownership to increase partnership. Second, part of PALOP’s success on MDGs is due to Japanese assistance; however, TICAD pledges are manifestly low to Lusophone SIDS and do not match their fragility and future challenges. The same applies to insignificant trade/investment values between Japan and PALOP. Hence, TICAD needs its own finance plan within the ordinary ODA budget. Third, given the new financing context, although ODA is still the major instrument of development finance for OECD donors, it no longer is to emergent donors. Stronger TICAD interaction through Japan’s observer status at CPLP would allow greater progress in PALOP states on SDGs, thus increasing outcome effectiveness.

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Appendix:

Graph 1. Sectoral Distribution of Japan’s ODA to Angola, 2000-2013 (US$ million)

Number of Projects

Source: Author.

Graph 2. Sectoral Distribution of Japan's ODA to Mozambique, 2000-2013 (US$ million)

Number of Projects

Source: Author.
Graph 3. Sectoral Distribution of Japan's ODA to Cape Verde, 2000-2013 (US$ million)

Source: Author.

Graph 4. Sectoral Distribution of Japan's ODA to Sao Tome and Principe, 2000-2013 (US$ million)

Source: Author.
Graph 5. Sectoral Distribution of Japan’s ODA to Guinea-Bissau, 2000-2013 (US$ million)

Source: Author.
15

TICAD in the Evolving Development Landscape

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This intervention is geared towards answering the question of how Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa, in general, and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in particular, position with respect to key emergent tendencies in Africa’s political economy and newer trends in the field of international development. The backdrop to the discussion is the change witnessed in economic trajectories on the African continent in recent years and the shifts that characterise the development cooperation arena. The discussion takes stock of how Japan’s Africa ODA sits alongside the development and aid relationships that are unfolding between the continent and other newer donors (particularly those from Asia) and reflects on TICAD’s place in the evolving donor landscape.

I would like to change tack somewhat and to do two things. The first is to cast TICAD against a larger political backdrop and to look at it as a development project (with a history of 20+ years) and to ask the question of how this project sits next to the changing orientations we are currently seeing in the international development landscape and in donor priorities.

The second is to look at the TICAD process of the past 20+ years against the larger picture of Japan’s Africa ODA, which has an even longer history (around five decades/50 years) and which mostly had a very different set of determinants and shape than TICAD and was quite disconnected from TICAD for a long time. The central interest here is how Japan has positioned and currently positions as donor in Africa when viewed next to other established (or traditional) and emerging donors, what has been positive and not so positive about this, and what the implications are for Japan’s Africa ODA and for TICAD into the future.

So let me start with the first objective. How should we make sense of TICAD as a development project (leaving for the moment the question aside of whether it has actually been successful or a failure), and does this project make Japan a different players in the international development landscape and in Africa?

Development landscape in transition, with perhaps four salient features. Most pertinently the debate about the nature and goals of the post-2015 agenda. Debate about transcending the MDGs (which were about achieving final goals of human development or individual-centric goals focused on poverty reduction) with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the SDGs which involves a different agenda and centres on the preservation or establishment or better provision of global public goods.

Second, changes in development thinking, and a reversal to a focus on the role of the state in bringing about development. Even World Bank is now adopting more statist approach and over past decade or so WB policy documents have moved away from emphasis on market-based policy prescription to ‘bringing the state back in.’ In a sense WB catching up with long-standing arguments against structural adjustment and neo-liberalism and the apparent success of models of state-based development of the world’s emerging powers.

Third, changes in donor priorities, with a shift in emphasis for donors from ‘small development’ (embodied in MDG’s for example focusing on material plight of individuals) to ‘big development.’ Big development entails transforming or building national systems achieved in large part through large-scale infrastructure development. So calls for ‘wholesale investments in roads, ports, agriculture, education,
finance, public health’ and concomitantly the institutional arrangements (public and private) to manage this transformation. [We see the significance of this thinking, how it filters through various institutions and multilateral forums these days – big focus on infrastructure investment for development by the established IFIs and the new ones – the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank of the BRICS and the AU’s Programme on Infrastructure Development (PIDA).

Fourth, changing donor landscape with the rise of new donors that in sense provide more choices for developing countries [although not necessarily removing the problems of efficiency, effectiveness of aid or of aid recipients’ agency vis-à-vis new donors].

It’s interesting that there are resonances with these four features of the new development landscape and the debates Japan has been involved in with DAC peers concerning its chosen method of development assistance. Japan has been part of privileged club of aid donors of the OECD, having joined in 1960 (which for Japan was an important validation of its modernisation project), but Japan has also tended to be an outlier in the DAC. Japan’s so-called aid philosophy of promoting self-help and discipline in recipient countries by providing loans (and therefore imposing repayment obligation) criticised by DAC peers for many years, who wanted Japan to provide ‘proper’ development assistance in the form of grants. Japan’s ODA, focused very much on projects to establish large-scale infrastructure in developing countries (big parts of east and southeast Asia) also for many years criticised for benefitting Japanese companies (tied aid).

In the 1980s and early 1990s Japan rallied against the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programme, saying that its neo-classical foundations went against Japan’s aid philosophy. For the same reason Japan initially did not want to join the World Bank and IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the late 1990s and poverty reduction strategy papers, and it rallied against the introduction of budget support.

When looking at Japan’s ODA to Africa over past five decades, all these debates to some extent shaped what, how and how much ODA Japan disbursed to the continent. [SLIDE?]

Structure of ODA modalities quite consistent – on balance more grants and technical cooperation than loans, but bilateral loans an embedded and continual part of Japan’s ODA to sub-Saharan Africa. In later years, from the time of the HIPC onward, grant element actually hidden in debt relief and debt rescheduling, so Japan found ways to continue to give effect to its aid philosophy of promoting discipline and self-help in recipient states but in covert way.

So these current ideas of ‘bringing the state back in’ and ‘big development’ focused on large-scale infrastructure versus “small development” all continuous features of Japan’s aid approach and its role as donor on the African continent. It’s a different question altogether how successful fifty years of Japanese ODA to Africa has been [as is the question of how successful ODA from other donors has been] but Japan has been a consistent donor and its ODA has grown in size, latitude, scope and sophistication over this period.

In terms of the impact emerging donors have had on the development landscape, and Japan’s relationship with the African continent, some interesting dynamics – part of the reason why there’s a new dynamism these days in how Japan engages with the continent – new pledges and public pledges of aid to compete with China, India, South Korea, Turkey and the like, and new investments and newer modes of diplomacy centred on new issues such as energy and security.

But it’s also interesting that there’s a degree of emulation on the part of the new/emerging donors in Africa: in addition to being a platform for competition with FOCAC or the Korea-Africa Forum these days, TICAD was also a model for these development summits that came later. There’s similarity in the aid approaches to Africa followed by Korea and China, that resonates with Japan’s long-standing philosophy of infrastructure projects and if possible, loans rather than grants. The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA, established in 1991) was modelled on JICA in the beginning and functions fairly similarly in Africa.

At the same time, should also be said that although Chinese aid (which opaquey comprises investments, concessional and non-concessional loans, credit financing, grants and the like) catches more
headlines these days, Japan’s ODA to Africa has developed a breadth and depth over the past decades that China’s has not. Just consider the difference in Japan’s provision of support for peacebuilding (albeit through the multilateral, UN Peacebuilding Fund, founded by Japan), agricultural production through elaborate programmes such as NERICA/CARD, water access, primary health care, focus on human security, etc, to China’s top-down, shotgun approach.

Let me finish by talking about TICAD more specifically and the way ahead. First, it’s important to note that even if TICAD has been an important foreign policy and signalling platform for Japan and it has given Japan to some extent prominence as donor in an age when aid fatigue and Afro-pessimism was the order of the day, it has largely been lacklustre and without many clear accomplishments for much of its existence.

TICAD has had too many slogans and too many messages over the years, and for a long time there was a disconnect between TICAD’s objectives and Japan’s actual Africa ODA. Pledges and statements at TICAD did not necessarily translate to changes in ‘aid on the ground’.

This has changed noticeably since TICAD IV, 2008 and TICAD V.

TICAD IV – better coherence and clearer attempt at institutional integration.

TICAD V – clearer alignment between TICAD themes and JICA programmes.

Business voice amplified (2013, [for first time?] business seminars on side of main TICAD meeting, JETRO-sponsored)

Sense that TICAD structures corporate interests and that corporate interests now structure TICAD more directly. Discourse among corporate executives in 2013 that TICAD an incentive for their new investments in Africa, alongside factors such as ‘Africa Rising discourse’, attempts to catch Africa’s so-called new middle class [and of course realities of more competitive environment for Japanese companies on their home front and in traditional markets]

From Japanese government’s perspective, increasingly the value of TICAD as soft power tool is realised and now utilised more effectively.

Way ahead for TICAD – shaped by realisation of need to position Japan favourably in a more competitive context – foreign policy tool.

Japan’s ODA – affected by new development cooperation charter (approved by Cabinet February 2015) and what is in no uncertain terms a securitisation and even militarisation of Japan’s foreign policy under Shinzo Abe: ODA and ‘enlightened national interest’: aid, trade and investment, energy security and security diplomacy centring on conventional and complex security (peacebuilding, infused with human security discourse).

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Introduction: General Issues and Objectives

Our objectives are: to examine Japan-Africa relations broadly; to examine the features of TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development); and to project and propose within the dynamics of changing world politics, new policy options within the framework of post-Millennium Goals. Is TICAD different from other types of instruments of international cooperation used by other foreign powers in Africa?

Although the article is a critical reflection rather than an empirically based work, specific illustrations are used to clarify and support our claims. Since the end of Cold War era, both Japan and Africa have been going through significant changes. Based on current economic development trends, it was forecasted that Africa would be the economy of tomorrow.

In Africa, people’s demands, since the 1990s, have been embracing changes.

Japan has been challenged through the market competition by China’s development model. Although some called the 1990s in Japan as a “lost decade,” characterized by overall slowness of its economy as a result of combined factors such as deregulation and bad loan policy, in the 21st century, Japanese economic opportunity has increased with the rise of newly emerging economies in Africa and Asia. Even during the “lost decade,” Paul Krugman stated: “Japanese growth over the past quarter century has been almost as fast as America’s, and better than Western Europe’s (2015: 1).”

Made-in-Japan is still competitive. Its unemployment rate is low. However, recent environmental calamities put Japan in the radar of the global environmental crisis. Despite persistent deflation (Anderson 2012) and the effects and costs of this environmental crisis, Japan is still highly industrialized with a strong leg of international cooperation policy. It finances the building of the needed infrastructures and the provision of training of African human resources in specific targets.

Japan-Africa relations reached their pick in the 1980s. But they started declining in the early 1990s (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2013: 120). Since 1993, the policy priorities articulated through Japan-Africa relations have been shaped mostly by declarations and resolutions made through TICAD’s programs. We examine these declarations in identifying their thematic policy values within broad theoretical framework of international cooperation.

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1 For furthermore on this topic see Lumumba-Kasongo, Japan-Africa Relations, New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2010.
2 This paper was first presented at the International Conference on “Asia-Africa Entanglement in the Past and Present: Bridging between History and Development Studies,” held on July 31-August 1 2015 at the Senriyama Campus of Kansai University, Osaka, JAPAN. The authors, Jacqueline Nembe Luhahi of University of Kinshasa and Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, Cornell University, Wells College and University of Ghana, thank professor Ampiah Kweku, the chair of the panel, and the participants for their constructive comments.
Japan-Africa relations are complex with a high dose of political realism. These relations are not static. Thus, the context of world politics and the constraints of international political economy are taken into account in analyzing these complexities. Domestic politics are responding to the pragmatism of the world economy, realism of the nation-states, and soft politics that is related to peace, democracy and development.

What kind of international cooperation is likely to develop within Japan-Africa relations in post-2015? What is the place of women in the post-2015 agenda?

Post-2015 is about the post-UN Millennium Development Goals. The willingness of the UN system is to recommend governments to formulate best policies in education, development, women, poverty, environment, and health. The new agenda is broadly about ‘sustainability.’

Japan-Africa relationships are examined within the context of post-2015 agenda and the dynamics world politics. In 2015, Africa is different from the 1990s. Transitional democratic Africa, though slow in her functioning has different demands to formulate to the world.

African popular movements combined with the outcome of political reforms initiated by the states under the pressures from the global transnational institutions and international judicial activism create opportunities for development and possibility for strengthening of international cooperation. Furthermore, Africa in which some countries have enjoyed economic growth between 5 and 7 percent is different from depressive Africa of the 1980s and 1990s. The 1980s were called “the lost decade” for Africa partially because of consequences of international debt crisis and militarism.

Methodologically, African countries are not monolithic. While some countries are making progress in the areas of good governance, for instance, having third time successful general elections and smoother circulations of power, other countries reflect tendencies of liberal democratic reversals. The military coups d’état also have been revisiting Africa.

But Africa that has gained some positive visibility. For instance, in international environmental conferences today’s Africa is different from the one that was mute on the environment. Africa that has a functioning effective smartphone, is different from Africa of telegrams, which were located mainly in urban and semi-urban areas. Africa that has elected a woman president is different from Africa of militarism.

However, as of 2015 the major problems that Africa faces collectively are still enormous: the persistence of extreme poverty, social and gender inequality, consequences of ethnic conflicts and sexual violence, civil wars, social and economic insecurity, a high level of unemployment, generalized corruption, and violent power struggles.

The issues about the low quality of governance are central in assessing positive changes in Africa. For instance, African Peer Review Mechanisms (APRM) through which countries are adhering to the African Union’s programs to be evaluated voluntarily in their practices of democracy and political, economic, and private enterprise governance, and social economic development are creating good images about Africa and her systems of governance. As of 2015, 35, thirty-five States of the African Union have voluntarily acceded to the APRM. Africa’s Self-Assessment for good governance can have a positive implications on Japan-Africa relations.

In Japan also, the 1990s were considered as “a lost decade” as well. Since 2010, Japan is no longer the number 2-world economy. It has been taken over by China. However, Japan remains an innovative international actor. It is ranked among the top 5 richest countries in the world, among the top 10 most powerful countries and among the top 5 economic donors. It is the top 2 food donor in Africa.

For the first time, since it was initiated in 1993 by Japan, the TICAD, which meets every 5 years, is scheduled to meet in Kenya in 2016. This could be considered as an important signal of changing attitudes and perhaps policy of TICAD.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union as a leader of the International Socialist groups, the nature of the international cooperation has gradually been changing. Although national tendencies and psychological attitudes associated with the Cold War never completely changed, world politics arena became freer. The notion of national sovereignty started to express itself more in its liberal form: liberty, autonomy, and individualism.

The momentum of free trade of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is perceived as the only effective option for nation-states. However, protectionism and comparative advantage are consolidated in many countries, including in highly industrialized countries. These principles are used without any systematic respect to the dominant principle of free trade. These practices can lead nation-states to trade wars.

Corporations are merging more rapidly than before. Furthermore, the maturity of global capitalism is consolidating at geo-regional level leading to economic regionalism. The exigencies from various movements are contributing to producing some forms of hybrid multipolarity discourse.

**Perspectives and Assumptions**

In the post-Cold War politics, policies related to international cooperation have been rapidly changing to respond to specific local, regional and international imperatives. These changes are neither random nor natural though they might not be linear or unpredictable.

Our working premises are that: all the states-states relations are essentially power relations, which are ideological. The way one perceives, defines, and analyzes a social phenomenon determines not only the nature of the understanding of this phenomenon, but more importantly, the kind of prescriptions to be used to solve its problems.

The world is defined as a system whose behaviours are conditioned by the actors’ locations and how they came to be in the system. The system is not just the sum of its elements. In order to understand why a system behaves the way it does, we have to examine the origins of its elements, the nature of the relationship among them, and the quality of the interactions between the system itself and other phenomena within or around its larger environment.

Thus, our approach contains the following dimensions on history and structure as stated by Jacqueline Luhahi:

Historical-structuralism focuses on: (a) socio-political dynamics and relationships between social phenomena; (b) change; search of the meaning of things about the past, present and projecting the future. And (c) finally, it focuses on the historical and social context of the events. This holistic approach is used to analyze the topic structurally and historically... (2015: 192).

We consciously avoid historical determinism and conspiracy theory because they tend to lack a good understanding of the forces of history or historical factors.

One of the most important manifesting characteristics of the world system since the end of 20th century has been the movement of states and people toward their self-redefinition. This redefinition has been taking different forms and shapes. The substance of the content of this redefinition and its intellectual quality depend on the dynamics of the local political configurations, the vision of a nation-state, how a given people and state have become part of the world system, the location of these actors in the world economy, what they are bringing into the global market and who the actors’ alliances are.

This process of redefining is facilitated by the forces of globalization: the innovations of science, the dynamics of the market, technology and democracy.
International Context: Liberal Global Unipolarity Versus Movement Toward Multipolarity

The nature of Japan-Africa relations should take into account the global political context. In this context, both notions of liberal global unipolarity and multipolarity are briefly examined. Liberal global unipolarity was invented as a single power system under the domination and guidance of the US and its allies after the World War II in order to organize the new world economy and new system of political governance for Western Europe’s reconstruction. Unified market economy and liberal democracy in Europe were the engines of such a model.

Unipolar globalization and unipolarity itself are defined as:

A period marked by the vertical determination of rules, practices and movements of globalization by the Western capitalist system as the engines of so-called modernization. This unipolarity, a single ideological perception and organization of globalization,.. In the classical political science, unipolarity is about classical realism, which deals with a state-centric approach in examining world politics (Lumumba-Kasongo 2013: 118).

The calls for alternative models for development are expressed in the forms of multipolarity through South-South dialogue. On June 14, 2014, for instance, while many leaders were preoccupied about the World Cup in Brazil and the political situation in Ukraine, the G-77 summit took place in Bolivia. It celebrated the 70th anniversary of the non-alignment. This grouping counts now 130 members. Russia is being invited to join this organization.

The final declaration called for a new world order for living well and it supports the UN Millennium Development Goals, and the plan for the eradication of poverty by 2030. President Evo Morales of Bolivia went far as to request the suppression of the Security Council of the UN.

In March 2013, in Durban, South Africa, the leaders of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) also agreed that the election for the next WTO Director-General should have a candidate from a developing country.

The South-South agenda is to project the creation of a multipolar world. Thus, multipolarity is about co-existence of system of multiple global and regional powers underlining decentralization of the world resources, their better management, and their fair distribution. It calls for more people’s participation in the reconstruction of their economies. It calls for the development of social welfarism, and the implementation and respect for the laws of the ecology, which are: everything is connected to everything else; everything must go somewhere; nature knows best; and that there is no such thing as a free lunch (Smith, 2009, pp. 2-3).

Post-2015 is defined as post-Development Millennium Goals. On May 30, 2013, the United Nations High Level Panel of eminent personalities appointed by General-Secretary Ban Ki-Moon made a report about the Post-Development Agenda. Five points were agreed upon as being part of the agenda of the post-millennium:

(1) Leave No One Behind; (2) Put Sustainable Development at the Core; (3) Transform Economies for Jobs and Inclusive Growth; (4) Build Peace and Effective, Open and Accountable Institutions for All, and (5) Forge a New Global Partnership.

One of the important elements embodied in those points is gender equality. It is intrinsic to the achievement of human development. The linkages between gender equality, growth and sustainable development have been well established. Various forms of violence continue to hit women’ spheres as observed by Jacqueline Luhahi:
It should be noted that women are still victims of sexual violence and many other forms of abuses world over. They continue to suffer from the consequences of policy of gender segregation and homophobic (fear) of nation-states or practices of traditional institutions, which are dominated by men for their own interests (2015:192).

How does the TICAD deal with this central issue of gender equality and empowerment of women?

**Basic Theoretical Framework for Explaining International Cooperation**

Pierre Bourdieu (1990) insisted that a theory must be rooted in a particular social experience. Theories should explain the phenomena as they are (Luhahi, 2015:195).

The nature of Japan-Africa relations must be contextualized within the framework of the broad explanations of the international cooperation.

Three major schools of thought in the West are located in definitions of international cooperation: classical/neo-Mercantilism, classical/neo-Liberalism, and classical/neo-Radicalism.

International cooperation in classical international relations’ perspectives may mean international intervention, economic, political and military assistance, negotiation, consensual movements or mutual agreements setting, treaty or convention making.

During the Cold War era, international interventionism was strongly associated with the ideological, military, and power struggles between the socialist Russia and its allies, and the capitalist United States and their allies. One cannot determine the nature of any international cooperation without locating it within the dominant trends of politics and theories of international relations (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005:23)

The assumptions in conventional international relations that stipulate that all sovereign states can have, in principle, and legally, equal access to the same international resources regardless of their past political history, their location, national resources, and identities, are utopian and ahistorical (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1999, p. 18).

These assumptions must be understood within the context of the realism and power configurations of the relationship among nation-states. Economic and political relations must be analyzed in historical context (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1999, p. 16).

Clearly, neither the state-centric approach nor the free market or a society-centered approach provides sufficient intellectual tools in explaining the nature of Africa’s international cooperation. Relationships cannot flourish in a closed kind of historical determinism.

Within the dominant paradigms defined as realist typologies in Western scholarship, studies of the linkages in political economy, include state-state agendas, state policies, economic ideas or ideals embodied in those policies, the availability of the necessary resources to implement policies, and the political climate of the social milieu.

Recently, it has become more difficult, using realism or neorealism and idealism or neo-idealism alone, to understand and predict the behaviors of the actors and structures of their actions partially because the logic of bipolarity and its infrastructural base have disappeared, leaving room for new self-redefinition. However, it is more appropriate to contextualize and historicize the analysis of international relations as this process can explain how and why the actors in world politics pursue their interests as they do based on the realities of their regions as reflected in the dynamics of the global puzzle (Mansbach, 1994).

The emergence of multiplicity of the actors, the reactions to domination of the US militarism and unilateralism and the redefinitions of capitalism at the region level have contributed to the rise of undefined multipolar movements.
International relations may be inspired by the Hobbesian theory of human nature. However, they are neither natural nor spontaneous. They are essentially and structurally historical constructs.

In short, we summarize our theoretical reflections and assumptions in the following statement:

The relations of political economy are more complex than just the mechanisms of capital inflow or outflow, technological dependencies or transfers, and the distribution of surplus accumulation, which are regulated and monopolized by the dominant classes (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1999, p. 17)

The classical approaches in the international cooperation, though are still broadly relevant, they are not totally sufficient tools. A brief commentary on them is necessary to elucidate our points about their incompleteness.

Mercantilism was an economic theory and practice, dominant in Europe from the 16th to the 18th century. Both mercantilism and neo-mercantilism put more emphasis on economic growth as a critical component of national power. National power and wealth are perceived as tightly connected (Oatley, 2006, p. 8). However, within the complexity of classical definitions of the national power, it is difficult to predict why and how a given state has been behaving the way it does. The classical liberalism or neo-liberalism has its limits to help explain the complex relations between states. As Oatley states:

First of all, liberalism attempted to draw a strong line between politics and economics. In doing so, liberalism argued that the purpose of economic activity was to enrich individuals, not to enhance the state’s power. Second, liberalism argued that countries do not much enrich themselves by running trade surpluses. Instead, countries gain from trade regardless of whether the balance of trade is positive or negative…The state must establish clear rights concerning the ownership of property and resources (2006 p. 9).

Being the incarnation of liberal thought, Adam Smith, for instance, put more emphasis on free trade as the most important modernizing force, which should be more powerful than the state. As Lairson and Skidmore stated:

Perhaps, liberals most important contribution is the idea that all participants in a system of free markets and trade are beneficiaries. But the arguments of liberals sometimes extend beyond respecting to worshipping markets; their views often have the effect of rationalizing the interest of powerful groups; and liberals almost never understand the role of politics and power in creating and conditioning markets… Neo-liberals make broad claims about the impact of markets, international interdependence, and the possibilities of cooperation among nations (2003, p. 12).

Most of the radical approaches such as those inspired and supported by socialism, Marxism, social democratic movements, dependency, Third World Forum, populism of some kinds, labor Unionism, whether they were produced in the Global North or in the Global South, were historically born out as reactive paradigms to the dominant paradigms. However, gradually these approaches developed their own basis of scientific inquiry and legitimacy in power system for explaining adequately the contradictions within social relationship of production and the ownership of means of production, projecting how to change the world system and establish socialist or Marxist regimes.

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes, and the globalization of the neo-liberal reforms, the legitimacy of those radical approaches was questioned and their values significantly diminished.
Radicalism, by contrast, holds that the system of national and international capitalism biases economic outcomes to the benefit of certain social classes within the most powerful capitalist nations. Drawing their ideas from a Marxist perspective on political economy, radicals focus their attention on the area of greatest weakness for liberalism and mercantilism: the way that economic power and political power create interests and shape outcomes. The merit of radical arguments is that they tend to see power relationship that others miss. The central purpose of radical analysis is to uncover the role of power in seemingly voluntary market relations. Radicals help us see how power can affect the distribution of economic benefits (Lairson and Skidmore 2003).

Neither realist, idealist nor Marxist approaches briefly discussed are consistently self-sufficient to help analyze the complex conditions, structures, and international cooperation and its policy implications. Thus, a combination of comparative and historical-structural perspectives are necessary with the assumptions of the “win-win theory.”

**TICAD: History and Objectives**

Post-Cold War politics have steered international conferences toward a focus on economic development, gender equality, liberal democratization, good governance, accountability, respects of the rule of law, and conflict resolutions as conditionalities toward the establishment of productive relationships.

In early 1990s, Japanese government created the strongest institutional support of its activities in the new Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which revised and formulated new policy areas in its relationship to Africa through the TICAD (Lumumba-Kasongo 2013: 123).

Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was initiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union—end of contemporary bipolar politics. Thus, this new initiative was to reflect the prescribed agenda to pursue peaceful global development and promote better interactions between the industrial and less industrial countries.

The first TICAD was held in 1993 in Tokyo, the second in Tokyo in 1998, the third in Tokyo in 2003, the fourth was held in 2008 in Yokohama, and the Fifth was held in 2013 also in Yokohama. And Yokohama Declaration 2013 and Yokohama Action Plan 2013-2017 were adopted.

Since the first TICAD in 1993, the TICAD conferences have constituted the basic approach of Japanese foreign policy toward Africa as TICADs have also produced programs for rapprochement between Africa and Asia.

TICAD is a conference held every five years with the objective of promoting a high-level policy dialogue between African leaders and development partners. It is Japan’s strongest indication yet of its long-term commitment to fostering peace and stability in Africa through collaboration partnership. The theme of the last was: "Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Africa."

TICADs have produced layers of expectations about how to achieve positive outcomes. All Official Development Aid (ODA) policies toward Africa are formulated through TICAD’s guidelines though not all ODA programs fit into the TICADs’ pragmatism. ODA is the oldest Japanese foreign policy instrument. TICADs have not totally replaced ODA yet.

TICADs have become policy guidelines used by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as the basis for its international relations with Africa. However, other Ministries such as those of Finance, Education, Culture Sports, Science and Technology, Health, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the Economic Planning Agency have all been actively involved in the decision-making procedures regarding TICADs.
From its inception, TICAD expressed that African developmental problems are genuinely global and that they should be addressed collectively by the international community.

It is worth emphasizing that the first TICAD was proposed by Japan at the UN General Assembly meeting in 1991 and was effectively organized by Takaya Suto, then Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau of the MOFA. It suggested a grand shift in Japan’s attitude towards Africa and the region’s developmental problems, broadening the tools of analysis and the methods for possible resolution to these problems. It brought into perspective the relevance of the East Asian economic development model to Africa.

In conjunction with this Asian perspective, the importance of formal education at every stage of the development process was also emphasized as a means of engaging with the issue of human resources development.

First, TICAD’s initiative took place at the end of bipolarity. Tokyo felt freer to act and establish its own foreign policy base toward Africa instead of continuously acting as a clientelist state to the US. Second, TICAD was an attempt at reflecting a shift in the policy discourse from Asia to Africa. And third, Japan wanted Africa to learn from the successes of Asian economic model. It should be noted that TICAD is a forum and not a fundraising institution.

During the TICAD I, the Tokyo Declaration identified the following key issues of development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Takahashi 1996: 11):

- Political and Economic reforms initiated by the countries themselves;
- Sustainable economic development propelled by private-sector activity;
- Regional cooperation and integration conducive to open multilateral trade;
- Prevention of an emergency relief for the natural and human-made disasters, which act as bottlenecks for development;
- The transfer of successful experiences of Asian economic development and promotion of South-South cooperation; and International cooperation for the resolution of broader development issues including gender relations, environment, and HIV.

The main features of TICAD I were self-reliance, cooperation, partnership, and learning from East and South East Asian countries. It encouraged African countries to take initiatives regarding their development processes. These initiatives should be actualized within the framework of economic and political reforms, which include: diversification of economic activities, privatization, poverty alleviation, improvement of the general welfare, and democratization.

In addition to adopting the Tokyo Declaration on Africa Development, the conference also stated the fundamental philosophy of the TICAD process: interrelationship between African self-help efforts (ownership) and international support (partnership), as well as Asia-African cooperation.

Our analysis suggests that TICAD I did not intend to challenge the dependency syndrome of African political economies on the industrialized countries' economies and finances. Instead, it projected that Africa could become the major consumer of made-in-Asia.

During TICAD II, the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA) was adopted. It was held under the joint auspices of Japan, especially MOFA, the United Nations and the Global Coalition for Africa. It was attended by a large number of delegates from 80 countries (51 African, 11 Asian, 18 North American and European), 22 NGOs, and 40 international organizations.

Other important items in TICAD II included: a more central role of the state in resource mobilization, the improvement of income distribution, the creation of employment opportunities, the revitalization of rural communities, the improvement of public expenditures, and the expansion of social services (Horiuchi 2005: 472). The centrality of issues related to stability,
sustainability and conflict resolution in the agenda constituted a new area in which Japan has accumulated some capacity from. Concerning democracy, for instance, Horiuchi stated:

TAAs requested strongly that governments reaffirm their commitment to improvements in democratic elections, strengthen the capacity of the legislature and judiciary, prevent corruption, devolve power, and restructure the civil service. . . It is regrettable that the support in the area of good governance and democratization is not the main thrust of Japanese ODA as a co-organizer of TICAD (Horiuchi: 473).

The TAA was intended to guide concrete policy implementation by African countries and their partners for African development toward the twenty-first century. Its message stresses resource mobilization with a pragmatic sense of urgency. As Horiuchi states:

TAAs proposes rules and strategies for African development under the African ownership… Although TAA proposes that the private sector should be allowed to do what it do better . . . The state is asked to take more positive actions in every area of activities . . . (Horiuchi: 473).

At TICAD II, Japan announced its willingness to extend more debt-relief grant aid. Thus, Japan increased the amount of debt-relief grants for yen loans up to the end of the 1997 fiscal year to five African countries. It extended its debt-relief grants to a total of 28 countries, among which 22 were among the “Least Developed Countries” and six were among the “Most Seriously Affected Countries” (www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999, accessed on June 25, 2009).

TICAD III took place in October 2003 in Tokyo with attendance of 23 African heads of the state; co-organized by the UN’s Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and the United Development Programme, with delegates from 89 countries and 47 regional and international organizations. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi insisted on three pillars, “human-centred development, poverty reduction through economic growth and the consolidation of peace.” The major agenda item was the discussion of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) by the international community (Harsch 2003:6). NEPAD is still a controversial program, as it emphasizes dependency syndrome.

At the TICAD-IV, Prime Minister Fukuda declared: “I pledge that by 2012-five years from now-Japan will have doubled its official development assistance (ODA) to Africa, increasing it gradually over these years.” At the same time, he indicated that his government would double its grant aid and technical cooperation for Africa (Tembo op.cit.).

TICAD V brought a new dimension that was not well articulated in other conferences, that is, about the place of women in African development. During the TICAD V in Yokohama on June 1-3, 2013, the thematic session on “Driving Development in Africa Through Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment” was well engaged. It was chaired and moderated by Helen Clark, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme. The conclusions of the panel were:

1. The rich body of evidence demonstrates how gender equality drives development;
2. Gender equality is a moral, rights and developmental issue; And
3. Promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women require the implementation of the commitments, as well as dedication of budgeting.

During the conference, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that, in addition to Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) of 14 billion dollars, Japan would also offer up to 32 billion dollars in public and private investments in support of Africa’s growth.

By and large, the TICAD process has taken a five-pronged approach: (1) promoting values of self-reliance and ownership of development within Africa; (2) projecting a positive
image of Africa’s progress to the external world; (3) promoting South–South Cooperation between Asia and Africa; and (4) mobilizing the international community to partner with Africa (Tembo, 2008, p. 1).

Concluding Remarks

Is the Japanese model of international cooperation in Africa challenging enough the old dominant liberal global unipolarity with its monopolistic tendencies? TICAD is not a principle. It is a strategy. Thus, it can be re-adjusted in order to respond to the new international cooperation’s needs more effectively.

Japan’s commitment for international cooperation through the TICADs with Africa is without any doubt strong. But its goals are too many and too diverse. Thus, their implementation requires a high level of mobilization of financial resources.

A large proportion of Japanese aid to Africa goes to infrastructure (e.g. road networks, electricity, telecommunications), water supply, health, food production, emergency relief, grassroots human security projects, education, support to Japanese NGOs and debt relief. Some assistance takes the form of technical cooperation or development studies (Tembo, 2008, p. 2).

One of the areas that Japan-Africa relations is expanding and needs more attention is education. Japan has developed exchanges programs with selected African educational institutions. In the past, it has focused on training of science teachers and building of some schools. Within Japan’s universities some special scholarships have been provided to bring African students to study in Japan. In Kansai University, the establishment of the Abe scholarship will create a solid group of African educated in Japan who will advocate the Japanese model of education in Africa.

In order for Japan to distinguish itself from other donors, the gender dimension should be considered vital. Japan has a stronger system of girls or women’s educational system among the industrial countries. It has more women’s colleges than the United States of America.

Japanese government through TICAD could develop the exchange programs at higher education level on science education in order to train and support women’s leadership that develops out leadership citizenry based on the right, responsibility, gender, knowledge and research (Luhahi 2015: 204).

Thus, Japan could make its model of international cooperation gender sensitive within the frame of decentralization and multiculturalism, which are part of multipolarity approach.

We think JICA through TICAD should promote multipolarity concept of power as articulated by both regional economic forces or global capitalism and pan-Africanism or cultural movements such as Ubuntu.

References


